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Automatic Attention to Aggression Cues and Alcohol Cues Using  
a Dichotic Listening Task and a Parafoveal Visual Task 
Michelle Edington LeVasseur 
ABSTRACT 
 Ongoing investigations of drunken aggression tend to focus on 1) situational cues, 
and 2) individual variables such as personality traits. This study investigated the 
hypothesis that an undergraduate’s attention would be pulled toward a nonconscious 
presentation of aggression stimuli, especially in the presence of alcohol cues, and 
especially if he or she was high on trait anger [as measured using the State Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory (STAXI); Spielberger, 1988] and had high expectancies for 
behaving aggressively while drinking alcohol [as measured using the Expectancy 
Questionnaire for Alcohol and Aggression – Lo Dose (EQAAL); Epps, Hunter, 
LeVasseur, Steinberg, & Hancock, unpublished manuscript].  
  Seventy-nine of the participants who completed questionnaires also completed 
one of the two computer tasks (adapted from John Bargh and associates) weeks later in 
either the Barroom or the Cleanroom. Attention to HiAggression words (as measured by 
reaction time or error rate difference scores) was significantly higher than attention to 
NonAggression words using the parafoveal visual task, with observed power at 1. No 
significant differences were found using the dichotic listening task. Additionally, there 
was a significant three-way interaction (Word Type X Setting X Angry Temperament) 
when participants where blocked according to high vs. low angry temperament scores. 
Follow-up analyses as well as regression analyses for the specific hypothesis provided 
mixed results. Individuals lower on angry temperament tended to demonstrate higher 
levels of attentional interference for aggression words, but only in the presence of alcohol 
cues. Conversely, individuals higher on angry temperament evidenced higher levels of 
attentional interference, but only in the absence of alcohol cues.  
 vii  
It appears that the relationships among these variables are by no means 
straightforward. Studies that include an opportunity to aggress behaviorally may shed 
more light on whether one’s level of attentional interference and self-reported personality 
traits can be combined to predict aggression in the presence of alcohol cues. The 
parafoveal visual task is recommended as the methodology of choice for these future 
studies.
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Introduction 
 Aggression represents a global health problem of enormous dimensions and 
involves behaviors such as homicide, suicide, domestic violence, and sexual violence 
(World Health Organization, WHO, 2001). WHO identified alcohol abuse as one of the 
primary individual risk factors for these types of aggression. Various data substantiate an 
alarming association between alcohol use and aggression. The U.S. Department of Justice 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (1997) reported that the following percentages of state 
prisoners were under the influence of alcohol at the time the offense was committed: 
murder - 45%, negligent manslaughter - 52%, assault - 45%, sexual assault – 40%, and 
robbery – 37%. Additionally, alcohol has been reported to be involved in about 70% of 
fatal automobile accidents, 88% of knifings, and 65% of spouse battering (Steele & 
Josephs, 1990). 
Consumption of alcohol appears to be associated with the severity of aggressive 
behavior. Koss (1988) investigated this hypothesize using a national college sample of 
nearly 3,000 men, some of whom were perpetrators of sexually aggressive crimes. Male 
perpetrators reported that alcohol or substance use was involved 74% of the time during 
rape, 67% of the time during attempted rape, 35% of the time during sexual coercion, and 
33% of the time during unwanted sexual contact (Koss, 1988 as cited in Testa, 2002). 
Although the majority of us do not become aggressive after consuming alcohol, the 
regrettable consequences of the interaction exact a heavy toll against our society, 
rendering the relationship between alcohol and aggression worthy of intense scrutiny.  
Ongoing investigations of this relationship attempt to identify variables that precipitate, 
mediate, or moderate drunken aggression, including 1) external socio-cultural or 
situational cues and 2) individual variables such as cognitions, mood, or personality 
traits. Researchers, governmental agencies, and various funding sources continue to 
invest extensive resources on research that will increase our understanding of this 
sometimes deleterious interaction. It is hoped that a more precise understanding of this 
interaction will facilitate the development of more effective intervention programs for 
those who drink and become aggressive. 
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Overview 
 The current study focused primarily with the cognitive aspects of the alcohol-
aggression relationship—attention to salient internal and external cues related to alcohol 
and aggression. More specifically, this study was designed to find out if a person’s 
attention is more likely to be pulled toward aggression stimuli, especially in the presence 
of alcohol cues and/or in the presence of high self-reported expectations for acting 
aggressive while consuming alcohol. To this end, a brief summary of the literature 
regarding aggression, selective attention theory, alcohol and cognition, and alcohol and 
aggression is provided below. This is followed by a description of two methods of 
presenting stimuli that hold promise for enhancing our understanding of the confluence of 
aggressive stimuli, alcohol cues and personality variables upon attention. Finally, the 
specific hypotheses and methodology for the current study are presented.  
Aggression 
Definitional Issues 
The definitions of the words violence and aggression are similar in their emphasis 
on the delivery of punishment to another organism. Of the two, “aggression” has been 
operationally defined with greater precision. Therefore, the term aggression will be used 
throughout this study.  
Many definitions of aggression have been offered in the literature. Baron’s (1977) 
definition of aggression is “any form of behavior directed toward the goal of harming or 
injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment” (p. 7). This 
definition excludes cases in which 1) hurtful behavior is intended to help another person 
and 2) is acceptable to the target (e.g., the harm received by a surgical or dental patient). 
It also implies that the essential feature of aggression is behavior that reflects intention to 
harm.  
Renfrew (1997) proposed that “aggression is a behavior that is directed by an 
organism toward a target, resulting in damage” (p. 6). Renfrew argued that this definition 
is broad enough to cover a wide range of aggressive situations such as aggression toward 
animals or objects, and self-injurious behaviors. However, the emphasis on “resulting in 
damage” excludes unsuccessful attempts to hurt the target. Also, for many researchers, 
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the impact of aggression toward animals or objects is not as interesting or relevant as 
aggression toward other people. 
Buss (1961) defined aggression as “a response that delivers noxious stimuli to 
another organism” (p. 1). This definition ignores intent or goal to cause damage or injury 
because Buss insisted that intent is unnecessary in the analysis of aggressive behavior. In 
his view,  “the relationship between reinforcement history of an aggressive response and 
the immediate situation eliciting the response” (p. 2) is the critical relationship because it 
is most likely to predict the occurrence and strength of aggressive responses. Buss’ 
definition fits well within a behavioral approach that circumvents unobservable 
cognitions such as intent. However, cognitions (e.g., intentions, expectancies, etc.), such 
as those implied by Baron’s definition, are central to an attentional approach, such as the 
one taken in this study.  
Intention to harm another person whether damage is caused or not, appears to be 
an important aspect of aggression. Therefore, Baron’s definition of aggression will serve 
as the backdrop for the following discussion of the origins of aggression. 
In addition to various definitional issues concerning aggression, researchers have 
struggled to distinguish among definitions of aggression, anger and hostility. One 
distinction recognizes that these terms are different facets of the same global construct: 
anger is the affective component; hostility is the complex cognitive, thought, or 
attitudinal component; and aggression is the behavioral component (e.g., Buss, 1961; 
Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, & Crane, 1983; Epps & Kendall, 1995). Unfortunately, 
some investigators continue to use anger, hostility and aggression interchangeably, 
contributing to ongoing definitional ambiguities. One method of minimizing this 
ambiguity has been to distinguish between angry or hostile aggression on the one hand 
and instrumental aggression on the other. These distinctions are generally made using 
Buss’s (1961) definitions. Buss characterized all aggressive responses as involving an 
interpersonal context and either being reinforced by the victim’s pain (which is 
considered angry/hostile aggression) or by extrinsic rewards (which is considered 
instrumental aggression). Angry or hostile aggression, then, is reinforced by the victim’s 
emotional suffering, physiological reaction, or physical injury, whereas with instrumental 
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aggression “the acquisition of some extrinsic reinforcer or the cessation of aversive 
stimuli are the crucial consequences, not the victim’s discomfort” (p. 3). 
 Recently, however, the dichotomy between hostile and instrumental aggression 
has come under attack. Bushman and Anderson (2001) recommended “pulling the plug” 
(p. 273) on this dichotomy claiming that it has outlived its usefulness. The authors made 
a cogent argument that too many acts of aggression serve multiple purposes and include 
both impulsive anger and a premeditated, instrumental component. For example, when a 
boy shoves his brother out of a bus seat his intention might be to get the seat for himself, 
to raise his power status in front of other students, to get revenge because his brother 
called him a name earlier, or a combination of all three. The relative influence of each 
type of aggression is often incalculable. In fact, Bushman and Anderson expressed 
appreciation for the past utility of the hostile vs. instrumental aggression dichotomy, but 
suggested that psychologists will realize future advances in the study of human 
aggression by utilizing a knowledge structure (information-processing) approach, which 
will be discussed shortly.  
Research related to the current study has centered on aggression that is performed 
concurrently with or secondary to anger arousal. While there may be an instrumental 
component to such aggression, the presence of anger arousal as a common theme makes 
it appropriate to focus primarily on literature related to angry aggression. However, 
instrumental aggression will be mentioned where appropriate. 
Salience or salient are concepts encountered frequently within the alcohol, 
aggression, and selective attention literature. Generally, stimuli (e.g., thoughts, attitudes, 
and environmental objects or events) are regarded as salient when they stand out and 
enter conscious thought more readily because their conditions of activation are more 
easily satisfied (Krech & Crutchfield, 1948). Higgins (1996) has provided convincing 
arguments that the common view of salience is better described by the concept of 
“accessibility” which he defined as the activation potential of available knowledge. These 
distinctions will be elaborated upon later (in the section on Selective Attention). 
However, in order to be concordant with the extant literature, the term salience will be 
used throughout the current study.  
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The Origins of Angry Aggression 
 To understand the variables that may be most fruitful for investigating the 
alcohol-aggression relationship, it is helpful to understand how angry aggression is 
assumed to develop. Many models have been proposed to explain the development of 
aggressive behavior including the original frustration-aggression hypothesis (Dollard, 
Miller, Doob, Mowrer & Sears, 1939), social learning theory (Bandura, 1973), a 
cognitive neo-associationistic conception (Berkowitz, 1990), two social information 
processing models (Huesmann, 1988; Crick and Dodge, 1994) and an explication of 
knowledge structures (Bushman and Anderson, 2001). Each of these models will be 
discussed briefly followed by a summary of the important themes. 
Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis. 
Originally aggression was theorized to result as a direct consequence of 
frustration brought on by an undesirable interruption (thwarting) of goal-directed 
behavior (Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). The theory specified that once 
frustration is experienced, the innate drive is to strike out at a target. If aggressive 
behavior is inhibited, the natural response toward aggression is thwarted and more 
frustration is produced. On the other hand, if aggression is exhibited, relief from the 
instigation to aggress occurs. This relief has been referred to as “aggression catharsis.” 
However, several studies have provided evidence against the cathartic effect. Under 
conditions in which one would be expected to produce less aggression (e.g., after already 
having the opportunity to aggress as investigated by Geen, Stonner, & Shope, 1975, or 
over time as investigated by Favata, LeVasseur, Koenig, Ciarcia, Epps, & Roberts, 2003), 
participants actually produce more aggression (Lewis and Bucher, 1990). 
The original frustration-aggression hypothesis also implied that frustration is 
always followed by aggression. However, participants who perceive their frustration as 
resulting from a legitimate reason are less likely to display aggression (Pastore, 1952; 
Cohen; 1955) Also, Bandura (1973) argued that awareness of likely punishers may cause 
a person’s aggressive response to be inhibited or even extinguished. Both of these 
arguments suggest a mediational effect of cognition regarding the frustrating event, an 
effect that is not addressed by the original model. Therefore, variables such as prior 
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learning (i.e., expectations) are likely to influence one’s interpretation of cues in the 
environment, mediating whether one considers an event to be frustrating in the first place, 
and whether a frustrating event even warrants an aggressive response.  
Both the lack of support for aggression catharsis and research indicating that 
frustration is not always followed by aggression cast doubt upon the tenability of the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis to explain the origins of aggression. Models of learning 
were instrumental in increasing our understanding of how aggression develops. 
Social Learning Theory. 
Social learning theory, as explicated by Bandura (1973), was the next notable 
model to describe the origins of aggression. Unlike the frustration-aggression hypothesis, 
social learning theory views frustration as merely one example of an emotional state that 
can lead to aggression. Here aggression is considered to result from learning—learning in 
a social context which feelings to label as “anger” and which behaviors are likely to 
punish another person or lead to reinforcers.  
According to Bandura (1973), aggressive behavior sequences are learned via 
direct experience or observation. Through direct experience, a child may learn by 
interacting with others behaviors for which he or she is likely to be punished or rewarded. 
The frequency of aggressive behavior will be a direct function of how often the behavior 
was rewarded or punished as it was being learned. Through observation, a child may 
learn which behaviors exhibited by influential others (such as role-models) generate 
reward or punishment. Once an individual uses the modeled behavioral sequence and it is 
rewarded, this will increase the likelihood that the behavior will be repeated. Conversely, 
punishment for using the behavioral sequence will result in its extinction. Whether the 
behavior originated through vicarious learning or direct experience, after more successes 
than failures in obtaining the desired results, the behavioral sequence (e.g., aggression) 
will become part of that individual’s repertoire for controlling his or her environment. 
It is tenable that frustration gives rise to a variety of negative emotions which may 
instigate the drive to aggress (as in the original frustration-aggression hypothesis). It has 
also been suggested that the experience of negative affect, in general, produces emotional 
arousal (Sandoval, 1997). When this arousal is paired with the right reinforcement 
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contingencies, aggression is produced. However, Bandura believed emotional arousal is 
not even necessary in the production of aggression (Sandoval, 1997). Awareness that an 
event is aversive may lead directly to aggression if the reinforcement contingencies are 
sufficiently rewarding.  
Although social learning theory began to specify the role of emotional arousal in 
the mediation of aggressive behaviors, it did not address the role of cognition in the 
mediation of these behaviors (Sandoval, 1997). Bandura (1973) suggested that one’s 
cognitive representations of reinforcement contingencies would mediate the interaction 
between behaviors and the environment. The more specific processes of cognition, such 
as how an individual assesses a situation and selects an appropriate response, were left to 
be explicated by information processing theorists (discussed later). But prior to this, 
negative affect was elegantly incorporated into a new model by Berkowitz (1983). 
Cognitive Neo-Associationism. 
In Berkowitz’s modification of the original frustration-aggression hypothesis, 
negative affect arising from a range of aversive conditions is considered the basic source 
of anger and angry aggression (1983, 1989, 1990). Berkowitz continued to expand this 
model and suggested that aversive conditions produce both flight and fight tendencies 
(1993). He considered these tendencies to be networks of associatively linked 
physiological, motoric, and cognitive components (Berkowitz, 1998) and suggested that 
the associative linkage is relatively primitive, automatic, and can occur in the absence of 
reportable cognitions. A variety of factors—genetic, learned, and situational—influence 
which of the flight or fight networks are most strongly activated. If fight networks are 
activated, these factors (e.g., situational) will also influence whether the aggressive 
response is inhibited or exhibited.  
One situational factor of interest for the current study was attentional focus. 
Berkowitz found in a series of studies (Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990) that when attention 
is focused upon one’s negative affect, emotional self-regulation is promoted, the link 
between negative affect and hostility (e.g., negative judgments about others) is 
diminished, and aggression is inhibited. However, not all evidence supports an inhibiting 
effect of attentional focus. Berkowitz (1998) reported that “highly aroused people are apt 
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to focus on the main features of the situation confronting them to the neglect of matters 
that are relatively peripheral…. Thus, persons who are emotionally aroused because of an 
aversive event might well focus their attention narrowly on those they blame for the 
unpleasant occurrence” (p. 68), disregarding inhibiting cues such as possible punishment. 
Berkowitz’ speculation parallels the theory of alcohol myopia which asserts that the 
range of attentional focus may be restricted after the consumption of alcohol, increasing 
the likelihood of aggression during volatile situations (Steele & Josephs, 1990). 
Regardless of whether attentional focus is eventually concluded to inhibit or increase the 
likelihood of an aggressive response, it is reasonable to assume that attentional focus is 
an important moderating variable. 
In some cases, those who are highly aroused or have overlearned aggressive 
responses to certain situations (to the point of automaticity), may go from anger (an 
affect) directly to aggression (a behavior), without any reportable intervening cognitions 
(Berkowitz, 1990). However, once individuals engage in a higher order level of cognitive 
processing, “they consider the perceived causes of their arousal, the possible 
consequences of any action they might undertake, the goals they would like to attain, and 
also what sensation they are feeling and what ideas and memories have just occurred to 
them” (Berkowitz, 1990, p. 497). This indicates that processes (e.g., appraisals of rules 
and consequences, and attributions) not used in its production can mediate aggression. 
Further, this implies that understanding which types of internal and external cues render 
behavioral responses more automatic, and understanding which types of cues facilitate 
higher order cognitive processing, are worthy goals of aggression research. 
Berkowitz’s (1990) cognitive-neoassociationistic conception of anger and 
aggression improves upon prior models by offering a cognitive bridge between negative 
affect and aggression. The strength of his model is that it accounts for the original 
evidence linking frustration to aggression while also linking a variety of aversive events 
(pain, extreme temperatures, noxious odors, stress, provocation, or viewing disgusting or 
aggressive images) to negative affect, which then leads to aggression, sometimes 
depending upon the outcome of higher level cognitive processing and sometimes 
independently of those processes (for research related to aversive events the interested 
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reader is referred to Berkowitz, 1983, 1989; Anderson, 1989; Hearold, 1986; Liebert & 
Spratkin, 1988; and, Geen 1998). One limitation of Berkowitz’s model is that it does not 
address what causes the higher order cognitive processing or how the appraisals and 
attributions control reactions to the aversive events. Fortunately, the task of explaining 
the origins and consequences of cognitive processing has been undertaken by information 
processing theorists.  
Social Information Processing Models. 
In information processing theories, a schema is a representation in memory about 
a general set of facts, and how these facts are related (Medin, 2001). A script is a type of 
schema that contains information about sequences of ordered actions that occur in a 
stereotyped situation. Scripts help us understand events and make predictions about 
future events (Medin, 2001). Scripts are learned and augmented by children (and adults 
as well) through vicarious and direct social experience and are accessed in order to 
interpret the social environment and guide behavior.  
According to Huesmann’s (1988) information processing model of childhood 
aggression, the conditions most conducive to the learning of aggressive scripts appear to 
be those in which the child is reinforced for displaying aggression, often observes 
aggression, and is the object of aggression (Eron, 1994). Salient environmental cues will 
then activate those aggressive scripts.  Salience is affected by one’s familiarity with those 
cues as well as one’s current emotional state (Sandoval, 1997). Once the relevant script is 
activated, the child evaluates 1) the appropriateness of the script with regards to 
internalized social norms, and 2) the likelihood that the script will obtain the desired 
results (Eron, 1994). Aggression is more likely to occur when salient cues activate an 
aggressive script, when the script has been repeatedly associated with the perception of a 
desired result (e.g., injury to another or a reward), and when the child feels confident that 
he or she can enact the activated script (Huesmann, 1988). Conversely, if salient, 
activating cues are not present, if there is a perception of negative results such as 
punishment, or if the child lacks self-confidence in enacting the script, aggression is less 
likely.  
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More recently, Huesmann and his colleagues (Guerra, Nucci, & Huesmann, 1994) 
proposed that aggressive actions are directed by “moral judgment” memory systems or 
knowledge structures.  Guerra, et al. (1994) suggested that which knowledge structures 
direct aggressive actions depends upon several factors including 1) an individual’s 
evaluative beliefs (i.e., right or wrong) and informational beliefs (i.e., potential 
consequences), 2) salience of situational cues (e.g., cues that focus attention on a 
particular aspect of a situation and activate relevant moral judgments), and 3) interpretive 
biases that influence whether the cue is perceived at all or distorted upon perception. 
They offered two sources of interpretive biases: interpersonal factors (e.g., mood states, 
personality, and attributional style) and sociocultural influences (e.g., family and peers, 
and social contexts such as school and religion). They also suggested that judgments 
become routinized, leading to behaviors that appear insensitive to the unique features of a 
given situation. That is, the behaviors become relatively automatic as a result of the 
moral judgment knowledge structures. It seems reasonable to conclude that automatic 
moral judgments and often-used or well-rehearsed behavioral scripts may represent an 
unfavorable combination in the production of aggression. 
A major strength of information processing theories is that they can be used to 
describe how aggressive behavioral scripts become represented in memory (Sandoval, 
1997). Early on, direct and observational learning facilitate the creation of knowledge 
structures (to be discussed in greater detail later) that link social cues to aggressive 
responses. These primitive structures are elaborated upon over time. When a child 
encounters a social problem, attention is directed toward the most salient cues (internal 
cues such as emotional state or external cues in the environment) and a comparison is 
made with scripts already in memory. Salient cues that are most similar to those present 
when the script was first encoded will increase the probability that the previous script will 
be retrieved. The retrieved behavioral script will then be evaluated for its appropriateness 
in the current situation.  
Huesmann (1988) capitalized on an information processing approach to account 
for how a behavioral sequence is maintained in memory once it is encoded. He postulated 
that rehearsal is the primary method by which the behavioral sequence is maintained in 
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memory for later accessibility. Rehearsal includes such behaviors as recalling the original 
script, fantasizing, or role-playing. 
Another social information processing theory (Dodge, Pettit, McClaskey, & 
Brown, 1986) also postulated aggression as a function of a child’s processing of 
environmental cues  (external and internal) in social situations (Sandoval, 1997). The 
Dodge et al. paradigm is noteworthy for its elaboration of how scripts are developed and 
activated. A variety of labels have been applied to what were originally described as the 
five sequential steps undertaken for skillful social information processing. In general, 
these five steps consist of 1) cue encoding, 2) cue interpretation, 3) response generation, 
4) response decision, and 5) response enactment (Dodge & Crick, 1990).  
More specifically, in the first step of Dodge and Crick’s model, relevant cues are 
selected from the environment. Attention to particular cues (e.g., a person, a situation, or 
an object in the environment) is mediated and moderated by heuristic rules and cognitive 
schemata that have developed over time.  During the second step, cues are mentally 
represented in long-term memory and given meaning. Meaning is related to one’s past 
experience with that particular person, situation, or object, as well as one’s past 
experience with those general types of stimuli. The third step involves accessing possible 
behavioral responses to the cues through associative networks of related long-term 
information. Behavioral responses that have been accessed recently or frequently over 
time, may be quickly accessed and appear to be relatively automatic. However, the 
evaluation of that response’s probability of achieving a certain outcome or be skillfully 
enacted (carried out in the fourth step), may lead to an inhibition of the selected response. 
Whichever response is chosen, during the final step the selected response is enacted using 
information from relevant scripts “to transform the selected response into verbal and 
motor behaviors” (p. 14).  Monitoring of the response’s effectiveness for achieving a 
particular outcome leads to further encoding of social cues, which is hypothesized to alter 
the response or start the sequence of social information processing all over again (Dodge 
& Crick, 1990). 
Crick and Dodge reformulated their model in 1994 and proposed that the 
processing steps are not executed in a sequential fashion and numerous cycles through 
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the steps (possibly in a different order each time) may be performed depending on 
environmental cues, such as social exchanges with others. Thus, the steps are viewed as 
more cyclical and transactional than linear or sequential as others become involved in the 
enactment of a script or other cues become more salient.  
Skillful execution of these cycles is considered necessary for competent 
behavioral responding, whereas failure at any point may lead to inappropriate behaviors 
such as aggression. Empirical studies have provided some evidence that children’s 
aggressive behaviors are related to biased or deficient processing during any cycle. 
Reviews of the research related to the specific “steps” can be found in Sandoval (1997). 
A review of the evidence for interventions based on the social information processing 
models discussed above can be found in Huesmann and Reynolds (2001).  
Both of the social information processing models emphasize the impact of 
information in memory on the perception of new information.  That is, a child’s existing 
memories of situations and possible behavioral responses will influence which cues in a 
new situation are attended to and encoded (Sandoval, 1997).  For example, a cue that has 
preceded punishment in the past may be especially salient for the child, and may inhibit 
an aggressive response. Both models also assume that if an aggressive behavioral script 
seems appropriate for the goal of hurting the victim or obtaining an extrinsic reward, an 
aggressive act will be chosen as the suitable response. In addition to describing how an 
aggressive response may be selected, both models imply that inefficient processing of 
social cues can produce inappropriate responses such as aggression.  
Knowledge Structures and Network Models. 
The above theories imply that there is an automatic nature to the cognitive 
elements of aggression. Bushman and Anderson (2001) relied heavily upon the 
assumption of automaticity to describe how aggression develops and used the construct 
of knowledge structures as a framework for appreciating the relevance of automaticity. 
First of all, they describe knowledge structures as organized networks of interrelated 
information (both schemas and scripts) that result from frequent activation of bits of 
related information (p. 276-277). Knowledge structures are compiled and augmented 
during childhood in order to guide behavior. They are activated by external cues 
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(environmental) and by internal cues (e.g., emotional arousal and goal attainment). In 
turn, some cues become more salient than others. The most salient cue(s) will prime 
relevant schemas or activate relevant scripts, which will then influence which behavioral 
response is finally chosen. “The person first selects a script to represent the situation and 
then assumes a role in the script” (p. 277). Knowledge structures that are accessed with 
greater frequency will become overlearned and hence automatic, exerting a fast and 
efficient influence on incoming information and the behavioral response that is selected. 
That is, once a behavioral sequence becomes activated, it is more likely to be carried out 
whether the person is aware of a decision to act a certain way or not.  
Salient cues are assumed to activate knowledge structures, which serve to bias 
some internal and external stimuli. Although salience of stimuli is difficult to establish a 
priori, research with children shows some progress. In one study (Dodge & Tomlin, 
1987), groups of aggressive and nonaggressive children were to interpret the intentions of 
a provocateur in a hypothetical situation. Aggressive children were more likely than 
nonaggressive children to base their interpretations on schemata rather than information 
presented in a story. That is, aggressive children were more likely than their 
nonaggressive peers to rely upon previous experience rather than immediate social cues. 
In another study (Gouze, 1987), aggressive participants were more likely than their 
nonaggressive peers to focus their attention on aggressive social interactions in the 
environment. They also provided more aggressive solutions to hypothetical interpersonal 
conflict situations. This finding suggests that aggressive children may pay greater 
attention to aggressive cues in social situations—presumably because these cues are self-
relevant.  
Another study of children (Rabiner, Lenhart, and Lochman, 1990) provided some 
evidence for the role of automaticity. Children were given the task of solving a social 
problem under conditions that elicited reflective processing or under conditions that 
elicited automatic processing. Socially maladjusted children had difficulty processing 
social information adequately only under automatic conditions. Crick and Dodge (1994) 
suggested that most studies were not designed to evaluate processing deficits under 
automatic responding conditions. They also suggested that techniques that measure 
  14
response time and evaluate priming effects would be valuable for future research on 
automatic processes.  
A major advantage of the knowledge structure approach is that it avoids 
confounding the hostile-instrumental aggression dichotomy with the automatic-controlled 
information processing distinction (Bushman and Anderson, 2001). As Bushman and 
Anderson noted, “hostile aggression is, by definition, automatic—it is unreasoned, 
impulsive, uncontrollable, and spontaneous. By contrast, instrumental aggression is, by 
definition, controlled—it is reasoned, calculated, and premeditated” (p. 276). The 
confound exists because both complex decisions and affect-laden decisions can be made 
automatically or with careful thought. Bushman and Anderson argued that the knowledge 
structure approach suggests that the more frequently a knowledge structure is activated, 
the more automatic it becomes, regardless of whether it originated from impulsive anger 
or calculated, conscious intent. Additionally, assuming that hostile and instrumental 
forms of aggression are dichotomous presumes that these knowledge structures are 
somehow separate in the brain, when it seems more plausible that they interact or are part 
of the same knowledge structure. The knowledge structure approach facilitates the 
investigation of conditions that mediate or moderate aggression and avoids reliance upon 
distinctions that create more ambiguity and questions than clarity and answers. 
Knowledge structures are conceptually similar to neural network models, 
especially major network models of semantic memory (Bushman and Anderson, 2001). 
Neural network models are considered to be analogous to the structure and function of 
neurons in the brain. Over the last six decades, neural network models have been revised 
and extended to a variety of research domains including computer science, economics 
and finance, and psychology. Within psychology, Anderson’s latest revision of his 
adaptive control of thought model (ACT-R) represents an attempt to describe a variety of 
phenomena and data related to memory and learning (Medin, 2001). According to the 
ACT-R model, as information is processed in working memory, networks of nodes 
(concepts) are activated. Activation then spreads to neighboring concepts through links in 
the network—a process called spreading activation. Activation of any one node “is a 
function of both the number of activated concepts it is linked to and also the strength of 
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the links to those nodes” (Medin, 2001, p. 224). The strength of a link is directly related 
to how frequently that link is used. However, even if the link is strong, activation 
dissipates from node to node and activation of a particular node may disappear altogether 
(fall out of working memory) as neighboring nodes become less active.  
The ACT-R model provides a reasonable hypothesis for how information is 
brought to bear in a situation. First, external and internal cues that are salient for an 
individual will become activated in working memory. Then, related information (which is 
most likely to be information that was related to it in the past, Medin, 2001) will be 
activated through spreading activation. Concepts (or behavioral scripts) with the most 
activation (i.e., that have been most frequently used) will influence which behavioral 
response is selected.  
In many ways the knowledge structures approach is similar to the ACT-R model. 
Aggression cues or stimuli that are salient for an individual will activate aggression-
related knowledge structures or networks. If an individual has often enacted aggressive 
behavioral scripts in the past, he or she is more likely to enact them in the future, 
compared to other individuals who have been less aggressive. It follows, then, that 
measuring trait anger of an individual may offer some predictive utility in determining 
whether someone is more likely to aggress as compared to others. Although the current 
study will investigate two methodologies for predicting aggression cue activation related 
to trait anger, studies that use one of these methodologies and give participants 
opportunities to aggress would be needed to test this last assumption. 
Assumptions Generated from Models of Aggression 
Like definitions of aggression, models of aggression have evolved and have 
successfully accounted for instrumental and angry aggression, the effect of a variety of 
aversive events on subsequent aggression, and the initiation and maintenance of 
aggressive behaviors. Several testable assumptions have emerged from these models. One 
is that negative emotional reactions (such as frustration or anger) or goal-attainment, or 
both together, when paired with the right reinforcement contingencies, will produce 
aggression. Another assumption is that engaging in complex thinking will reduce 
aggression. Conversely, factors that limit or interfere with complex thinking are assumed 
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to increase aggression. These factors include 1) automaticity, 2) distraction, which 
promotes superficial processing of relevant social information, 3) individual differences 
in social reasoning ability, which may be due to poor role models, or inconsistent rewards 
or punishments for aggressive behavior; 4) individual differences on a variety of 
personality dimensions, such as impulsivity and trait aggression, 5) intense emotions, 
which have been shown to interfere with the processing of incoming information, and 6) 
anything that would interfere with one’s capacity to process a wide range of cues, 
including alcohol consumption (Smith & Mackie, 2000). Some of these factors can be 
manipulated (e.g., distraction) while others can be measured (e.g., trait aggression). 
Another assumption generated by aggression models is the reciprocal nature by 
which salient cues and existing networks of social information (knowledge structures) 
interact to produce behavior. Cues that are salient for an individual will activate 
knowledge structures, which will in turn guide behavior. Conversely, existing knowledge 
structures will bias individuals toward some social cues, especially those that are self-
relevant, while other cues are disregarded or ignored. That is, existing knowledge 
structures will differentially influence the processing of available information. 
Determining which cues someone is likely to attend to, whether attention is intentionally 
focused or not, may help us predict behavior a priori. Methods that help clarify the 
relationship between knowledge structure activation and aggressive behavior and can 
produce automatic effects may also increase our understanding of the alcohol-aggression 
relationship.  
Selective Attention 
In order to investigate assumptions related to cognitive mediators of aggression, it 
is important to consider what is known about selective attention and automaticity. There 
is no universally accepted definition of attention in the psychological literature. It has 
been viewed as mental effort, concentration, focalization, or selective processing. 
Although there is considerable overlap among these concepts, attention appears to 
represent a variety of situations/processes. Johnston and Dark (1986) in their review of 
the literature, defined selective attention as “the differential processing of simultaneous 
sources of information” (p. 44). Although they did not define “processing,” it may be 
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regarded as the series of steps, sequential or simultaneous, taken to detect and analyze a 
stimulus and to decide upon a course of action based upon that analysis. Johnston and 
Dark further specified that simultaneous sources of information consist of internal events 
(memory and knowledge) and external events (environmental objects and situations) and 
that the information is analyzed perceptually, semantically, or both. Selective attention, 
then, implies that we select some information for further processing (because it is 
relevant in some way) while ignoring or filtering out other information (because it is 
irrelevant). 
Salience vs. Accessibility 
Salience is another concept that has been defined in various ways throughout the 
literature on selective attention and knowledge activation. As discussed earlier, salient 
stimuli have been viewed as those that stand out and enter thought more readily because 
their conditions of activation are more easily satisfied (Krech & Crutchfield, 1948). 
Others use the concept of salience to describe anything that commands one’s attention 
(see Higgins, 1996). However, this view implies that any variable that influences 
attention is salient. Many other factors clearly influence which stimuli we attend to (such 
as effort, the difficulty of the current task, alertness, mood, etc.). Furthermore, such a 
broad definition does not allow distinctions to be made between salience and selective 
attention, salience and accessibility, or salience and knowledge activation (Higgins, 
1996). 
Higgins (1996) argued that salience is more appropriately viewed as “something 
about a stimulus event that occurs on exposure, without a prior set for a particular kind of 
stimulus, that draws attention selectively to a specific aspect of the event” (p. 135). 
Higgins further restricts salience to the properties of the stimulus event only, which may 
include features of the particular stimulus, properties of the immediate context in which 
the stimulus appears, and the relations among these properties. That is, a stimulus can be 
considered salient because of something about its absolute properties or because of 
something about its properties relative to those of other objects in the immediate 
situation.  
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Higgins’ (1996) definition of salience does not include properties of the perceiver, 
such as expectancies or goals. These properties fall under the rubric of accessibility, 
which Higgins defined as the activation potential of available knowledge. However, 
salience and accessibility can interact to increase the likelihood that knowledge structures 
will be activated (p. 134). That is, the perceptual system is biased toward some internal or 
external stimuli because of 1) prior experience with that stimuli, 2) chronic or habitual 
expectancies or attitudes that have developed over time, and 3) recent thought or 
experience. Any of these biases may render one stimulus property as more distinctive 
when compared to nonbiased stimuli or stimulus properties that are available for further 
processing. Even for stimulus information that is impoverished, vaguely related, or fits 
into other knowledge categories better, its activation in the perceptual system will be 
easier and swifter than other cues. Thus, nonbiased stimuli that would normally serve to 
guide one’s behavior in a social situation may be minimally or not at all processed  
(Bruner, 1957a, 1957b as cited in Higgins, 1996).  
Although the above distinctions between salience and accessibility are important 
for future research intended to parse apart their relative effects on knowledge structure 
activation, the earlier definition of salience is still in common use. It is expected that 
Higgins’ concise treatise on knowledge activation will facilitate an associated precision 
in future research endeavors. For the current study, stimuli that are considered salient are 
best viewed as those stimuli that have higher potential to activate knowledge structures. 
However, the term salient will continue to be used instead of accessibility.  
Early vs. Late Selection 
The idea that information is differentially attended has been well accepted by 
researchers.  However, agreeing upon the precise point at which salient information 
becomes selected for further analysis has been the basis of the decades-long early 
selection versus late selection debate (see Pashler, 1998 for a review). Briefly, Johnston 
and Dark (1986) summarized the debate as to whether selection of stimuli for further 
processing takes place after sensory analysis but before semantic analysis, or if it always 
takes place after semantic analysis. In support for early selection they concluded, 
“selection based on sensory cues is usually superior to selection based on semantic cues” 
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(p. 48). However, they also recognized that early selection of relevant stimuli assumes 
early rejection of irrelevant stimuli. This assumption does not seem tenable since 
considerable evidence exists that irrelevant stimuli sometimes undergo semantic analysis 
(e.g., see Lewis, 1970; Treisman, 1960; MacKay, 1973; Corteen & Wood, 1972; and, 
Moray, 1959). Thus, the evidence supports both early and late selection models.  
Automatic vs. Controlled Attention 
 Within selective attention a distinction was proposed to more fully explicate how 
environmental stimuli are chosen for further analysis. One way is via controlled attention, 
which has been described as a conscious, active, voluntary, effortful, flexible, or 
intentional cognitive process. The other way is via automatic attention, or automaticity, 
which has been described as a nonconscious, passive, involuntary, effortless, or 
unintentional cognitive process (see Bargh, 1992 and Johnston & Dark, 1986 for reviews 
of controlled and automatic attention).   
Bargh (1992) described controlled attention as flexible but resource-limited. That 
is, controlled attention is a resource that can be allocated toward a task. The degree to 
which a stimulus is processed relates directly to how much attention is directed toward 
that stimulus, which in turn relates to how demanding the associated task is. Bargh’s 
description mirrors that of capacity models. According to capacity theories, simple tasks 
do not interfere with each other. However, a difficult (or resource-demanding) task 
interferes with the processing of a simpler task. There are also multiple resource theories 
(as discussed in Medin, Ross, & Markman, 2001), which suggest that there are multiple 
pools of attentional resources that can be allocated to various tasks. The degree to which 
two tasks interfere with each other depends on the degree of overlap between the resource 
pools. For example, the resource pool for auditory tasks should not be the same as the 
resource pool for visual tasks. Therefore, attention could be directed toward auditory and 
visual tasks at the same time with minimal interference. 
Johnston and Dark (1986) reviewed studies that investigated spatial attention and 
likened spatial attention to an attentional spotlight with an adjustable beam. However, 
adjustment capabilities are limited. The beam can be adjusted to include information 
directly outside of the foveal region (the parafoveal region), but the processing of 
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information is most efficient for stimuli within the attentional spotlight (i.e., aligned with 
the center of the fovea and directed toward specific regions of space). The beam of the 
attentional spotlight can be adjusted in order to complete a task and can even be “split.” 
For stimuli outside of the spotlight, processing is most likely (albeit minimal) for 
nonsemantic stimuli but still at a considerable cost to processing speed and accuracy. 
Regarding semantic information that is presented visually, nonattended information that 
is more than about 3º from the visual angle of attended stimuli is unlikely to be processed 
(Rayner, 1978). For information that is presented aurally, nonattended information is 
intrusive when it is relevant. For example, in dichotic listening tasks, controlled attention 
to one channel can be interrupted by information in the other channel if the nonattended 
information conforms to active schema (i.e., is self-relevant).   
This tendency to be attracted toward information that is not being directly 
attended but is self-relevant is described by the other selection process, the automatic 
process (Bargh, 1992). This process directs one’s attention to environmental stimuli 
without conscious intent. In the strictest sense, a process is regarded as automatic if it 
requires no cognitive resources to initiate it (i.e., attention is not intentionally focused) 
and if the process runs to completion once it has begun. One possible cause of the 
automatic process is top-down processing, which refers to the effect that old information 
(i.e., internal representations or expectations about the stimuli) has on the selection of 
new information. According to Broadbent (as cited in Johnston & Dark, 1986), as an 
individual learns associations among stimuli, the individual develops internal biases 
toward those stimuli. Therefore, even if stimuli are not relevant for a particular task, 
those stimuli may be relevant to the individual. These biases direct attention away from 
the stimuli that should be processed quickly and accurately for successful execution of a 
given task. 
Johnston and Dark (1986) presented results from studies on the intrusiveness of 
irrelevant (nonattended) stimuli and concluded that selective attention can be guided by 
active schemata and that this process can be controlled or automatic. Selective attention is 
more likely to be categorized as controlled when the stimuli are purposefully attended to, 
but categorized as automatic when the stimuli are attended to because of an internal bias. 
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The internal bias may exist because schemata have been primed (activated) by recent 
thought or experience, or because those stimuli are self-relevant (chronically accessible) 
to the individual.    
Bargh (1992) came to a similar conclusion but assigned this internal bias to one of 
two types of automaticity: preconscious or postconscious.  Preconscious automaticity 
refers to the nonconscious selection of stimuli based upon stereotypical constructs held 
by the individual (i.e., chronic expectancies assembled over years of interacting with the 
environment). That is, stimuli are processed based upon their mere presence. 
Postconscious automaticity, on the other hand, is essentially the same except that the 
nonconscious selection of stimuli is based upon constructs, expectancies, or schemata 
that have been primed (preactivated ) by recent conscious thought or experience. That is, 
the stimuli would not be salient, or processed, based on their mere presence except that 
they have been recently activated in memory. The recent activation results in a lower 
threshold of accessibility for those stimuli. 
Priming, in a research context, generally refers to procedures that activate 
knowledge structures. Priming can occur at any level of stimulus analysis (Rabbitt & 
Vyas, 1979 as cited in Johnston & Dark, 1986), ranging from low-level sensory analysis 
(e.g., find something green) to high-level semantic analysis (e.g., presenting the test word 
BREAD speeds up the recognition of the test word BUTTER). Considerable evidence for 
priming effects led Johnston and Dark (1986) to propose that the processing of low-level 
sensory or high-level semantic information can be primed toward sensory characteristics 
of stimuli (e.g., auditory vs. visual), toward identity of stimuli (i.e., physical codes in 
memory), toward semantic representations of stimuli (e.g. word meaning and synonyms), 
and toward schematic representations of stimuli (e.g., knowledge structures). Thus, “all 
levels of stimulus analysis can be biased simultaneously toward the characteristics of 
most of the relevant stimuli and some of the irrelevant stimuli. In some instances, these 
biases can be sufficiently strong that attention to the relevant or irrelevant stimuli appears 
to be automatic” (p. 65). 
The interaction between controlled attention and automatic attention, and the 
effect of preconscious automaticity were elegantly investigated by Bargh (1982). He 
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demonstrated that even when one is intentionally focusing on stimuli related to a primary 
task, stimuli that are unattended (and considered irrelevant to the primary task) can pull 
one’s attention away from the relevant stimuli. In a focused-attention dichotic listening 
task participants were directed to attend to and shadow (repeat) the stimuli presented to 
one ear and to ignore the stimuli presented to the other ear. Bargh manipulated the 
relevance of stimuli by measuring participant levels on particular personality traits and 
then presenting traits that the participants were high on to either the attended or 
unattended channel. For example, a person that self-reported a high level of independence 
was presented with words like assertive and nonconformist to either the attended or 
unattended channel. Bargh hypothesized that self-relevant stimuli in the attended channel 
would facilitate attention (i.e., the stimuli would require less attentional effort) but that 
self-relevant information in the ignored channel would inhibit attention to the attended 
channel (i.e., the stimuli would require more attentional effort for the participants to stay 
focused). Although the participants demonstrated no awareness of the words in the 
unattended ear (as judged later by a momentary awareness test) the self-relevant words 
facilitated attention if they were in the attended channel and inhibited attention if they 
were in the unattended channel. Thus, according to Bargh (1982), automatic processes 
can either facilitate or inhibit the control process, requiring either more or less attentional 
effort depending on the self relevance of the stimuli that is presented.  
Bargh (1992) also proposed that primed constructs, while they remain active in 
memory, are equivalent to the effects of preconscious automaticity on the selection of 
stimuli from the environment. In fact, Bargh (1996) claimed that “pre- and postconscious 
automaticity are functionally identical and the processing effects are the same; the only 
difference is in how the necessary level of accessibility is achieved (i.e., via chronic or 
temporary means)” (p. 174).  Therefore, it is important for researchers to consider the 
biases that are created by primed constructs as they design their studies. In order to rule 
out the possibility of postconscious automaticity in his experiment, Bargh (1982) was 
careful to measure personality traits a month before the dichotic listening task was given. 
He was then more confident in his conclusion that attention to the contents of the 
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unattended channel reflected a preconscious automatic process because those items 
tapped chronic expectancies.  
After reviewing a plethora of studies related to central constructs and assumptions 
of selective attention, Johnston and Dark (1986) derived a set of empirical generalizations 
(eleven to be exact; several of which have been presented here) to explain attentional 
phenomena. They concluded that theories that view selective attention as the natural 
priming effects of prior processing on subsequent processing are able to accommodate all 
eleven empirical generalizations with relative ease. In addition, the view of selective 
attention as an effect of chronically active schemata precludes any reliance upon an 
active mental agent (or homunculus) to describe how stimuli are selected from the 
environment. This view of attention as a by-product of one’s prior experience with 
stimuli is the view taken for the purposes of the current study. This view and the 
associated methods used for this area of research (notably dichotic listening tasks and 
parafoveal vision tasks, to be discussed next) provide a framework for investigating the 
activation of aggression-related knowledge structures and their effect upon the selection 
of information from the environment. Ultimately, one of these methods may provide an 
index of knowledge structure strength that is independent of self-report.  
Dichotic Listening Tasks for the Measurement of Attention 
Dichotic listening is a procedure that was originally developed by Broadbent in 
1954 to study the impact of receiving multiple flight bearings, at the same time, on traffic 
controllers’ attention (Bryden, 1988). Since then the basic procedure has been used for 
studying short-term memory, lateralization and ear advantage. Dichotic listening tasks 
were also essential in increasing our understanding of how people are able to focus their 
attention on one stimulus, but automatically attend to another stimulus that is particularly 
relevant for them (e.g., the cocktail party phenomenon). Research using the dichotic 
listening task spawned evidence for both early selection (e.g., Treisman & Geffen 1967) 
and late selection theories (e.g., MacKay, 1973; Corteen & Wood, 1972; and Moray, 
1959; and, Lewis, 1970) and the procedure continues to be used to explore the sequential 
and simultaneous processing of information.  
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The basic procedure has been adapted in several ways and more recently has 
proliferated into a variety of psychological contexts such as attention and depression 
(Ingram, Bernet, & McLaughlin, 1994), attention and schizophrenia (Hugdahl, Rund, 
Lund, Asbjornsen, Egeland, Landro, Roness, Stordal, & Sundet, 2003), and attention and 
psychopathy (Hare & Leslie, 1984). In the study of information processing, the procedure 
has been used to understand when selection of stimuli takes place for further processing 
and whether selective attention can be guided by active schemata (Johnston & Dark, 
1986). More recently, dichotic listening tasks have been used in electrophysiological 
studies to investigate the influence of attended and unattended auditory stimuli on event-
related potentials in the brain (e.g., Bentin, Kutas, & Hillyard, 1995; and Holcomb, & 
Neville, 1990).  
 The general procedure for dichotic listening tasks is to present verbal stimuli or 
nonverbal stimuli (e.g., tones, car horns, flushing toilets or music) to the left auditory 
channel, the right channel, or both at the same time. Instructions to attend to one channel 
while ignoring the other are given in focused attention tasks. Bryden (1988) reported that 
the right ear (which activates the left auditory cortex) processes verbal stimuli more 
quickly and the left ear (which involves the right auditory cortex) processes nonverbal 
stimuli more quickly. However, there are inconsistencies across studies as well as 
variability among study participants. Thus, when lateralization effects are not under 
investigation, it is prudent to balance presentation of stimuli between the left and right ear 
by balancing the number of participants that are instructed to focus on each channel. 
Results from dichotic listening tasks have also revealed that stimuli that are presented to 
the unattended channel are more easily ignored when they are physically different (e.g., 
the voice in one channel is female while the other is male; Cherry, 1953). Therefore, the 
gender generating stimuli (e.g., word pairs or passages of text) is generally the same for 
both auditory channels when semantic level processing is under investigation. 
 Dependent measures of the allocation of attention to one channel vs. the other 
have included intrusions (i.e., responding with information presented to the unattended 
channel), and error rates (e.g., incorrect shadowing of stimuli presented to the attended 
channel). Intrusions and error rates are expected to be higher when attention is drawn 
  25
away from the attended channel. Another method for measuring the allocation of 
controlled attention was developed by Bargh in 1982. He used a secondary task—
reaction time (RT) to a probe stimulus—to index attention. Study participants were 
instructed to focus their attention on a primary shadowing task and to use any remaining 
attention to press a button to turn a light stimulus off as quickly as possible once it came 
on. Bargh’s rationale was that latency to respond to the secondary task should be directly 
related to the amount of controlled attention being given to the primary task. If response 
latency were greater, then more effort, and thus more attention, was being used to stay 
focused on the primary task. He sought to validate this method of assessing spare 
processing capacity by including a no probe condition. When there were no differences in 
shadowing errors (the primary task) between the light probe and no probe conditions and 
no better than chance recognition of target items on a memory test, he concluded that RT 
to a probe was a valid measure of attentional capacity being used by the primary task. 
Bargh (1982) used this method of dichotic listening, shadowing, and reaction time to a 
probe to test his main hypothesis that self-relevant information in the attended ear should 
facilitate faster RTs to the probe and that self-relevant information in the unattended ear 
would interfere with RTs to the probe as the participant struggled to maintain attention on 
the primary task. As discussed earlier, his data supported his hypotheses. 
 Other researchers have turned to this methodology to help them study cognitive 
factors that might affect behavior. McCabe and Gotlib (1993) looked at attentional 
processing in clinically depressed people by having participants complete a focused-
attention dichotic listening task and a concurrent light-probe task. They concluded that 
depressed people had attentional biases (what Bargh would call postconscious 
automaticity) for negative-content information fed into the unattended ear because their 
RTs to a stimulus probe were longer on the primary task than those of non-depressed 
people. Interestingly, the researchers found that when the participants were retested three 
months later and were no longer depressed, they no longer demonstrated attentional 
biases. It is reasonable to conclude that negative-content words were no longer salient for 
the formerly depressed participants because this information was no longer self-relevant. 
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 Although McCabe and Gotlib’s (1993) study focused on depression, it does seem 
clear that self-relevant information must be considered when attentional processes are 
being studied. When the effects of alcohol are considered in the light of theories of 
selective attention, it follows that a drinker’s attention to stimuli in the internal or 
external environment is directed by recent thoughts or experiences or by chronic beliefs 
or expectancies that he or she may hold regarding the effects of alcohol on behavior when 
particular cues are present. Bargh’s model shows promise as a method of measuring the 
salience of internal and external cues. Therefore, his method will be used to demonstrate 
an automatic attentional effect of aggression cues for those who report higher 
propensities to aggress, especially after the consumption of alcohol.  
Although the reaction-time methodology has been helpful for understanding the 
influence of unattended verbal information on attention to a primary task, Bargh has more 
recently turned his interest toward understanding the influence of automatic attention on 
goal-directed behavior (e.g., see Bargh, 1992; Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Bargh & 
Ferguson, 2000; and Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). This methodology utilizes a parafoveal 
vision task to demonstrate that information presented outside of conscious awareness can 
influence various behaviors. Before this study, a direct comparison of the dichotic 
listening task and the parafoveal vision task had not been made.  
Parafoveal Visual Tasks for the Measurement of Attention    
In memory and learning, both auditory and visual perception play a crucial role in 
the selection of stimuli, the conversion of stimuli to long-term memory, and the selection 
of responses for behavior. Parafoveal vision tasks are a more recent methodological 
choice for studying the selection of visual stimuli from one’s environment for encoding 
and retrieval.  
Parafoveal visual tasks require the participant to attend to information presented 
in the center of a computer screen (also the fixation point), while relevant or irrelevant 
information is presented to the parafoveal (peripheral) region of vision on the computer 
screen. The foveal region extends from 0° to 2° from the fixation point, whereas the 
parafoveal region extends from about 2° to 6° from the fixation point. Although 
parafoveal stimuli theoretically could be presented anywhere between 2° and 6° from the 
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fixation point on any point along the circumference of the circle, usually the stimuli are 
presented equidistant from the fixation point to one of the four quadrants encompassed by 
that circle (e.g., at 45°, 135°, 225°, and 315° as in Chartrand & Bargh, 1996). To 
determine where the stimuli should be presented, Bargh and Chartrand (2000) provided 
the formula Y = X/tan(2º), where X = the distance between the fixation point and the 
parafoveally presented stimulus, and Y = the distance between the participant’s eyes and 
the fixation point at the center of the computer monitor. Another method is to use Bargh 
et al.’s (1986) existing calculations. That is, each word should be placed in one of the 
quadrants such that the center of the word is 7.6 cm from the fixation point. This will 
ensure presentation of the stimuli to the parafoveal region as long as the participant’s 
eyes are 99 cm away from (in front of) the monitor. Controlling the placement of the 
chair and monitor and instructing the participant to sit erect at all times further ensures 
that the stimuli are presented outside of the participant’s foveal visual field.  
It is wise to follow parafoveal stimuli with a masking stimulus at the same 
location for two reasons (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). The first is that refresh rates on 
computer monitors often vary and a stimulus that has not decayed from the monitor is 
more likely to be perceived by the participant. The second reason is that a visual iconic 
memory trace of a stimulus may increase the likelihood of perceiving that stimulus. If a 
masking stimulus quickly replaces the parafoveal stimulus of interest, the participant is 
more likely to perceive only the jumble of letters that comprises the masking stimulus 
(e.g., Bargh generally uses the masking string “XQFBZRMQWGBX”).  
Another issue of concern involving parafoveal presentation of stimuli is the 
duration that the stimuli are presented. Rayner (1978) found that participants took at least 
140 ms to move their eyes from the fixation point to the parafoveal word when they were 
explicitly instructed to do so. Bargh (2001) recommended using parafoveal presentations 
of 60 ms to 90 ms to avoid even “express saccades” (fast saccadic jumps of 100 ms; 
Fischer & Weber, 1993 as cited in Bargh, 2000).  
Bargh and Chartrand (2000) have also varied the quadrant that the parafoveal 
stimulus is presented to as well as the onset of stimulus (between 2 and 7 seconds) so that 
the participant is unlikely to “predict” the location of the next parafoveal stimulus. To 
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provide additional reassurance that the participant’s attention is at the fixation point when 
parafoveal stimuli are presented, it is prudent to provide a task that involves the fixation 
point (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Since Bargh’s (1982) dichotic listening task involves a 
primary task that is presented to the center of the screen, utilizing the same task for both 
methodologies will allow a direct test of the ability of each methodology to provide an 
index of selective attention to self-relevant stimuli that is presented outside of conscious 
awareness.      
Parafoveal visual tasks (or subliminal priming tasks as it is referred to by Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000) have been used in a variety of research endeavors. In the context of 
reading, researchers have used these tasks to investigate whether a semantic priming 
effect occurs for words in sentences that are outside of the foveal visual region. For 
example, research by Altarriba, Kambe, Pollatsek, & Rayner (2001) did not support a 
semantic priming effect. However, when words were presented individually, there did 
appear to be a semantic priming effect as far as 3° from central fixation (Rayner, 1978).  
There is other evidence to suggest that parafoveal words are processed at a 
semantic level. In a parafoveal priming condition (Di Pace, Longoni, & Zoccolotti, 1991; 
Experiment 1), participants were presented with nonwords at the fixation point 
concurrently with a lateral parafoveal stimulus, which consisted of words that were 
semantically related to the target words and, finally, the target word (e.g., mesod centrally 
concurrently with flight laterally, followed by the target word eagle). Participants were 
expected to show a facilitation effect when parafoveal words were related to target words 
(i.e., faster reaction times to respond “yes” when the target word represented an animal) 
as opposed to the negative priming and baseline conditions. The results supported their 
hypothesis. Di Pace, et al. also found that the facilitation effect was smaller for 
parafoveally presented words than for foveally presented words and only existed if the 
inter-stimulus interval between parafoveal word and target word was short (200 ms vs. 
2000 ms). They regarded this as evidence for the assumption that automatic processing 
effects decay at a rapid rate. This is consistent with theories of selective attention. 
 Bargh and his associates have used subliminal priming tasks to investigate a 
variety of automatic effects such as the increased likelihood for men to sexually aggress 
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when their “power→sex association” is activated (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, 
1995); the effect of goal activation on impression formation (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996); 
and the effect of subliminal priming on negative mood (Chartrand, Bargh, & van Baaren, 
2003).  However, these tasks are generally conducted in order to prime a particular 
construct or behavior of interest. For example, to investigate an effect of priming on 
mood (Chartrand, et al., 2003) participants were exposed to strongly valenced negative or 
positive stimuli in a subliminal priming task (i.e., a parafoveal vigilance task). The 
stimuli were presented parafoveally concurrently with a brief flash to the left or right 
visual field. Participants indicated whether they detected a flash on the left or right of the 
screen by pressing the appropriate key as quickly as possible. They found that repeated 
exposure to positive or negative stimuli produced a concurrent mood as self-reported on 
mood scales.  
 Another study (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996) successfully primed participants to 
form impressions of a person described in a variety of behavioral phrases. Participants in 
the study were subliminally primed with words like impression, judgment, personality, 
and evaluate, (as opposed to a no-goal priming condition) and then read more phrases 
indicating honest behaviors or more phrases indicating dishonest behaviors. If they had 
been primed with an impression formation goal, subsequent trait ratings of a target person 
were much more likely to coincide with either dishonest or honest ratings (depending on 
which one they had been exposed to more often within the behavioral phrases). Chartrand 
& Bargh (1996) concluded that the effect of nonconscious activation (subliminal 
priming) of memory representations was as effective as explicit instructions for forming 
an impression of a target person. 
As with other studies conducted by Bargh and his associates, reaction times to the 
vigilance task were not reported as being analyzed. It is likely that the authors would not 
see these reaction times as an index of automatic attention to unattended stimuli. 
However, in a recent review of automaticity research, Bargh and Chartrand (2000) 
indicated that using a dual-task parafoveal visual paradigm, such as the one used in 
Bargh’s (1982) dichotic listening task with a concurrent light-probe task, may index how 
efficiently one is able to process attended information under conditions of scarce 
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attentional resources. If a nonattended stimulus is self-relevant, it should interfere with 
attention to the primary task, which will be reflected in fewer resources available for the 
secondary task, hence slower reaction times.  
Limitations of Dichotic Listening and Parafoveal Visual Tasks 
The appeal of the dichotic listening task is in its potential to measure the effect of 
attended versus unattended information on task performance. Ultimately, however, the 
participant’s attentional focus is not under the experimenter’s direct control. Various 
techniques have been used to measure attentional drift to irrelevant stimuli, such as 
shadowing tasks (e.g., errors and intrusions typically indicate attentional shift), and post-
hoc recognition or recall tasks. One argument against using these techniques is that lack 
of errors or intrusions or inability to report unattended stimuli does not equate lack of 
attention to or nonprocessing of the stimuli.  
Parafoveal visual tasks also suffer from lack of experimenter control over 
intentional shifts to unattended stimuli. In addition to the visual masking procedure 
described earlier, reassurance that the participant did not attend to irrelevant stimuli is 
available by viewing eye movements (as with a video camera) and, again, recognition or 
recall tasks. Unfortunately, the use of video cameras to track saccadic eye movement is 
costly, cumbersome, and intrusive. Additionally, it is difficult to track saccades 
concurrently with stimulus presentation.  
Despite the limitations of using either the dichotic listening or parafoveal visual 
dual-task methodologies, either task may be expected to demonstrate aggression-related 
knowledge structure activation. That is, individuals that are higher on measures of trait 
aggression will demonstrate a form of chronic (preconscious) activation when their 
attention to a secondary task is made more effortful (response latencies are longer) in the 
presence of unattended aggression cues. It was hypothesized that this effect would be 
reliable for both the parafoveal and the dichotic listening methodologies as long as dual 
primary and secondary tasks were used.  
Alcohol and Cognition 
A great deal of research in the last few decades has been devoted to exploring the 
nature of alcohol’s cognitive impairment. Although cognitive theory borrows heavily 
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from and is related to various aspects of learning theory and social psychology, implicit is 
the understanding that without clarification of the cognitive domain, a comprehensive 
model of alcohol’s influence on excessive social behaviors, such as aggression and risk-
taking, may never be achieved. Predicting when recently perceived information or 
information represented in memory (e.g., expectancies) will have a disproportionate 
influence upon behavior (over and above environmental cues, personality variables, or 
the pharmacological properties of a drug), is a challenge that cognitive theorists face. 
Predicting when an individual will be the life of the party on one occasion or commit a 
violent crime the next is a challenge that alcohol researchers face. 
Physiological and Expectancy Effects 
The evidence clearly indicates that alcohol consumption is related to inappropriate 
and excessive behaviors. Early models attributed these behaviors to the disinhibiting 
effects of alcohol. That is, alcohol reduces one’s ability to refrain from acting upon 
behavioral impulses (e.g., acting upon an impulse to be more sociable or aggressive when 
one is generally shy or nonviolent). However, the earlier disinhibition models assumed a 
more overall effect of alcohol that was not supported by the research. According to Steele 
and Josephs (1990), alcohol itself does not directly cause excessive or inappropriate 
behavior. They pointed out that an individual’s specific reactivity to the drug could not 
account for a person’s behavior because his or her behavior may vary from one occasion 
to the next.  
Alcohol consumption has clearly been demonstrated to cause a slowing of motor 
responses as it depresses the central nervous system. However, there is evidence to 
suggest that even alcohol’s impairment of motor performance is not a pure effect of 
ethanol on tissue. The degree of impairment on motor performance appears to be 
mediated by the thoughts or expectancies that an individual holds about the drug. 
Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott (1995), in their efforts to identify factors that might account 
for alcohol’s variable effects on behavior, examined whether motor response varied with 
expectations about how alcohol would affect their performance on a specific task. The 
degree of impairment anticipated on a motor skill task after consuming alcohol accounted 
for a significant proportion of impairment demonstrated—whether alcohol or placebo 
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was consumed. In fact, expectancies for participants in the alcohol condition accounted 
for 12.3% of the variance of a participant’s change in performance. Likewise, 
expectancies for those in the placebo condition accounted for 17.2% of the variance. 
These findings are not specific to alcohol. Expectations about task performance after the 
consumption of caffeine have yielded a similar pattern of results. That is, increases in 
actual task performance have been predicted by the strength of the participant’s 
expectancies about their performance, regardless of whether they had consumed caffeine 
or a placebo (Fillmore, Mulvihill, & Vogel-Sprott, 1994). 
 It is reasonable to hypothesize that understanding an individual’s expectancies is 
an important precursor in predicting behavior because a drug’s physiological effects do 
not occur independently of expectancies. This assumption prompted an explosion of 
alcohol expectancy research in the past few decades. However, researchers have had only 
partial success in using expectancy theory to predict the behavior of drinkers, and most of 
that success applies to the initiation and maintenance of drinking behaviors (e.g., Carey, 
1995; Chassin, & Molina, 1993; Goldman, Brown, & Christiansen, 1987; Reese, Jones & 
McMahon, 1994; and, Zucker, Kincaid, Fitzgerald & Bingham, 1996). A potential 
prevention strategy proposed by Darkes and Goldman (1993) focuses on the arousal and 
sociability expectations of participants. When these expectancies are challenged in 
comparison to a no-treatment control, alcohol consumption and expectancies show 
reliable decreases at post-treatment and after a booster session six weeks later.  Although 
studies like this are encouraging, researchers have had little success in predicting most 
other individual behavior, such as when aggression might occur. This lack of predictive 
power has serious implications for the use of expectancy theory in the assessment and 
treatment of alcohol-related problems such as aggression.  
Why has it been so difficult for researchers to predict an individual’s behavior 
after consuming alcohol? One reason is that researchers have struggled to define the term 
“alcohol expectancy.” Very generally it refers to an intervening variable of a cognitive 
nature (Goldman, et al., 1987) and is used in the literature to indicate the belief that one 
has consumed alcohol and how one thinks it will affect his or her behavior. The use of the 
word “belief” in association with “expectancy” has been criticized for its implication that 
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expectancies are consciously accessible information (Goldman, Del Boca, & Darkes, 
1999). Instead, expectancies should be regarded as   memory templates that organize 
incoming information; expectancies do not require conscious awareness or focused 
attention. In relation to alcohol, expectancies should be viewed as memory templates that 
reflect “the reinforcement value of alcohol acquired as a function of biological, 
psychological, and environmental risk variables” (Goldman, et al., p. 216). Further, these 
memory templates or expectancies serve to anticipate which behaviors should be 
performed under which circumstances depending upon what was learned about alcohol 
and its contexts during previous encounters.  
Measurement issues may also contribute to the inconsistency of results regarding 
the relationship between expectancies and alcohol. A major difficulty in separating 
alcohol expectancy effects from the pharmacological effects is that there appear to be 
several different types of expectancies. For example, expectancies about how other 
people behave after drinking alcohol are different from expectancies about how alcohol 
will affect one’s own behavior. Scales used in the service of predicting an individual’s 
behavior should consist of items that tap expectancies of one’s own behavior after 
consuming alcohol (Leigh & Stacy, 1993). Negative expectancies (e.g., punishment) 
regarding the outcome of alcohol consumption is considered as important as positive 
expectancies (reinforcement) and attempts have been made to measure both types of 
outcome expectancies (e.g., Leigh & Stacy, 1993).  
 The expectancy model clearly overlaps with the knowledge structures approach 
offered by information-processing theory. Both approaches imply that networks of 
memory templates bias the perception of incoming information and that behavioral 
outputs are selected based upon the similarity of incoming information to the networks of 
information already represented in memory. The value of expectancy theory is that it may 
help clarify extant outcome expectancies and predict their relevant salience in a given 
situation. Alcohol myopia is a theory that outlines the mechanisms by which more salient 
information may have a disproportional influence upon behavior. 
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Alcohol Myopia 
One cognitive theory, developed in the late eighties (Steele and Southwick, 1985; 
Steele and Josephs, 1990), suggested that alcohol causes behavioral disinhibition through 
impaired cognitive processing of relevant cues.  Thus, alcohol’s variable effects are due 
to an interaction of the pharmacological and cognitive effects. In this theory, “alcohol 
myopia” is defined as a state of shortsightedness in which drinkers process fewer cues 
less well than non-drinkers. That is, alcohol intoxication causes a restriction in 
information processing that influences the salience of both external cues (environmental 
cues) and internal cues (expectancies, memories, and mood), increasing the likelihood of 
socially excessive behaviors such as aggression. Even cues that are attended to are 
assumed to be processed superficially and relevant information is not given due 
consideration before a behavior is initiated and carried out.  
The theory of alcohol myopia provides some predictive value. An example may 
demonstrate the utility of alcohol myopia for predicting aggressive behavior. A man in a 
bar may be drinking, with the expectation that he will become more relaxed. After 
consuming a moderate amount of alcohol, he notices a large man staring at him in a 
hostile way. Will there be a bar fight? According to alcohol myopia theory, the myopic 
effects of alcohol consumption should increase with dosage. The more salient a cue is 
(e.g., the hostile- looking male), and the drunker the person gets, the more likely it is that 
an aggressive response would prevail over more distal yet more appropriate behavioral 
responses. The likelihood of an aggressive response may also be mediated by attitudes or 
beliefs that the inebriated person holds. For example, he may hold a chronic belief that 
people who stare are rude and deserve to be “taught a lesson.” If the person holds this 
belief, becomes intoxicated, and sees a hostile-looking male staring at him, alcohol 
myopia theory would predict a bar fight. 
The above scenario falls under a class of alcohol’s social effects that Steele and 
Josephs (1990) termed drunken excess. They posited that whenever there is a conflict 
between inhibiting and provoking cues (whether these cues are internal or external), the 
most salient aspects of the event will have a disproportionate influence upon the 
behavioral response that is selected. If relevant pressures that would normally inhibit 
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inappropriate responses to salient cues are not allowed normal processing, the inebriated 
person’s behavior will appear impulsive and excessive. As salience of cues change, the 
strength of the competing responses will change, with the stronger cue saving or 
wrecking the day. If the knowledge structure that includes information about rudeness 
(the salient, instigating cue from the previous example) is activated frequently and a 
behavioral sequence that includes aggression often follows, staring may be interpreted as 
something worth fighting about. Other relevant yet more distal social cues (a bar fight 
might lead to arrest) may be less likely to overcome the aggressive behavioral sequence 
once it has been initiated. Thus the drinker’s perceptions appear myopic in that the focus 
is on stimuli that are nearer in time or proximity. 
Several research endeavors have utilized the response conflict component of the 
drunken excess construct to investigate precursors to aggression and other socially 
excessive behaviors such as sexual aggression (Testa, 2002); drinking and driving 
(MacDonald, Zanna, & Fong, 1995); and, high-risk sexual behavior (Kaly, Heesacker, & 
Frost, 2002; MacDonald, Zanna, & Fong, 1996; Morris & Albery, 2001). Unprotected 
sex is one example of drunken excess that arguably includes an inherent response 
conflict. MacDonald, Zanna, and Fong (1996) investigated cognitive precursors to 
unprotected sex and provided strong evidence that alcohol myopia can explain the 
relationship between alcohol consumption and decreased condom use. Alcohol myopia 
theory would predict that in a conflicting situation where people express intentions to use 
condoms but condoms are unavailable, intoxicated people will pay less attention to distal, 
inhibiting cues (e.g., the risk of pregnancy or getting a sexually transmitted disease), and 
more attention to immediate, provoking cues (e.g., the attractiveness of the partner, the 
partner’s willingness to have sex).  As a result of this cognitive process, intoxicated 
people should endorse higher likelihood of intentions and justifications for having 
unprotected sex.  
The relationship between alcohol consumption and decreased condom use was 
investigated by having intoxicated and sober participants watch a video showing a male 
and female leaving a bar and going to the female’s apartment to have consensual sexual 
intercourse. The couple in the video did not have access to condoms, indicating a risky 
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situation, but the female was attractive and willing to have sexual intercourse. The video 
was stopped at this point, representing a response conflict for the viewer. The researchers 
asked students who indicated positive attitudes toward using condoms, and reported that 
they regularly did use them, what they would do next. They found that intoxicated 
participants were more likely than sober participants to endorse intentions and 
justifications to have sexual intercourse. Further, intoxicated participants indicated more 
awareness of the potential for condoms to protect them against sexually transmitted 
diseases and that having intercourse without them in a situation similar to the one in the 
video could be characterized as “extremely foolish” behavior. The authors interpreted the 
results as compelling evidence for the alcohol myopia perspective. 
 The central assumptions of the alcohol myopia model with respect to drunken 
excess include response conflict, salience of cues, and impaired cognitive processing. 
Some findings provide evidence for these assumptions. For example, Mulvihill, Skilling, 
and Vogel-Sprott (1997) provided evidence that alcohol impairs cognitive processes that 
govern response inhibition. They demonstrated this effect using a “go-stop” task in which 
go signals are considered to initiate an activating process and stop signals are considered 
to initiate an inhibiting process (Logan, Cowan & Davis, 1984; Mulvihill, et al.). When 
go and stop signals are presented simultaneously (response activation vs. response 
inhibition), these processes compete. Depending on which process finishes first, the 
response is either executed or inhibited. Mulvihill et al. showed that participants who 
were given moderate doses of alcohol were less able than participants in a placebo or 
control group to inhibit their responses to go signals when they were concurrently 
provided with a stop signal. Since their measure of response activation (reaction time) 
was unaffected for all three groups, they concluded that alcohol primarily affects 
response inhibition—not response activation. 
Zeichner, Allen, Petrie, Rasmussen, and Giancola (1993) examined the interaction 
between alcohol drug effects and the salience of cues, specifically information regarding 
threat. The drug condition included alcohol, placebo, and control. The salience condition 
included low threat (positive trait) or high threat (negative trait) information that 
described the participants themselves (salient condition) or described others (nonsalient 
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condition). Intoxicated participants attended to threat information (negative traits) longer 
than participants in the placebo or control group when the traits described themselves 
(salient condition).  “Presumably, in the salient negative information condition, alcohol 
limited the subject’s attention to the most threatening or salient aspect of their situation” 
(p. 731). The authors concluded that these findings were consistent with Steele and 
Joseph’s (1990) attention-allocation model and that further research should focus on the 
interactive effects of alcohol intoxication and salience of environmental cues in 
emotionally charged situations such as aggressive situations. 
Another study (Herzog, 1999) is unique in that it investigated the effects of 
alcohol on the second stage of a two-stage social inference (attributional) process and 
suggests a link between alcohol and automaticity. The first stage of social inference 
involves identifying and classifying a person’s behavior into dispositional terms (the 
degree to which the behavior is driven by the enduring personality traits of the person) or 
situational terms (the degree to which the aspects of the person’s environment are 
influencing his or her behavior). This stage is often regarded as a more automatic process 
based upon heuristic methods of categorizing the vast array of available information (e.g., 
stereotypes, schemas, and behavioral scripts). The second stage involves a corrective 
stage in which the opposite influences are taken into account. This stage is considered to 
be a more deliberate, controlled process and requires a higher expenditure of cognitive 
resources than the first stage.   
Since alcohol is thought to impair the cognitive processing of information that is 
more distal in time or place, Herzog (1999) hypothesized that intoxicated participants 
would be less likely than sober participants to engage in the more effortful, corrective 
stage of social inference. When both sober and intoxicated participants were asked to rate 
how influential disposition was in the behavior of actors in a series of videos, intoxicated 
participants rated dispositional influences as significantly higher than sober participants. 
Similarly, when both groups were asked to rate how influential situational factors were 
on the behavior of the actors in the videos, intoxicated participants exaggerated the 
influence of situational factors. The author suggested that sober participants did not 
exaggerate the relative influence of either dispositional or situational factors because they 
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were able to consider both influences regardless of the condition they were assigned to, 
and were able to adjust their ratings accordingly. The author concluded that these 
findings were consistent with the alcohol myopia perspective. 
Although the above studies provide evidence for the tenability of the alcohol 
myopia model, direct evidence for the model is meager. This is partly due to the 
relatively few studies that have been conducted and the abundance of alternative 
hypotheses offered by the investigators and other authors. Sayette (1999) observed that 
the alcohol myopia model, among other cognitive models, offers indirect evidence for the 
alcohol-behavior relationship and that, ultimately, validity of models like this will rest on 
studies that more directly test this relationship. The current study may provide a method 
by which salience of a given construct (in this case, aggression and/or alcohol cues) can 
be determined before a person is given the opportunity to aggress. Salience, of course, is 
a central assumption of the alcohol myopia model. 
Alcohol Cues 
The current study is intended to demonstrate that aggression cues are chronically 
salient to individuals who report higher levels of aggression/trait anger. In a similar 
fashion, alcohol cues are expected to be chronically salient to individuals who report 
higher levels of drinking experience. A plethora of evidence exists for this assumption 
and is exemplified by several modified Stroop color-naming studies. Cox, Blount, and 
Rozak (2000) used the Stroop paradigm to investigate the interference effects of neutral, 
alcohol-related, and concern-related words on alcohol abusers’ and nonabusers’ attention. 
Alcohol abusers responded more slowly to naming the color of stimuli that were related 
to alcohol (e.g., beer, vodka) than to naming the color of stimuli that were related to 
personal concerns (e.g., divorce, dog). Nonabusers showed no differential interference. 
Another modified Stroop color naming study (Sharma, Albery and Cook, 2001) 
also demonstrated attentional interference from alcohol-related words. The investigators 
found that in-treatment abstinent problem drinkers were significantly slower to name 
alcohol-related words than to name neutral words. Interference from alcohol-related 
stimuli was also found for a “high-drinker” control group. Those in the “low drinker” 
control group showed no differential interference for alcohol-related vs. neutral stimuli.  
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Finally, in a more rigorous investigation of alcohol cue interference (Stormark, 
Laberg, Nordby, & Hugdahl, 2000), alcoholics demonstrated longer reaction times to 
both alcohol-related and emotion-related words than neutral words on a Stroop task. They 
also evidenced significantly larger skin conductance responses to alcohol words than to 
any other words. These effects were not duplicated in the nonalcoholic controls. The 
researchers concluded that alcoholics’ attention is biased toward alcohol stimuli, and that 
alcoholics have difficulty disengaging their attention from those stimuli. They further 
suggested that alcoholics’ processing of these cues is automated.  
Another investigation of alcohol-related cue salience (Townshend & Duka, 2001) 
also revealed an attentional bias to alcohol-related stimuli. However, in this study a dot 
probe detection task was used. Participants were instructed to look at a fixation cross 
(presented for 500 ms.) when it appeared in the center of the computer monitor. Then two 
pictures appeared (for 500 ms.), one on each side of the screen. One picture was related 
to alcohol and one was related to stationery (e.g., a hand holding a glass of wine on one 
side and a hand holding a stapler on the other). After the stimuli were presented, a dot 
appeared on either the same side as the alcohol-related picture or on the opposite side. An 
attentional bias score was calculated for each participant by taking the mean reaction time 
for when the dot and alcohol-related word were presented in the same location and 
subtracting it from the mean reaction time for when the dot and alcohol-related words 
were presented on opposite sides of the screen. The researchers found that heavy social 
drinkers responded significantly more quickly than occasional social drinkers to the dot 
probe when it replaced the alcohol-related picture on the same side. They interpreted this 
as evidence for an attentional bias toward those stimuli. However, the researchers 
conducted the same task using words instead of pictures and found no differences 
between the two groups. This may be partly explained by the nature of the stimuli. The 
words represented a variety of concepts related to drinking (e.g., withdrawal-related 
words, craving-related words, and concrete words like beer and wine). The variety of 
stimuli but small number of words in each category may have reduced the sensitivity and 
power of the task for detecting attentional biases.  
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Another explanation for the lack of differences regarding alcohol word stimuli in 
the aforementioned study (Townshend & Duka, 2001) is that an initial, automatic 
orientation toward self-relevant word stimuli has been found only for shorter intervals 
between onset of the cue word and onset of the target (interstimulus intervals; ISIs; 
Posner & Snyder, 1975). At longer ISI’s (e.g., 500 ms.), participants have enough time to 
direct their attention away from the stimuli. Slower RT’s at 100 ms. ISI’s are theorized to 
represent difficulties in shifting attention, while faster RT’s at 500 ms. ISI’s are assumed 
to reflect an avoidance of those stimuli and a more conscious effort at shifting attention 
from those stimuli (Stormark, Field, Hugdahl, and Horowitz, 1997).  
One study (Stormark, et al., 1997) investigated the influence of shorter vs. longer 
ISIs directly and found that abstinent alcoholics showed longer reaction times when 
alcohol-related words were presented at a 100 ms. ISI (automatic orientation) but faster 
reaction times (avoidance) when alcohol-related words were invalidly cued at 500 ms. 
ISI. In the study by Townshend and Duka (2001) words were presented at 500 ms ISI. 
This may have given participants the opportunity to avoid some of the word stimuli, 
especially the ones that were not an integral part of the heavy social drinkers’ knowledge 
structures (e.g., withdrawal effects of drinking). This avoidance was likely to vary across 
subjects and may have reduced differences between groups. 
Although evidence is converging that alcohol-related stimuli interrupt attention 
for participants with heavier drinking experience, it is less clear how the presentation of 
alcohol cues and aggression cues simultaneously would impact attention and how these 
stimuli would effect a nonalcoholic population. From the above discussion, it seems 
reasonable to assume for the current study that college students who are presented with 
aggression cues at a subliminal level of awareness in a room devoid of alcohol cues, 
would show longer latencies to respond to those stimuli if they are high on trait 
aggression. Those who also have a lot of drinking experience may be expected to 
demonstrate the longest latencies of all. This is related to the assumption that alcohol and 
aggression knowledge structures will be more tightly interwoven and more frequently 
activated, resulting in a more automatic effect on the processing of aggression-related 
stimuli.  
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For students tested in a room full of alcohol cues (i.e., a barlab), it is reasonable to 
assume that alcohol cues would be especially salient for those with more drinking 
experience and higher levels of trait anger. Their levels of interference on attention 
should be the highest. The current proposal will investigate this hypothesis.   
Alcohol and Aggression 
Although the theory of alcohol myopia may be useful for predicting alcohol’s 
various social effects, when attempting to understand the alcohol-aggression link it is 
useful to understand the more basic nature of the relationship between alcohol and 
aggression. Bushman and Cooper (1990) conducted a meta-analysis of 30 experimental 
studies with male confederates and male participants who were social drinkers. They 
concluded “alcohol influences aggressive behavior as much or more than it influences 
other social and nonsocial behaviors” (p. 350). They reported an average effect size for 
alcohol vs. control to be d(+) = 0.25. The average effect size for alcohol vs. placebo was 
calculated to be d(+) = 0.61. They speculated that the average effect size for the alcohol 
vs. placebo condition is larger because there are methodological problems with the 
alcohol vs. control condition. The most serious problem is that the control groups 
generally see through the beverage deception. Sometimes the placebo groups see through 
the deception as well. However, since the psychological and pharmacological effects of 
alcohol occur together anyway, Bushman and Cooper recommended that the alcohol vs. 
placebo comparison is the best estimate of the effects of alcohol on aggression.  
Recent research continues to provide evidence for an alcohol-aggression 
relationship. One study (Lange, 2002) demonstrated that participants with higher blood 
alcohol levels (BACs;  .05-.18) who associated alcohol with aggression were more likely 
to identify ambiguous behavior (via vignettes) as more aggressive than those who 
associated aggression with amiability. These authors concluded that alcohol affected the 
perception of aggression. 
Many studies have investigated the alcohol-aggression relationship using the 
Taylor Aggression Paradigm (TAP; Taylor, 1993) or modifications of it. In these 
competitive reaction time tasks, participants are generally provided with information 
(e.g., using feedback lights) about the level of shock the opponent has selected for them if 
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the participant is slower to respond (i.e., loses the “trial”). Participants are assumed to use 
this information to set subsequent shock levels. Aggression, then, is operationally defined 
in these tasks as the intensity and/or duration of shocks selected for a fictitious opponent 
for each competitive trial. Since the amount of wins versus losses is predetermined and 
distributed evenly in all conditions (Chermack & Giancola, 1997), direct comparisons 
can be made between shock levels and durations set by participants who are intoxicated 
and those set by participants who are not. 
In general, investigators have found that intoxicated participants are reliably more 
aggressive than participants who have received a placebo or a nonalcoholic beverage 
(Chermack & Taylor, 1995; Laplace, Chermack, & Taylor, 1994; Giancola & Zeichner, 
1997). This finding may not generalize beyond the college student population or the 
laboratory. However, as noted by Chermack and Giancola (1997) a few studies have 
attempted to address external validity and found that aggressive responses within the 
laboratory correlate positively with peer and counselor rated aggression, with self-report 
aggression inventories, and with histories of antisocial behavior (see also Anderson & 
Bushman, 1997; Giancola & Chermack, 1998; and, Tedeschi & Quigley, 1996). 
Situational Variables 
A variety of situational factors have been found to intensify the alcohol-
aggression relationship. These include provocation, frustration, threat, social pressure (to 
aggress), and response conflict (as operationalized in the alcohol myopia perspective of 
drunken excess). On the other hand, social pressure (to avoid aggression) and self-
focused attention can also decrease aggression. (See Chermack & Giancola, 1997; 
Gustafson, 1993; and Ito, Miller, & Pollock, 1996 for reviews of the literature concerning 
these variables.) Provocation appears to be one of the most important moderators of the 
alcohol-aggression relationship. In fact, provocation has been claimed to be a more potent 
elicitor of aggression than either gender or beverage condition (Giancola, Helton, 
Osborne, Terry, Fuss, & Westerfield, 2002). 
To date, studies directly investigating the interaction between aggression and 
alcohol cues (without the consumption of alcoholic or nonalcoholic beverages) have not 
been conducted. Based on the idea of knowledge structure activation, it may be that 
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participants in a barlab would respond more aggressively than control participants in a 
room devoid of alcohol cues if they self-report higher levels of aggressive states or traits 
and they have more extensive drinking experience. Only one study investigated the 
impact of drinking experience on alcohol-related aggression (Laplace, Chermack, & 
Taylor, 1994). Surprisingly, of participants categorized with low-, moderate-, or high-
drinking experience, only participants with low-drinking experience were more 
aggressive (using the TAP) after consuming alcohol. Although the current study would 
not investigate the interaction between intoxication and aggression, it may provide a 
baseline measure of the influence of person variables. That is, a methodology that can 
measure the influence of alcohol and aggression cues to automatically interfere with a 
participant’s attention to a primary task would provide a useful baseline before the 
participant is given the opportunity to aggress subsequent to provocation or frustration, or 
before they are given alcohol. 
Situational factors are clearly essential for understanding the alcohol-aggression 
relationship. Additionally, attention (whether automatic or controlled) to situational cues 
(e.g., provocation, threat, social pressure), as specified by the alcohol myopia perspective, 
is arguably the most convincing mechanism by which these variables influence the 
alcohol-aggression relationship (Gustafson, 1993). However, lack of attention to 
individual differences (or person variables) limits the explanatory value of cognitive 
theories. As research exploring individual differences has accumulated, investigators 
have begun to incorporate these findings into their models (e.g., Chermack & Giancola, 
1997). 
Gender 
The data regarding the willingness or tendency for men and women to aggressive 
at equivalent levels is mixed. In the absence of alcohol, there is evidence that both 
women and men experience anger but that women respond with less physical aggression 
than men (Frost & Averill, 1982). Another study found that men were aggressive toward 
other men when provoked but not toward women, and women were aggressive toward 
men when provoked but not toward women (Taylor & Epstein, 1967). Interestingly, the 
highest levels of aggression in the study were found for highly provoked women 
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competing with men. However, this finding is in contrast to another study (Richardson, 
Vandenberg, & Humphries, 1986) in which women were less likely than other men to set 
extreme shock levels toward men. 
In the presence of alcohol, the data are also mixed. Direct comparisons are often 
difficult due to variations in the type and amount of alcohol administered, the choice of 
aggression measures, and the type of noxious stimuli inflicted on or by the participants 
(Dougherty, Bjork, Bennett and Moeller, 1999) as well as variations in gender of the 
fictitious opponent, confederate or even experimenter.  One study found that intoxicated 
men were more aggressive than sober men toward a fictitious female opponent 
(Richardson, 1981). Gustafson (1991) did not show an increase in aggression for women 
as a function of alcohol when a nonaggressive response was available toward the 
fictitious male opponent. Another study (Bond & Lader, 1986) demonstrated an increase 
in aggression for both intoxicated men and women when provocation level was low but 
only for men when provocation was high. However, a recent study (Giancola, et al., 
2002) demonstrated almost the opposite. Intoxicated men were more aggressive then 
intoxicated women under low provocation, but men and women were equally aggressive 
under high provocation. These authors (Giancola, et al. 2002) concluded that alcohol 
increases aggression for men but that only provocation will lift aggression–related 
inhibitions for women. 
Some studies have focused more on gender differences related to direct and 
indirect forms of aggression. In some cases, indirect aggression increased for intoxicated 
women but not men (Rohsenow & Bachorowski, 1984). Giancola and Zeichner (1995) 
operationalized direct aggression as shock intensity and indirect aggression as shock 
duration and found that intoxicated men showed an increase in both forms of aggression, 
while intoxicated women only showed increases in indirect aggression. However, the 
authors recommended interpreting this finding with caution since shock duration fits 
questionably with most definitions of indirect aggression. 
 There appears to be at least one plausible generalization that can be made 
regarding gender differences for alcohol-related aggression: men show a consistent 
increase in aggressive responding while drinking. Although this generalization cannot be 
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applied to women, at least one study found that aggression increased equally for men and 
women over cumulative doses of alcohol (Dougherty, Bjork, Bennett and Moeller, 1999). 
In the Dougherty et al. study, participants who showed higher levels of aggressive 
responding under placebo conditions (indicating baseline individual differences) also 
showed the highest increases in aggression under alcohol conditions. This finding 
suggests that variables beyond gender are critical for understanding the alcohol-
aggression relationship—specifically, individual difference variables. 
Individual Difference Variables 
The study of individual difference variables as moderators in the alcohol-
aggression relationship has gained momentum over the last two decades. Alcohol 
expectancies would certainly vary by individual, but, as discussed earlier, alcohol 
expectancies appear to play a negligible role in the alcohol-aggression relationship. The 
role of alcohol-aggression expectancies may also be trivial but the jury is still out. Some 
studies indicate that alcohol-aggression expectancies do not facilitate aggression beyond 
dose. One such study (Chermack & Taylor, 1995) used a three-question scale to 
determine whether participants had a high or low score on alcohol-aggression 
expectancies (Effects of Drinking Questionnaire; EDQ; Dermen & George, 1989) and 
then randomly assigned participants to a high-dose or placebo-dose condition in which 
they all performed a competitive reaction time task with a fictitious opponent. 
Participants in the high-dose condition set higher shock intensities for the opponents than 
those in the placebo condition. The main effect of expectancy was not significant, nor 
was there a significant interaction of dose X expectancy. On the other hand, participants 
in the high-dose condition did select more severe shock intensity levels as “opponent” 
shock levels increased. This finding appeared to be driven by participants who had scored 
high on the alcohol-aggression scale of the EDQ. Thus, it appeared that intoxicated 
participants with high expectancies for alcohol-related aggression were the most reactive 
to increased levels of provocation. It is possible that high levels of alcohol consumption 
and provocation are both necessary for expectancy effects to emerge (Chermack & 
Taylor, 1995). However, it may also be the case that alcohol-aggression expectancies are 
not adequately measured. 
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A few other studies (Dermen & George, 1989; Leonard & Senchak, 1993; and 
Quigley & Leonard, 1999) indicated that the belief that alcohol leads to aggression does 
moderate the alcohol-aggression relationship. These studies are correlational and, in one 
(Quigley & Leonard, 1999), the findings did not hold up over time. A recent study 
(Leonard, Collins, & Quigley, 2003) investigated a host of variables (e.g., personality and 
socio-cultural factors) related to alcohol consumption and aggression within bar 
environments. With respect to alcohol-aggression expectancies (measured using the 
Alcohol Effects Questionnaire; Rohsenow, 1983), the investigators hypothesized that 
these expectancies would moderate the alcohol-aggression relationship, and that the 
belief that alcohol causes aggression would be related to both the number of episodes 
resulting in aggression and aggression severity. They found that a belief that alcohol 
causes aggression was not necessary for an association between alcohol consumption and 
aggression. They also found that participants were more likely to behave aggressively 
during an episode when they held this belief, but that the opponent was less likely to be 
harmed during the episode. The authors suggested that alcohol-aggression expectancies 
might serve in the initiation of aggression, but not in the continuation, escalation, or 
cessation of an aggressive episode. Further, the authors found that once aggression was 
initiated, forces within the social environment (people instigating the participant and his 
opponent during the aggressive episode, and no one trying to defuse the situation) were 
predictive of more severe aggression and greater harm to the opponent. Interestingly, 
angry temperament was not reliably associated with aggression in this study. But, again, 
the authors suggested that individual differences may influence the initiation of 
aggression, but other factors (i.e., eggers-on) may be more crucial in the escalation of 
aggression (Leonard, Collins, & Quigley, 2003). 
Findings from an earlier study offer some experimental support for this alternative 
explanation. Bailey and Taylor (1991) found that when men self-reported moderate to 
high levels of aggressive tendencies (as measured by the Assault subscale of the Buss-
Durkee Hostility Inventory, Buss & Durkee, 1957), they were significantly more likely to 
set higher shock levels at a faster rate toward their provokers in a reaction time task. 
Although the level of shock intensity set by men who self-reported nonaggressive 
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tendencies never reached the level set by men who self-reported aggressive tendencies, 
the former clearly set higher shock levels when intoxicated. The authors speculated that 
when the intentions of the target were ambiguous (during block one), a high dose of 
alcohol appeared to have an instigative effect upon all of the individuals in the study, 
regardless of whether they self-reported high, moderate, or low levels of aggression. 
When the antagonist was clearly more provocative (blocks two and three), the effects of 
alcohol appeared to depend more on disposition. That is, those who self-reported 
moderate or high levels of aggression set increasingly higher shock intensities, whereas 
those low on aggression were more restrained.  
A more recent study (Parrott & Zeichner, 2002) partially replicated the above 
results. Participants were categorized as low, moderate, or high trait anger according to 
their responses on the Trait Anger Scale (TAS, Spielberger et al., 1980, 1983). 
Participants completed a modified TAP in either an alcohol or a no-alcohol condition. 
Shock intensity and duration, as well as the proportion of shocks set at the highest level, 
served as indices of aggression. Regardless of beverage condition, men who were 
categorized as moderate or high on trait anger displayed significantly higher aggression 
on all of the indices of aggression. Unexpectedly, only intoxicated participants rated as 
moderate trait anger selected higher shock intensities and a greater proportion of shocks 
at the highest level than their sober counterparts. The authors suggested that the lack of 
difference for low trait anger participants likely reflects an aggression-inhibiting effect. 
For high trait anger participants, the lack of difference may reflect a ceiling effect. They 
also suggested that a placebo condition and a measure of alcohol-aggression expectancies 
might have enhanced the interpretation of the current findings.  
As previously mentioned, Giancola et al. (2002) have concluded that provocation 
is the most reliable predictor for alcohol-related aggression across gender. Even if this 
conclusion is accurate, other factors clearly moderate the alcohol-aggression relationship. 
In an earlier study, Giancola and Zeichner (1995) investigated the combined predictive 
ability of subjective intoxication, BAC level, provocation, and aggressive personality 
traits on physical aggression in men and women. They found that aggressive personality 
traits and BAC level predicted physical aggression under both high and low provocation 
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for men. None of the variables were predictive of aggression for intoxicated women, and 
subjective intoxication was not predictive of aggression for men when provocation was 
high. 
In a more recent study, Giancola (2002) again found that provocation was the 
strongest elicitor of aggression in a modified TAP. More importantly, alcohol was more 
likely to increase aggression for men with higher levels of trait anger as measured by the 
Spielberger Trait Anger Scale. The author suggested that research should continue “to 
delineate a multivariable risk profile” in the effort to predict when aggression is likely to 
occur subsequent to alcohol intoxication (Giancola, 2002, p. 1357).  In an attempt to 
specify additional factors within a “risk profile” Giancola used a similar methodology in 
another study (2003) and measured self-reported levels of empathy (empathic concern for 
others and the ability to see things from another person’s point of view as measured by 
two subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index). Alcohol was found to increase 
aggression for men who self-reported lower empathy on these two subscales. 
Interestingly, for both of the above studies, alcohol had no effect on female aggression 
regardless of trait anger or empathic concern (Giancola, 2002; Giancola, 2003). 
The above studies highlight some variables that reliably influence the alcohol-
aggression relationship. Provocation appears to be a crucial situational variable for men 
and women, and trait anger appears to be a crucial individual difference variable—
especially for men. For women, potential “risk” variables have proven harder to identify. 
One study (as cited in Dougherty, et al., 1999) found that women who self-reported 
menstrual symptoms were more aggressive than those who did not. The authors summed 
up the current state of research well when they concluded that studies like this “clearly 
underscore the need for taking into account individual characteristics that may help us 
better understand why alcohol increases aggression in some persons but not in others” (p. 
329). 
Attentional Effects and Automaticity 
Another aspect of the alcohol-aggression relationship involves attention. 
Although alcohol intoxication does not appear to change attentional capacity (Lamb & 
Robertson, 1987), it appears to influence the relative importance of the most salient 
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information from the internal and external environment. In one study (Jeavons and 
Taylor, 1985), the attention of half of the intoxicated participants and half of the sober 
participants were directed toward a nonaggressive norm intended to reduce participant’s 
aggression toward a bogus opponent. Mean shock settings by each group clearly 
indicated that intoxicated participants whose attention was not directed toward the 
nonaggressive norm were the most aggressive. For intoxicated participants whose 
attention was directed toward the nonaggressive norm, their levels of aggression were 
comparable to the sober participants, and lower than participants who were not provided 
with a nonaggressive norm.  
Zeichner, Pihl, Niaura, and Zacchia (1982) also attempted to evaluate the role of 
attention in the production of alcohol-mediated aggression. Some intoxicated participants 
were forced to attend to the consequences of their behavior (a tone indicating how much 
pain an opponent felt after receiving shock), some were distracted from attending to those 
consequences, and some did not receive any attentional instructions at all. Zeichner et al. 
expected that participants in the forced-attention condition could not fail to attend to the 
information about how much pain their opponent was experiencing and that this 
processing of relevant information would lower aggressive responding. They were 
surprised to find that those in the forced-attention condition actually increased the 
duration of time that participants pressed the shock button. In contrast, for participants 
who were distracted from the pain, shock durations were significantly shorter. The 
authors concluded that an information-processing deficit interpretation was not 
applicable. However, they also suggested that alcohol restricted attention to the shock 
manipulation rather than the behavioral contingencies (which are more distal in nature). 
In this case, their self-focused attention combined with alcohol may have been more 
arousing (e.g., they become more aware of threat of harm). Those that were distracted 
from the salient threat of harm were able to inhibit their aggressive responding. Of 
course, an interpretation such as this awaits further investigation. 
To date, there are no known alcohol studies that have investigated the interaction 
between automaticity and aggression. The current study may validate a methodology that 
can look at the automatic activation of knowledge structures related to aggression and 
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alcohol cues for those who self-report higher levels of trait anger or higher alcohol-
aggression expectancies. Measurement of a chronic, automatic effect is considered 
necessary for understanding the alcohol-aggression link.  
The Current Study 
The current study investigated whether high self-reported levels of aggression, 
trait anger, or alcohol-aggression expectancies (which all reflect chronically accessible 
knowledge structures) are related to the salience of aggression stimuli in the presence or 
absence of alcohol cues (which both reflect external cues). This study assessed the 
predictive utility of the parafoveal visual versus dichotic listening methods of 
presentation to demonstrate the effects of self-relevant aggression cues upon two 
behavioral measures of attention—reaction time and error rate.  
Hypotheses 
Three main hypotheses were formulated in regard to one’s performance when 
aggression cues are presented via a computer task either dichotically or parafoveally: 
1. Participants who self-report higher levels of trait anger will demonstrate longer 
latencies and higher error rates (more attentional interference) when exposed to self-
relevant cues of aggression than those who report lower levels of trait anger. This 
effect will hold whether participants are tested in the presence or absence of alcohol 
cues. 
2. Participants who self-report higher levels of alcohol-aggression expectancies will 
demonstrate longer latencies and higher error rates when exposed to aggression cues 
than those who report low levels of alcohol- aggression expectancies. Setting should 
moderate this effect. That is, the effect should hold only for participants tested in the 
presence of alcohol cues. 
3. Higher alcohol-aggression expectancies will predict longer latencies to respond and 
higher error rates on the computer tasks after the effects of trait anger are partialled 
out. However, this effect will hold only for participants tested in the presence of 
alcohol cues. 
Although a specific hypothesis was not formulated in regard to the relative predictive 
utility of the parafoveal visual computer task versus the dichotic listening computer task, 
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patterns of significance and effect sizes were examined to suggest which methodology 
may be most helpful for investigating attentional interference, trait characteristics, and 
alcohol cues.   
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Method 
Design 
 This study included two dependent measures (error rate and reaction time) and 
two independent variables (Word Type and Setting). Word Type had two within subject 
(WS) levels (NonAggression and HiAggression) and Setting had two between subject 
(BS) levels (Barroom and Cleanroom). Therefore, this study was a 3 (WS) X 2 (BS) 
mixed design. Error rate and reaction time were analyzed separately, as were Dichotic 
Listening Task (DLT) and Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT) data.   
Condition Assignment  
 Participants were assigned to one of four conditions: Barroom Parafoveal, 
Barroom Dichotic, Cleanroom Parafoveal, or Cleanroom Dichotic. The attended Channel 
(Left vs. Right) was counterbalanced within the DLT condition. Setting and Task 
assignments were decided by flipping a coin and filling the other cells by default as 
necessary. Since there were constraints upon departmental availability of room space, if 
the next Setting condition was not available, the participant was run in the same Setting 
condition rather than being rescheduled. 
Power 
While effect sizes regarding error rate are theoretically related to the dependent 
variables examined in this study, our experiences suggested that they would be quite 
small (e.g., Edington, 1996). Although error rate was investigated in the current study, 
sample size needed was based upon expected effects for reaction time. Similar 
methodologies investigating reaction time and/or parafoveal presentation of stimuli 
(Bargh, 1996; di Pace, Longoni, & Zoccolotti, 1991; Ortells & Tudela, 1996) indicated 
that 100 participants (25 participants for each computer task and in the presence or 
absence of alcohol cues) should provide ample power for detecting mean differences in 
reaction times.  
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Power analyses regarding reaction time means were conducted for N = 79.  
Significant differences were found for Word Type on the PVT with power at 1.00. 
Reaction time means across Word Type for the DLT were not significant, and power was 
calculated to be .56. Participant recruitment was ended at N = 79 (Dichotic X Cleanroom 
= 20; Dichotic X Barroom = 18; Parafoveal X Cleanroom = 19; and Parafoveal X 
Barroom = 22).  
Participants 
 Three hundred eighty five undergraduate students at the University of South 
Florida completed questionnaire data for the first part of this study (Phase I). Eighty-five 
of the 385 students who completed the Phase I questionnaires participated in Phase II of 
the study. The data of six participants were not used in any analyses because examination 
of error rate data revealed that these participants had error rates that were unacceptably 
high. Since the other 79 participants were able to complete either task with error rates no 
higher than 19%, it is more likely that the six participants with error rates in the range of 
47% to 61% did not attend adequately to the instructions. Therefore, data for these six 
participants was excluded from all reaction time (RT) and error rate (ER) data analyses 
and demographics are reported for N = 791. 
The mean age for the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT) sample (N = 38) was 22.95 
years (SD = 4.06, range 19 to 35). For the Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT; N = 41) sample, 
excluding one 63-year-old female, the mean age was 21.83 years (SD = 2.62, range 19 to 
31). Mean ages were not significantly different for the two task types, t(62.75) = 1.44, p = 
.15. Fourteen of the 79 participants were male (18%) and 65 were female (82%). This 
overrepresentation of females is expected given the high number of female 
undergraduates within undergraduate psychology classes at this university. To evaluate 
the difference among the proportion of males vs. females completing the PVT vs. the 
DLT, a contingency table analysis was conducted. Gender was not significantly different 
across tasks, Pearson χ2 (1, N = 79) = .03, p = .88.  The sample included 14 African 
American (17.7%), 11 Hispanic (13.9%), 51 Caucasian (64.6%), 2 Asian American 
(2.5%), and 1 Latino (1.3%) participant. Race/ethnicity was not significantly different 
across tasks, Pearson χ2 (4, N = 79) = 5.72, p = .22. 
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To evaluate whether students who never came in for Phase II were significantly 
different on demographic characteristics or on the measures of interest for Phase I, a 
comparison group of Phase II noncompleters was randomly selected from the 300 
remaining participants. This resulted in a comparison of 79 Phase II completers and 79 
Phase II noncompleters. No differences emerged for age, gender, race/ethnicity, 
household income, the trait anger variables, or the alcohol-aggression expectancy 
variables.   
Phase I Materials 
Participants were given a number of measures to complete during Phase I. These 
measures were the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI; Appendix B), the 
Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ; Appendix C), the Expectancy Questionnaire for 
Alcohol and Aggression—Low Dose (EQAAL; Appendix D), a questionnaire made up of 
other alcohol-aggression expectancy subscales (Appendix E), a demographics 
questionnaire (Appendix F), and a request for further participation (Appendix A). Only 
the psychometric properties of the STAXI and the EQAAL measures will be considered 
below. The BPAQ and the questionnaire including other expectancy subscales were 
included in Phase I for later study. The demographics questionnaire and request for 
further participation will not be discussed further. 
State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory.  
The State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI; Spielberger, 1988) was 
used to measure participants’ levels of anger proneness (trait anger) as well as the manner 
in which they typically express their anger. The STAXI evolved from earlier measures of 
the experience and expression of anxiety and anger as important factors in the etiology of 
hypertension and coronary heart disease in the late 1960’s (e.g., see Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; Spielberger, 1980). Spielberger has spent decades refining 
the measurement of state anger (operationalized as a relatively short-lived emotional 
state) and trait anger (operationalized as a longer-standing personality characteristic) to 
assess individual differences in the experience of anger (State-Trait Anger Scale or 
STAS; Spielberger, 1980; Spielberger, et al., 1983). Spielberger maintained that 
individuals high in trait anger would more frequently perceive a wider range of situations 
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as anger provoking than those low in trait anger and that they would experience more 
frequent and more intense elevations in state anger over time.  
Although the measurement of state and trait anger proved useful in some contexts, 
Spielberger, Sydeman, Owen, and Marsh (1999) realized that understanding the 
experience of anger is not enough to develop strategies and treatments for maladaptive 
anger. They claimed that it is essential “not only to distinguish, both conceptually and 
empirically, between the experience of anger as an emotional state (S-Anger) and 
individual differences in anger proneness as a personality trait (T-Anger), but also to 
identify and measure the characteristic ways in which people express their anger” (p. 
1006). This led to the development of the Anger Expression scale or AX Scale, which 
provided a distinction between anger-in (suppressed anger; AX/In) and anger-out 
(verbally or physically expressed anger; AX/Out). Research with the AX scale indicated 
an anger control factor, which was developed into the third subscale of the AX, the 
anger-control (AX/Con) subscale. The STAS and the AX scales were combined to create 
the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI; Spielberger, 1988).  
The STAXI has continued the role of the STAS and AX in research on the 
relationship between anger and health-related factors such as hypertension, as well as a 
variety of other constructs (for examples of the use of the STAS, AX, and STAXI in 
research the interested reader is referred to Spielberger, Reheiser, & Sydeman, 1995).  
The STAXI has also been proposed and evaluated as a screening and outcome measure 
with mixed but promising results (e.g., Foley, Hartman, Dunn, Smith, & Goldberg, 2002; 
Mahon, Yarcheski, & Yarcheski, 2000; Cornell, Peterson, & Richards, 1999). The 
STAXI’s ability to measure anger-related states, traits, and its expression (i.e., 
aggression) suggests that it can be useful for providing evidence that these constructs are 
highly correlated with aggressive behavior in laboratories, and, more importantly, in 
naturalistic settings. 
The STAXI is comprised of: a 10-item trait anger (T-Anger) scale that measures 
individual differences in anger proneness; a 10-item state anger (S-Anger) scale that 
measures one’s current subjective feelings of anger; and a 24-item Anger Expression 
(AX) scale that measures internalized, seething anger (AX/In—8 items), externalized 
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aggressive behavioral tendencies (AX/Out—8 items), and effort expended controlling the 
expression of anger (AX/Con—8 items). The AX/EX measure indexes the frequency that 
anger is experienced and expressed and is calculated by combining items from other 
STAXI scales. A factor structure analysis of the T-Anger and S-Anger scales 
(Spielberger, 1988) indicated that the T-Anger Scale should be broken into two subscales. 
Angry Temperament (T-Anger/T) is intended to measure one’s tendency to experience 
and express anger without provocation. Angry Reaction (T-Anger/R) is intended to 
measure one’s tendency to express anger when criticized or treated unfairly. 
The STAXI has been found to have good psychometric properties (Fuqua, et al., 
1991; Moses, 1992; and, Spielberger, 1988). Factor analysis of the S-Anger scale yielded 
high item-remainder correlations and alpha coefficients of .93 for both sexes. Internal 
consistency of the T-Anger subscales was evaluated separately for males and females 
using college and Navy samples (Spielberger, 1988, p. 8). Item-remainder correlations 
were acceptably high for both subscales and alpha coefficients ranged from .84 to .89 for 
the T-Anger/T subscale and from .70 to .75 for the T-Anger/R subscale. In the current 
study, internal consistency estimates of reliability were calculated with both males and 
females and yielded a somewhat lower, although still acceptable, result for S-Anger 
(alpha = .85). For the T-Anger subscales, coefficients for males and females together 
were comparable to previously obtained results with alpha = .85 for T-Ang/T but 
somewhat lower for T-Ang/R with alpha = .68.  Item-remainder correlations for the 
AX/In and AX/Out subscales of the AX scale in Spielberger’s (1988) study were much 
lower but still satisfactory and alpha coefficients for all three of the AX subscales ranged 
from .73 to .85. Coefficients were highest for the AX/Con subscale (.84 for females and 
.85 for males) and lowest for the AX/Out subscale (.75 for females and .73 for males) 
with AX/In coefficients falling in between (.81 for females and .84 for males). In the 
current study, AX/In coefficient alpha was .78, AX/Con alpha was .82, and AX/Out alpha 
was .78. 
Correlations among the STAXI scales in the Spielberger (1988) study were as 
expected (e.g., essentially zero between AX/In and AX/Out). Test-retest stability 
coefficients for the state and trait anger scales of the State-Trait Personality Inventory 
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(STPI; Spielberger, Jacobs, Crane, Russell, Westberry, Barker, et al., 1979) and for the 
AX subscales have been reported for males and females separately (Jacobs, Latham, & 
Brown, 1988). As would be expected, coefficients for the state anger scale (.27 for males 
and .21 for females) were much lower than for the trait anger scale (.70 for males and .77 
for females). Additionally, coefficient values for the AX subscales (a range of .64 to .70 
for males and .73 to .81 for females) were comparable to the trait scale values. 
The T-Ang/T and T-Ang/R subscales were of most interest for the current study. 
The mean T-Ang/T score reported by Spielberger (1991) for college students was 6.56 
for males (SD = 2.67) and 6.71 for females (SD = 2.73). The mean T-Ang/R score 
reported by Spielberger for college students was 9.84 for males (SD = 2.55) and 10.18 for 
females (SD = 2.60). In the current sample, mean T-Ang/T scores for the Parafoveal 
Visual Task (PVT) were 5.57 for males (SD = 1.81; N = 7) and 6.00 for females (SD = 
1.71; N = 34). For the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT), mean T-Ang/T scores were 5.71 
for males (SD = 1.89; N = 7) and 5.90 for females (SD = 2.34; N = 31). For the T-Ang/R 
subscale, mean scores for the PVT were 8.71 for males (SD = 2.75) and 8.44 for females 
(SD = 1.74). On the DLT, mean scores were 8.14 for males (SD = 2.12) and 8.19 for 
females (SD = 2.56). The maximum obtainable score for each subscale is 16 and the 
lowest is 4. This indicates that most respondents indicated having an angry temperament 
somewhere between “almost never” and “somewhat.” For the T-Ang/R subscale, sample 
means were somewhat higher than the means for T-Ang/T but they were still 
considerably lower than the means that Spielberger reported. 
Concurrent validity of the STAXI was provided using 270 naval recruits and 280 
college undergraduates (Spielberger, 1988). T-Anger scale scores were compared with 
scores from the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (BDHI) and the Hostility and Overt 
Hostility scales of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). All 
correlations were significant at <.01 for both males and females. Spielberger (1988) also 
studied the correlations between the STAXI T-Anger and S-Anger scales and the 
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) subscales and the Trait and State Anxiety and 
Curiosity Scales of the State-Trait Personality Inventory (STPI). Moderate correlations 
between the EPQ Neuroticism scales and the T-Anger scale as well as between the State 
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and Trait Anxiety scales from the STPI and the T-Anger scale were significant and 
interpreted by Spielberger (1988) as consistent with the theory that individuals high in 
neuroticism and trait anxiety frequently experience angry feelings that they suppress (p. 
12). Correlations of the T-Anger scale with the EPQ Extraversion scale and the STPI S- 
and T-Curiosity scales were essentially zero and suggested that T-Anger is not related to 
those personality constructs.  
Convergent and divergent validity for the AX/EX scale has also been provided 
(Spielberger, Johnson, Russell, Crane, Jacobs, & Worden, 1985). Correlations of the AX 
subscales with the STPI state and trait curiosity subscales were relatively nonexistent, but 
significant correlations were found with trait anxiety for both males and females (ranging 
from .24 to .34). Correlations between the AX/EX total anger expression scores and the 
STPI anger measures were lower although still significant with the exception of the STPI 
T-Anger/T and AX/EX correlation for females, which was essentially zero.  
In an analysis of the 44-item STAXI (Fuqua, Leonard, Masters, Smith, Campbell 
& Fischer, 1991), as well as a replication analysis (Forgays, Forgays, & Spielberger, 
1997) the structure of the measure was examined to determine whether the use of the 
different subscales is justified. The researchers concluded that the structural validity of 
the STAXI was better than expected and that the scale structure they found was similar to 
that claimed for this instrument.  
 Expectancy Questionnaire for Alcohol and Aggression—Low Dose. 
The current study views aggressive scripts as knowledge structures in memory 
that represent information about when and why it might be appropriate to use aggression 
in a given situation, and what will happen as a result. Alcohol scripts are viewed in a 
similar fashion. It is reasonable to expect that knowledge structures about aggression 
secondary to alcohol use will contain information about the circumstances under which 
someone drinking alcohol would be aggressive and what the outcomes might be. 
Therefore the Expectancy Questionnaire for Alcohol and Aggression—Lo Dose version 
(EQAAL; Epps, Hunter, LeVasseur, Steinberg, & Hancock, unpublished manuscript) was 
used in the current study to measure expectancies that participants hold about behaving 
aggressively following the consumption of low but behaviorally significant doses of 
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alcohol.  Questions from other measures that tap alcohol and aggression related 
expectancies were also included for later study (i.e., the Alcohol Expectancy 
Questionnaire, Brown, Goldman, Inn & Anderson, 1980; the Drinking Expectancy 
Questionnaire, Young & Knight, 1989; the Comprehensive Effects of Alcohol 
Questionnaire, Fromme, Stroot, & Kaplan, 1993; the Effects of Drinking Alcohol scale, 
Leigh & Stacy, 1993; and, the Alcohol Expectancy Questionnaire-3, George, Frone, 
Cooper, Russell, Skinner, & Windle, 1995). The items taken from these measures are 
provided in Appendix E but the psychometric properties of their respective scales will not 
be discussed.  
The EQAAL is a 23-item scale representing a cognitive-behavioral taxonomy of 
alcohol-aggression expectancies divided into four factors. Factor analysis indicated two 
affective factors labeled Unprovoked Anger Expectancies (UnpAng; 8 items) and 
Reactive Anger Expectancies (AngReac; 7 items), one cognitive factor labeled 
Expectancies of Hostile Cognitions (HostCog; 3 items), and one behavioral factor labeled 
Expectancies to Maintain Control (ExpCon; 5 items). Confirmatory factor analysis 
revealed the following factor loadings: UnpAng = .70; AngReac = .68; HostCog = .71; 
and, ExpCon = .78. High internal consistency was demonstrated by computing 
Chronbach’s alpha (UnpAng = .88, AngReac = .81, HostCog = .76, and ExpCon = .82). 
Intercorrelations between the various scales ranged from -.014 to .53. The higher 
intercorrelations were among the two anger factors and the hostile cognitions factor. Six-
week test-retest reliability with a separate group of students revealed the following 
Pearson product-moment correlations: UnpAng = .80, AngReac  = .57, HostCog = .56, 
and ExpCon = .79. No significant differences were found on any of the subscales 
according to gender or ethnicity. Although the EQAAL shows promise as a more precise 
measure of alcohol-aggression expectancies, studies that provide evidence of 
discriminant and convergent validity are lacking.  
The current study provides additional evidence for internal consistency. 
Coefficient alphas for three of the four factors were quite high and were as follows: 
Unprovoked Anger Expectancies = .93, Expectancies of Hostile Cognitions = .77, 
Reactive Anger Expectancies = .88, and Expectancies to Maintain Control  = .90. 
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Phase II Materials 
 During Phase II, participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Appendix G). Then they completed either the Dichotic Listening 
Task (DLT) or the Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT) in the presence or absence of alcohol-
related stimuli. During either task they were exposed to aggressive and nonaggressive 
stimuli (word stimuli are included in Appendix H) while they responded to a reaction 
time task. Upon completion of the computer task, they completed a recognition task 
(Appendix I) followed by the PANAS again, and the Brief Drinker Profile (Appendix J; 
for later study). Finally, participants were debriefed about the study (Appendix K) and 
awarded their extra credit points.  
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. 
It was possible that exposure to aggression stimuli would induce or increase 
negative affect. To investigate this possibility, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was given to participants before and after 
they completed the computer task in Phase II. Both times the participants were instructed 
to read the adjectives and “indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at 
this very moment.” 
The PANAS consists of 10 positive adjectives and 10 negative adjectives that are 
assumed to represent two orthogonal dimensions of mood—positive affect and negative 
affect. In order to develop these scales, a range of descriptors (60 adjectives taken from 
Zevon and Tellegen, 1982) that loaded .40 or greater on the relevant positive or negative 
factor and that did not load |.25| on the other factor, were selected. Of 12 positive 
descriptors, two more items were dropped that had relatively high secondary loadings on 
the negative affect factor for a final pool of 10 items. Of the 25 negative descriptors, two 
content categories were dropped altogether leaving two items from each of five content 
categories (distressed, angry, fearful, guilty, and jittery).  For example, the items that 
represent “angry” are hostile and irritable. The authors obtained PANAS ratings using 
six time frames (moment, today, past few days, past few weeks, year, and in general) and 
found acceptably high alpha reliabilities (ranging from .86 to .90 for positive affect and 
from .84 to .87 for negative affect) and low correlations between the scales (ranging from 
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-.12 to -.23, indicating about 1-5% shared variance). Test-retest reliability indicated 
stability over a two-month time period, with greater stability over longer time frames. 
Validity for the PANAS was also acceptable, based upon good factorial validity and 
expected correlations with measures of related constructs (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). 
In the current study, coefficient alphas for the positive affect scale were .87 (Time 
1) and .88 (Time 2). Coefficient alphas for the negative affect scale were .64 (Time 1) 
and .72 (Time 2). When comparing the positive and negative affect scales at Time 1, 
alpha was .22. At Time 2 alpha was .04. Overall, the scales appear to measure orthogonal 
constructs as maintained by Watson, et al. (1988). 
 Dichotic Listening Task (DLT). The participants’ primary task was to attend to 
one channel of a DLT while they simultaneously performed a computer task. The 
computer program was created using Superlab Pro, Version 2, which presented word 
pairs dichotically (through headphones) and number strings (on the monitor) using a Dell 
PC.  
During the computer task, participants indicated by the press of a button whether 
the center number in a five-digit string of numbers was odd or even. Between number 
strings, a capital X was placed in the center of the screen and served as the fixation point. 
Two seconds later, the .wav file played and the number string appeared. After two 
seconds, or as soon as the odd or even button was pressed, the X reappeared. The 
computer program recorded, in milliseconds, the time between onset of the number string 
to the pressing of the red (“odd”) key or the blue (“even”) key. If no key was pressed 
within 2 seconds of stimulus presentation, RT was recorded as .00 seconds and the 
response was marked as incorrect. All participants were presented with 10 Blank trials, 
10 Practice Trials, 80 Word Type Trials mixed with 10 Blank Trials, and 10 final Practice 
Trials. Within a type of trial, a different randomly generated order of stimuli was 
presented to each participant to control for order effects. 
 Word Pairs. The words presented to the unattended channel consisted of words 
rated as high aggressive, ambiguously aggressive, low aggressive or nonaggressive (as 
used in Edington, 1997; see Appendix H). Two types of aggressive words (high and 
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nonaggressive) were selected in order to examine whether these levels would be 
predictive of differential cognitive interference. Low aggressive and ambiguous 
aggressive words were also included. However, these two word types were included for 
later study. All of the words presented simultaneously to the attended channel consisted 
of additional nonaggressive words.  
Twenty word pairs comprised each of the Word Type conditions—called 
NonAgg, LoAgg, AmbAgg, and HiAgg—for a total of 80 word pairs. All four types of 
words were selected from a normed database of over 5000 words and their associated 
links compiled by Nelson, McEvoy and Schreiber (1999). Words in the HiAgg category 
were associated with aggression-related concepts from 60-95% of the time. Examples 
include brawl, stab and fight. Words in the AmbAgg category were related to aggression 
concepts 35-50% of the time. Examples include tank, strike, and punch. LoAgg words 
were associated with aggression-related concepts 10-20% of the time and included mask, 
fray, and hide. The NonAgg words had no evident association with aggression-related 
concepts. Examples included store, few, and desk. Additionally, both words in the word 
pairs began with the same consonant sound. For example, stab was paired with store.  
Ten words, without a paired word, were presented before the practice words 
(Blanks). Ten NonAgg word pairs were presented at the beginning of the computer task 
to investigate practice effects (Practice words) and another 10 Blanks were mixed in with 
the 80 pairs of experimental words. This yielded 100 word pairs and 20 Blanks that were 
presented at a rate of one pair approximately every four seconds. 
Word pairs were recorded and saved as sound .wav files using the Adobe 
Audition program. Detailed information about the word stimuli is provided in Appendix 
H. All of the words were recorded using the same male voice. The Superlab program 
accessed these files and used them for the Dichotic Listening Task. The audio 
presentation typically lasted from .50 to .80 seconds.  
Parafoveal Visual Task. The Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT) computer program 
was also written with Superlab Pro, Version 2.14 and presented on a Dell PC. 
Participants completed the same odd vs. even number decision-making task as in the 
Dichotic Listening Task. However, the experimental words (Word Type) were presented 
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as written words within the parafoveal visual field of the participant. Single 
nonaggressive words played in stereo on the headphones. The PVT methodology 
resembled that of Chartrand and Bargh (1996), Experiment 2. On a computer screen, 
these researchers presented a word and a subsequent masking stimulus at an angle of 45°, 
135°, 225°, or 315° from asterisks in the center of the screen (the fixation point). These 
four quadrants coincided with an area approximately 7.6 cm from the fixation point. 
Thus, stimuli were presented to the parafoveal visual field, which has been shown to be 
from 2° to 6° of visual angle.  
In order for the experimental word stimuli to appear within the parafoveal range, 
participants in the current study were situated in front of the screen such that their eyes 
were 65 cm from the fixation point. The center of the word stimulus appeared 2.6 cm 
above, below, to the left, or to the right of the fixation point. Detailed information about 
the parafoveal stimuli is provided in Appendix H. The distance of 65 cm from the 
monitor insured that if the participant leaned forward 5 cm (approximately 2 inches) or 
back 5 cm, the stimulus would still be presented within 2° to 6° of visual angle. 
 Chartrand and Bargh (1996) used brief prime word duration, immediate masking, 
and parafoveal presentation of words to prevent conscious awareness of subliminally 
primed stimuli. These precautionary measures were observed in the current study as well. 
Experimental words were presented for a duration of 100 milliseconds, which is halfway 
between the duration Bargh et al. (1995) used and the minimum that Rayner (1978) 
suggested. The masking stimulus, “WQXQW,” replaced the experimental word for the 
next 60 milliseconds. Response time to press the odd or even key after stimulus 
presentation was recorded by the Cedrus RB-610 Response Pad. Cedrus has reported that 
the response pad provides reaction time data that is accurate to within 1 millisecond. 
 Experimental Settings. The barroom is a room at the University of South Florida 
created as an analogue drinking environment filled with typical drinking paraphernalia. 
The “clean” room is another room in the same building that is devoid of any alcohol 
related cues. Participants were assigned to one of the two settings in order to examine 
whether alcohol cues would increase or decrease overall reaction times or error rates to 
aggression stimuli.  
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Recognition Task. Recognition tasks are often used to determine whether 
awareness of stimuli has occurred (Bargh, 1982; Edington, 1996; Epps, Hunter, 
LeVasseur, Steinberg, & Hancock, 1997). Usually, some words that were presented 
during the relevant task are listed on a sheet of paper along with some words that the 
participant had not been exposed to, and the participant is asked to check off words he or 
she recognizes. Better than chance recognition of words to which participants were 
exposed may indicate awareness of those stimuli. In the current study, minimal to no 
awareness of the stimuli presented via the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT) or the 
Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT) was expected to occur. 
 For this study, one recognition task was created to determine whether participants 
were momentarily aware that alcohol or aggression related stimuli were presented to the 
unattended channel in the DLT or parafoveally in the PVT. The recognition task that was 
used is provided in Appendix I. The recognition task contained 14 “Control” words, 
which were words that participants were instructed to listen to in the attended channel of 
the DLT or in stereo for the PVT. The recognition task also contained eight Experimental 
words that had been presented to the unattended channel or parafoveally. Eighteen New 
words were selected that participants had not been exposed to during any task. These 
words were similar in length and general meaning to words that they had been exposed 
(e.g., hate and maim were selected as equivalent aggression words for shout and gun). 
New words were selected from Nelson, et al. (1999) database. Participants were 
instructed to check off words that they recognized seeing or hearing during their 
respective task.  
The additional questions on the recognition task were intended to provide 
information about whether the participants had guessed the purpose of the computer task, 
or if they were aware of a connection between completing the computer task and filling 
out a variety of aggression and alcohol-aggression related questionnaires during a 
previous, supposedly unrelated experiment (i.e., during Phase I).  
Procedure 
 Phase I was conducted over Fall 2004 through Summer 2005. Students were 
recruited via an online research data management program, Experimentrak, used by the 
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University of South Florida’s Psychology Department. Participants completed the 
questionnaires either online or in groups of 10 to 20 in small classrooms. Minor changes 
were made to the questionnaires, Informed Consent, and the Debrief form in order to 
accommodate an online format. Participants were asked to complete the AQ, the 
EQAAL, the STAXI, and a demographic questionnaire (see Appendix F) for extra credit 
toward their course grade. After completing the questionnaires, participants were asked to 
indicate their willingness to be contacted at a later date for participation in a larger study 
(see Appendix A) and were given a debrief form (see Appendix K). For the online 
participants, the request for participation in another study was omitted. Whether 
participants completed the Phase I questionnaires in classrooms or online, they were 
contacted at least two later and asked to participate in Phase II. The time delay was 
included to reduce the possibility that alcohol- or aggression-related concepts would be 
active, or recently primed, during Phase II of the study. 
Participants who had indicated interest in the larger study on the questionnaires; 
who did not indicate motor, hearing, or visual impairments; and who indicated that 
English was their native/first language were contacted at least two weeks later by phone 
or e-mail and invited to participate in a computer task study (Phase II). Those completing 
the questionnaires online had already passed a screener (which included similar questions 
about impairments and first language) and were contacted at least two weeks later by e-
mail and invited to participate in Phase II. Whether recruited by phone, e-mail, or online, 
some deception was necessary to increase the likelihood that participants were unaware 
that the two phases of the study were related. All participants of Phase II were fully 
debriefed about the connection between the two phases before leaving the lab. 
 Recruitment of participants to return for Phase II of the study was inadequate. A 
few weeks after Phase II was initiated, a lottery was instituted. When participants were 
contacted about participation in Phase II, they were told that when they arrived for the 
study their participation identification number (IDN) would be entered into a lottery that 
included three $20 drawings. They were told that if they then decided to participate, their 
IDN would be entered into the drawing again. When recruitment did not appear to 
improve, Informed Consent was changed to specify monetary remuneration and 
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participants were paid $5 for their participation in addition to being included in the 
lottery.    
 Before a participant arrived, he or she was assigned to one of the two tasks and 
one of the two settings. Upon arrival, participants were asked if they had any impairment 
that would prevent them from completing the computer tasks and if English had been 
their primary language since birth. Those that were appropriate for the study were shown 
to the designated area of the lab and seated in front of the computer. They were asked to 
complete the PANAS before instructions were given regarding the computer task. 
For the Dichotic Listening Task, participants were told that they would be doing 
two tasks at one time. Their most important task was to listen to the word presented in the 
ear they were instructed to attend and count the number of words that started with the 
letter “L.” They were also told to ignore any words they might hear in the other channel. 
Participants were told that if they could report the correct number of L words within plus 
or minus two, their IDN would be entered into the lottery again. At the same time that 
word pairs were presented, participants completed a decision-making task. Participants 
were instructed to decide whether the center number of a five-digit stimulus appearing in 
the center of the computer screen represented an even number or an odd number (e.g., 
04863). Participants were asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible by 
pressing a key to indicate that the number was odd, or a different key indicating that the 
number was even. For example, for the word pair kill-key, participants would have 
ignored the word kill and would not have counted the word key and, at the exact same 
time, they would have pressed the EVEN button to indicate that the center number in the 
string 04863 was even. 
For the Parafoveal Visual Task, participants completed the same two tasks. There 
were two fundamental differences: 1) all of the words presented on the headphones were 
single nonaggressive control words presented in stereo, and 2) the experimental word of 
the word pair was presented on the computer screen to the participant’s parafoveal region 
(i.e., at 2˚ to 6˚ angle from the fixation point). For the word pair scream-lake, participants 
would have heard the word lake in stereo on their headphones, they would have counted 
it as an L word, they would not have been expected to notice the word scream flashed to 
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their parafoveal region, and, at the same exact time, they would have pressed the ODD 
button because the center number in the string 23501 is odd.  
To insure that the experimental word stimuli were always presented to the 
parafoveal region, a ruler was used to measure 65 centimeters between the participant’s 
eyes and the center of the monitor. The chair was stationary and participants were 
instructed to maintain this position during the computer task and told that the distance 
between their eyes and the computer would be measured again after completion of the 
task.  
For either computer task, all 100 word-pairs (and 20 Blanks) took approximately 
11 minutes to complete. Once instructions had been given, the participant donned the 
headphones, the experimenter left the room, and the participant began the task. Upon 
reentering the room, the experimenter asked all participants to report the number of L 
words they heard and to complete the Recognition Task (Appendix I). Participants were 
then given the PANAS to complete for a second time. Next, they were asked a number of 
questions about their patterns of drinking in order to obtain an estimate of their standard 
ethanol consumptions units over the last three months. This estimate was obtained using a 
brief version of the Comprehensive Drinker Profile (Marlatt & Miller, 1986; Appendix J). 
Finally, all participants were told about the purpose of the study and the minor deception 
involving the connection between Phase I and Phase II.  They were then given a debrief 
form (Appendix K) to take with them.    
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Results 
Descriptives 
 Visual inspection of histograms indicated that the Reaction Time (RT) sample 
means for the two word types were normally distributed. Measures of kurtosis and 
skewness were within acceptable ranges (all within ± 1). For Error Rate, sample means 
were not normally distributed for the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT), with measures of 
kurtosis and skewness as high as 5.31 and 2.27, respectively. Overall, ER means for the 
DLT tended to bunch up around .00 (no errors) with relatively few means over .10 for 
word type HiAgg. Therefore, any results using Error Rate means from the DLT should be 
interpreted with appropriate caution. 
 
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for RT HiAgg—NonAgg Difference 
Scores and Trait Anger Predictor Variables for PVT Completed in the Presence of 
Alcohol Cues (N = 22)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable     M         SD           1    2  
________________________________________________________________________ 
RT HiAgg—NonAgg DS           52.76        64.67         -.68*  .01 
Predictor Variable    
1. Trait Anger/Angry Temperament  6.36         1.71            --  .30 
2. Trait Anger/Angry Reaction  8.82         1.26                -- 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note. RT = Reaction Time; DS = Difference Scores; HiAgg = High Aggression Word 
Type; NonAgg = Non Aggression Word Type; PVT = Parafoveal Visual Task 
*p < .001 
  69
The possible bias that could exist in the data due to outliers for the RT data was 
considered. Response latencies higher than 2000 milliseconds (2 seconds) were recorded 
as missing data for RT and as an error. By design, this cutoff limited the potential for 
extreme outliers to exist in the data. When considering the two Word Types of interest 
(NonAgg and HiAgg) and a cutoff of three standard deviations, there were roughly 45 
outliers out of 3,160 data points (approximately 1.4%). However, the data were fairly 
evenly spread across the data and were not deleted from the analyses. 
  
Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for RT HiAgg—NonAgg Difference 
Scores and EQAAL Predictor Variables for PVT Completed in the Presence of Alcohol 
Cues (N=22) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable      M         SD   1      2              3               4  
________________________________________________________________________ 
RT HiAgg—NonAgg DS 52.76        64.67  .01    -.29          -.47*        .06 
Predictor Variable    
1. EQAAL – AngReac 21.18         6.81    --     .22          .48          .62** 
2. EQAAL – ExpCon  18.96           6.11                   --            .57**     -.19 
 
3. EQAAL – HostCog   6.86         2.27             --            .27 
 
4. EQAAL – UnpAng  16.59           6.40       -- 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. RT = Reaction Time; HiAgg = High Aggression Word Type; NonAgg = Non 
Aggression Word Type; EQAAL = Expectancy Questionnaire for Alcohol and 
Aggression – Low Dose; DS = Difference Score; AngReac = Angry Reaction 
Expectancies; ExpCon = Expectancies to Maintain Control; HostCog = Expectancies for 
Hostile Cognitions; UnpAng = Unprovoked Anger Expectancies; PVT = Parafoveal 
Visual Task 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Correlations among the trait anger measures and HiAgg—NonAgg difference score 
means used in the regression analyses are presented in Table 1. Correlations among the 
EQAAL subscales and HiAgg—NonAgg difference score means are presented in Table 
2. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Reaction Time for Word Type. The first step in evaluating each of the hypotheses 
for this study was to demonstrate differential responding across Word Type. Mean RTs 
were calculated for each type of word and a Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) was used with two levels (NonAgg and HiAgg Word Type) of the within-
subject factor and two levels (Setting: Barroom vs. Cleanroom) of the between subject 
factor. ANOVA was used in an attempt to control familywise error. DLT and PVT data 
were analyzed separately. 
Statistical analyses failed to indicate a significant interaction between Word Type 
and Setting for the DLT [F(1, 36) = 3.05, p > .05] or the PVT [F(1, 39) = .46, p > .05]. 
Therefore, main effects were inspected. The main effect of Word Type for the DLT was 
not significant [F(1, 36) = .76, p > .05] with low power (.14). The main effect of Word 
Type for the PVT was significant [F(1, 39) = 25.87, p < .001] with power at 1.00.  
RT means in milliseconds for the DLT were 696.32 (SD = 172.53; NonAgg), and 
684.82 (SD = 154.97; HiAgg). RT means for the PVT for the two word types were 
651.15 (SD = 211.42, NonAgg) and 698.17 (SD = 219.62; HiAgg). RT means as a 
function of Task X Word Type are shown in Figure 1. 
RT means in milliseconds for the DLT in the barroom setting were 665.24 (SD = 
152.69; HiAgg) and 703.79 (SD = 176.95; NonAgg). In the cleanroom setting, RT means 
were 702.44 (SD = 158.79; HiAgg) and 689.59 (SD = 172.77; NonAgg). 
RT means in milliseconds for the PVT in the barroom setting were 730.15 (SD = 
239.29; HiAgg) and 677.39 (SD = 219.48; NonAgg). For the PVT in the cleanroom 
setting, RT means were 661.14 (SD = 194.12; HiAgg) and 620.76 (SD = 203.26; 
NonAgg). RT means for the PVT as a function of Setting X Word Type are shown in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 1. RT as a function of task type X word type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. PVT RT Means as a function of setting X word type. 
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Error Rate for Word Type. The number of errors (incorrectly selecting Odd vs 
Even) made by each participant was summed and converted to a mean error rate 
(percentage) for both Word Types (NonAgg and HiAgg). The analyses used for ER 
mirrored those used for RT.  
Statistical analyses indicated that the interaction between Word Type and Setting 
for ER was not significant for the DLT [F(1, 36) = .31, p > .05] or the PVT [F(1, 39) = 
.67, p > .05]. The main effect of Word Type for the DLT was not significant [F(1, 36) = 
.31, p > .05] with low power (.08). The main effect of Word Type for the PVT was 
significant [F(1, 39) = 28.94, p < .001] with power at 1.00.  
ER mean percentages for the DLT for the two word types were 3% (SD = 4.7%; 
NonAgg) and 2.6% (SD = 4.6%; HiAgg). ER means for the PVT were 4.5% (SD = 5%, 
NonAgg) and 10.6% (SD = 6.1%; HiAgg). ER means are shown in Figure 3 as a function 
of Task Type X Word Type.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Error rate as a function of task type X word type. 
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Main effects for Setting were not significant for the DLT when considering ER 
means [F(1, 36) = .39, p > .05; power = .09]. Main effects for Setting also were not 
significant for PVT ER means [F(1,39) = .63, p > .05; power = .12]. ER mean 
percentages for the DLT in the cleanroom setting were 3% (SD = 4%; NonAgg) and 3% 
(SD = 3%; HiAgg). In the barroom setting, ER mean percentages were 3% (SD = 6%; 
NonAgg), 3% (SD = 6%; HiAgg). ER mean percentages for the PVT in the cleanroom 
setting were 4% (SD = 5%; NonAgg) and 11% (SD = 4%; HiAgg) For the PVT in the 
barroom setting, ER mean percentages were 10% (SD = 8%; HiAgg). It is apparent when 
looking across task that the presence of alcohol cues did not appear to make a difference 
in the distribution of error rates or reaction times. 
Implications of Differential Responding Across Word Type. The significant main 
effect of Word Type on Error Rate was unexpected. As previously noted, error rate was 
not found useful for detecting mean differences in word type on a dichotic listening task 
(Edington, 1996). The lack of mean differences for the DLT was replicated in the current 
study. But, for the PVT, ER means differed significantly by Word Type. According to the 
theory driving the current methodology, higher error rates for words that are more 
aggressive in nature should reflect more attentional interference from (or the pulling of 
attention toward) those words. The current results for the PVT supported this assumption 
for ER and RT.  
Both ER and RT appeared to measure the ability of aggression words presented 
parafoveally to pull attention away from a decision making task. Although this finding is 
important because it suggests that the PVT may be a useful methodology for 
investigating automatic attention, the predictive value of the overall methodology was 
central to this thesis. Therefore, regression analyses were necessary to better understand 
the relationship between participant’s self-reported trait aggression or alcohol-aggression 
expectancies and the attentional interference that could arise from aggression words.   
Overall, ER means were higher and latencies to respond (RT means) were longer 
when participants were exposed to high aggression stimuli presented parafoveally. This 
finding made it possible to use the magnitude of the difference to reflect each individual’s 
sensitivity to HiAgg words vs. NonAgg words. That is, the difference scores in the 
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current study were regarded as a meaningful index of the magnitude of attentional 
interference caused by HiAgg words for each participant. To investigate the potential 
usefulness of such an index, a difference score was calculated by simply subtracting the 
NonAgg mean from the HiAgg mean for both ER and RT data. This method of 
calculating a difference score was comparable to that used by Townshend and Duka 
(2001). To investigate Hypotheses 1 through 3, all of the regression analyses were 
conducted using ER and RT HiAgg means as the criterion variables first and then the 
analyses were repeated using the ER and RT HiAgg—NonAgg mean difference scores as 
the criterion variables. The results of both approaches are provided. 
Analyses of Alcohol Cue Moderation 
For each hypothesis, Setting (and hence alcohol cues) was tested as a moderator 
of the specified relationship. In the current study, moderation was considered to be the 
combined influence of two variables after controlling for the effects of each variable 
alone. If the interaction of the two variables successfully predicts the criterion variable, 
moderation could be said to have occurred. If moderation occurs, it is reasonable to 
disambiguate the combined effects by repeating the analyses at each level (e.g., Barroom 
vs. Cleanroom) of the moderating variable. This method follows the approach suggested 
by Pedhazur (1997). Therefore, in the current study, the moderating effect of Setting was 
explored by entering a trait anger subscale or EQAAL subscale and Setting (coded as 1 
for Cleanroom and 2 for Barroom) into the regression equation first, and the product of 
those two variables second. Significant interaction terms were then parsed apart by 
entering the relevant subscale in one step with either Barroom or Cleanroom cases 
selected, and vice versa. Since the main effects for Word Type were not significant for 
the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT) using RT or ER data, DLT data were not examined. 
Hypothesis 1 
Participants who self-report higher levels of trait anger will demonstrate longer 
latencies and higher error rates (more attentional interference) when exposed to self-
relevant cues of aggression than those who report lower levels of trait anger. This effect 
will hold whether participants are tested in the presence or absence of alcohol cues. 
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HiAgg Word Type, Trait Characteristics, and Alcohol Cue Moderation. 
To evaluate Hypothesis 1, multiple regression analyses using Parafoveal Visual 
Task (PVT) data were conducted. Each trait anger subscale (representing the predictor 
variable) from the STAXI was regressed on HiAgg word RT means and ER means 
(representing the dependent variable). The subscales included the Trait-Anger/Angry 
Temperament (T-Ang/T) subscale and the Trait-Anger/Angry Reaction (T-Ang/R) 
subscale.  
Neither T-Ang/T nor T-Ang/R with Setting as a moderator predicted responses to 
HiAgg words presented parafoveally when using either ER data or RT data. Therefore, 
difference scores were examined. 
Difference Scores, Trait Characteristics, and Alcohol Cue Moderation. 
Using HiAgg—NonAgg ER difference scores, the regression equation including 
T-Ang/T, Setting, and the interaction term was significant [R2 = .22, adjusted R2 = .16, 
∆F (1, 37) = 4.35, p < .05]. Examination of the bivariate correlations between T-Ang/T 
and ER difference scores for participants tested in the Barroom revealed that T-Ang/T 
was positively associated with ER difference scores [r(22) = .50, p < .01; t(22) = 2.55, p < 
.05]. That is, angry temperament tended to increase as attentional interference (mean ER 
differences) increased. The bivariate correlation in the Cleanroom was not significant 
[r(19) = -.02, p > .05] indicating that alcohol cues (Setting) moderated the effect of trait 
angry temperament on the magnitude of the difference for HiAgg vs NonAgg error rates.  
Using HiAgg—NonAgg RT difference scores, a different pattern emerged. The 
regression equation including T-Ang/T, Setting, and the interaction term was again 
significant [R2 = .37, adjusted R2 = .31, ∆F (1, 37) = 16.86, p < .001. However, 
examination of the bivariate correlations between T-Ang/T and RT difference scores for 
participants tested in the Barroom revealed that T-Ang/T was negatively associated with 
RT difference scores [r(22) = -68, p < .001, t(22) = -4.09, p < .01]. That is, angry 
temperament tended to increase as the magnitude of attentional interference (mean RT 
differences) decreased. This time, the bivariate correlation in the Cleanroom was also 
significant [r(19) = .41, p < .05]. However, the model was not [R2 = .17, adjusted R2 = 
.12, F(1, 18) = 3.44, p > .05]. This may be due to the instability of the regression 
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coefficient [Beta = .41, t(19) = 1.86, p > .05]. For the Trait Anger/Angry Reaction (T-
Ang/R) subscale of the STAXI, no main effects or interaction effects were observed. 
In order to more fully investigate the relationship between trait angry 
temperament and reaction time for participants in general (that is, between subjects), PVT 
participants were blocked into high or low trait angry temperament. This yielded 20 
participants with a score of 5 or lower (the Low T-Ang/T group) and 17 participants with 
a score of 7 or higher (the High T-Ang/T group). Therefore, a 2 (Word Type: NonAgg vs. 
HiAgg) X 2 (Setting: Barroom vs. Cleanroom) X 2 (Angry Temperament: High vs. Low) 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with RT as the dependent variable. As 
expected, the main effect for Word Type was significant. However, there was also a 
significant three-way interaction between Word Type, Setting, and Angry Temperament, 
F(1, 34) = 11.86, p < .01 with power observed at .92.  
Next, four follow-up paired t-tests were conducted to examine simple effects for 
Word Type. For participants completing the PVT in the barroom, those who self-reported 
lower trait anger had significantly longer RT means for HiAgg words (M = 704.52, SD = 
297.18) than for NonAgg words [M = 621.35, SD = 248.31; t(8) = -3.37, p = .01]. For 
those higher on T-Ang/T, no differences emerged in the barroom [t(10) = -1.20, p > .05] 
for HiAgg words (M = 616.43, SD = 195.18) versus NonAgg words (M = 599.93, SD = 
227.66). For participants completing the task in the cleanroom, the pattern of results was 
reversed. That is, for participants who reported higher levels of angry temperament, RTs 
to HiAgg words (M = 739.90, SD = 191.78) were significantly longer than RTs to 
NonAgg words [M = 670.54, SD = 186.63; t(5) = -5.11, p = .004]. The RT means for 
HiAgg words (M = 732.50, SD = 215.94) were not significantly different from NonAgg 
words (M = 713.20, SD = 216.45) for participants lower on angry temperament when 
tested in the cleanroom [t(10) = -1.48, p > .05)]. 
It is apparent that the ANOVA results and t-tests replicated the results produced 
by examining the data using regression and interaction terms. Overall, support for 
Hypothesis 1 using either method of analysis was mixed. Using ER difference scores, the 
positive relationship between angry temperament and the magnitude of attentional 
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interference in the Barroom was predicted. The negative association that resulted in the 
Barroom when using RT difference scores was not predicted.  
Hypothesis 2 
Participants who self-report higher levels of alcohol-aggression expectancies will 
demonstrate longer latencies and higher error rates when exposed to aggression cues than 
those who report low levels of alcohol-aggression expectancies. Setting should moderate 
this effect. That is, the effect should hold only for participants tested in the presence of 
alcohol cues. 
HiAgg Word Type, Alcohol-Aggression Expectancies, and Alcohol Cue 
Moderation. To investigate Hypothesis 2, each alcohol-aggression subscale (representing 
the predictor variable) from the EQAAL was regressed individually on HiAgg word 
means (representing the dependent variable). The four subscales of the EQAAL include 
Unprovoked Anger Expectancies (UnpAng), Angry Reaction (AngReac), Hostile 
Cognitions (HostCog), and Expectancies for Maintaining Control (ExpCon). It is 
important to keep in mind that participants reported likely alcohol-aggression 
expectancies for when they were drinking a low dose of alcohol.  
Using ER data, none of the regressions for the main effect of an EQAAL subscale 
or Setting or the interaction term approached significance. Using RT data, the regression 
equation including AngReac, Setting, and the interaction term approached significance in 
relation to HiAgg RT means [R2 = .19, adjusted R2 = .12, ∆F (1, 37) = 4.03, p = .05]. 
Examination of the bivariate correlations for participants in the Barroom revealed that 
AngReac was negatively associated with HiAgg RT means [r(22) = -.51, p < .05, t(22) = 
-2.62, p < .05].  Overall, when participants reported that they were less likely to react 
with anger after consuming a low dose of alcohol, they were more likely to show 
attentional interference from aggression cues when in the presence of alcohol cues. This 
effect did not hold in the absence of alcohol cues [r(19) = -.03, p > .05].  
The regression equation including HostCog, Setting, and the interaction term was 
significantly related to HiAgg RT means [R2 = .28, adjusted R2 = .22, ∆F (1, 37) = 7.97, p 
< .01]. Examination of the bivariate correlations for participants in the Barroom revealed 
that HostCog was negatively associated with HiAgg RT means [r(22) = -.64, p < .01, 
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t(22) = -3.75, p < .01]. When participants reported that they were less likely to be 
suspicious of others after consuming a low dose of alcohol, they were more likely to 
show attentional interference from aggression cues when in the presence of alcohol cues. 
Again, the relationship was not significant in the absence of alcohol cues [r(19) = .03, p > 
.05].  
Although the regression equation using the interaction term representing 
Expectancies to Maintain Control (ExpCon) and Setting to predict HiAgg RT means was 
not significant [R2 = .16, adjusted R2 = .09, ∆F (1, 37) = 2.33, p > .05], the moderate 
bivariate correlation between HiAgg RT means and ExpCon was significant [r(41) = -.31, 
p < .05]. Thus, the effect of Setting was examined. In the Barroom, ExpCon was 
negatively associated with HiAgg RT means [R2 = .22, adjusted R2 = .18, ∆F (1, 37) = 
5.47, p < .05]. In addition, the regression coefficient was significant [t(22) = -2.34, p < 
.05]. Since lower scores on this scale reflect decreased expectancy to maintain behavioral 
control while drinking a low dose of alcohol, the negative association suggested that 
participants who reported fewer control expectancies were also likely to show greater 
attentional interference to HiAgg stimuli. Additionally, the lack of an association 
between these two variables for participants tested in the Cleanroom provides additional 
evidence for the moderating effects of alcohol cues [r(19) = -.02, p > .05].  Regression 
equations using Unprovoked Anger Expectancies and Setting were not significant.  
Difference Scores, Alcohol-Aggression Expectancies, and Alcohol Cue 
Moderation. As with trait variables, scores representing the difference between HiAgg—
NonAgg RT means and HiAgg—NonAgg ER means were used as the criterion variable 
with EQAAL subscales as the predictor variables in multiple regression analyses. The 
potential moderation effect of Setting was investigated as well. For ER difference scores 
none of the regression equations were significant. When considering RT difference 
scores, the regression equation including HostCog, Setting, and the interaction term was 
significantly related to the magnitude of the difference between HiAgg vs. NonAgg RT 
means [R2 = .19, adjusted R2 = .12, ∆F (1, 37) = 7.52, p < .01]. Examination of the 
bivariate correlations for participants tested in the Barroom revealed that HostCog was 
negatively associated with RT difference scores [r(22) = -.47, p = .05, t(22) = -2.39, p < 
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.05]. This relationship suggested that when participants reported that they were less likely 
to be suspicious of others after consuming a low dose of alcohol, the magnitude of 
attentional interference was greater when in the presence of alcohol cues. An inverse 
relationship approached but did not reach significance in the Cleanroom [r(19) = .31, p = 
.10] probably due to the unstable regression coefficient [t(19) = 1.36, p > .05].There were 
no significant regression equations for the other three EQAAL subscale predictors when 
using ER or RT difference scores. 
Although significant results were obtained in relation to the Angry Reaction and 
Expectancies for Hostile Cognitions subscales of the EQAAL, the relationships with 
HiAgg words were negative. Expectancies to Maintain Control were also negatively 
associated with HiAgg RT means but lower scores on this subscale reflect fewer 
expectancies to maintain control while drinking alcohol. Thus, in the presence of alcohol 
cues, greater interference to aggression cues was also associated with higher expectancies 
for losing control while drinking. Conversely, greater attentional interference to 
aggression cues (using HiAgg means or RT difference scores) was associated with a 
lower level of expectancies to react with anger or view others’ intentions suspiciously 
when drinking a low dose of alcohol. Hence, support for this hypothesis was mixed.  
Hypothesis 3 
Higher alcohol-aggression expectancies will predict longer latencies to respond 
and higher error rates on the computer tasks after the effects of trait anger are partialled 
out. However, this effect will hold only for participants tested in the presence of alcohol 
cues.  
Alcohol-Aggression Expectancies After Controlling for Trait Anger. 
In order to investigate whether the EQAAL measure could predict HiAgg means 
beyond trait anger for participants tested in the Barroom, T-Ang/T was entered on step 1 
and then the EQAAL subscale that demonstrated the highest correlation with HiAgg RT 
means (HostCog) was entered on Step 2. The analysis was then repeated using RT 
difference scores and then again using ExpCon since this variable had successfully 
predicted HiAgg RT means in the expected direction. It was decided to use predictor 
variables sparingly because the ratio of the number of predictors to the sample size was 
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too small and inclusion of all four EQAAL subscale scores was likely to result in an 
overestimation of R2 in addition to unstable regression coefficients (Pedhazur, 1997).  
For participants tested in the Barroom, the regression equation was significant 
when regressing HostCog onto HiAgg RT means after T-Ang/T [R2 = .41, adjusted R2 = 
.35, ∆F (1, 19) = 13.00, p < .01]. The regression coefficient for HostCog was also 
significant [Beta = -.65, t(22) = -3.31, p < .01]. When considering HiAgg RT means as 
the criterion variable it appears that participants showed more attentional interference 
from high aggression words when they reported fewer expectancies for thinking 
suspiciously about others’ intentions if they had consumed a low dose of alcohol, 
regardless of their standing on the trait anger construct. This finding held after trait anger 
was partialled out but only in the presence of alcohol cues. That is, the bivariate 
correlation between HostCog and HiAgg means was not significant in the Cleanroom 
[r(19) = -.03, p > 05]. 
When predicting RT difference scores for participants in the Barroom, HostCog 
was significantly predictive beyond trait anger [R2 = .57, adjusted R2 = .53, ∆R2 = .11, ∆F 
(1, 19) = 5.04, p < .05]. Additionally, regression coefficients were significant for both T-
Ang/T [Beta = -.60, t(22) = -9.92, p < .01] and HostCog [Beta = -.35, t(22) = -2.25, p < 
.05]. In the Cleanroom, the bivariate correlation between T-Ang/T and the RT difference 
score was significant and in a positive direction [r(19) = .41, p < .05]. However, the 
bivariate correlation using HostCog was not significant [r(19) = .31, p = .10]. 
Additionally, neither regression equation was significant in the Cleanroom, probably due 
to the instability of the regression coefficients [Beta of T-Ang/T = .36, t(19) = 1.21, p > 
.05; Beta of HostCog = .09, t(19) = .29, p > .05].  
When using ER difference scores instead of RT difference scores, regression 
equations were not significant. Also, when considering ExpCon and HiAgg RT means, 
ExpCon was not predictive after partialling out the effects of T-Ang/T [∆R2 = .03, ∆F (1, 
19) = 1.25, p > .05]. 
For participants in a barroom environment, a consistent and significant 
relationship was uncovered between a measure of alcohol-aggression expectancies 
(HostCog) and attentional interference from aggression stimuli even after controlling for 
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trait anger (see Table 3). Unfortunately, the direction of the associations between alcohol-
aggression expectancies and attentional interference were contrary to expectation. 
Although the finding is intriguing, this hypothesis was not supported. 
 
Table 3 
Regression Model Predicting Attentional Interference (HiAgg—NonAgg Difference 
Scores) from Aggression Stimuli Presented Parafoveally in the Presence of Alcohol Cues 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Predictor Variable   B     ß    t   p  R2 Adj R2         ∆R2      ∆F  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Step 1 
STAXI T-Ang/T       -25.60     -.68    -4.09    .001     .46         .43          .46    16.75* 
Step 2 
STAXI T-Ang/T       -22.85     -.60    -3.92     .001     
EQAAL HostCog       -9.83     -.35    -2.25     .037     .57         .53          .11      5.04* 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. RT = HiAgg = High Aggression Word Type; NonAgg = Non Aggression Word 
Type; STAXI T-Ang/T = State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory Trait Anger/Angry 
Temperament subscale; EQAAL = Expectancy Questionnaire for Alcohol and 
Aggression – Low Dose; HostCog = Expectancies for Hostile Cognitions 
*p < .05. 
 
 
Supplemental Results 
PANAS scores at Time 1 and Time 2. For the Dichotic Listening Task (DLT), the 
overall mean for the Positive Affect scale at Time 1 (M = 2.90, SD = .77) was 
significantly higher than the mean at Time 2 [M = 2.69, SD = .84; t(36) = 2.76, p < .01]. 
For the Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT), Positive Affect means were equivalent from Time 
1 (M = 2.85, SD = .62) to Time 2 [M = 2.75, SD = .66; t(38) = 1.71, p > .05. For the 
Negative Affect scale, overall means were not significantly different between Time 1 and 
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Time 2 for either computer task. DLT means for Negative Affect were 1.28 (SD = .30) at 
Time 1 and 1.21 (SD = .32) at Time 2. PVT means for Negative Affect were 1.27 (SD = 
.24) at Time 1 and 1.26 (SD = .27) at Time 2. Overall, participants experienced a slight 
decrease in Positive Affect when completing only the DLT and did not experience a 
change in Negative Affect when completing either task. 
It is possible that feelings related to the construct of anger could change when a 
person is exposed to words of an aggressive nature even if overall negative affect did not 
change. Two negative affect adjectives were of special interest in the current study—
hostile and irritable—since they are considered to represent the construct of angry. When 
these two adjectives were examined across computer task and time, no differences 
emerged. Given the overall pattern of results for the PANAS, it was unlikely that, at least 
subjectively, participants were experiencing a meaningful change in negative affect as a 
result of their exposure to aggression related words.  
Recognition Task. Participants were expected to check off a higher percentage of 
Control Words (words that they were instructed to attend to) than Experimental words 
(unattended and parafoveal) or New words (words they had never been exposed to). On 
average, participants checked off 41% of the 14 Control words. On average, they also 
checked off 20% of the eight Experimental words, and 19% of the New words. Thus, the 
rate of endorsement for words participants had never seen or heard was equivalent to the 
rate of endorsement for unattended words.  
Regarding the words on the Recognition Task that had been chosen to represent 
HiAgg (e.g., shout and gun), comparable distractor words were selected to represent this 
category (e.g., hate and maim). Comparison of the average number of HiAgg vs. New 
(HiAgg equivalent) words checked off revealed no difference (t  < 1). In fact, a majority 
of participants checked off none of these words. Additionally, there appeared to be no 
discernible difference in the overall patterns of checked words for participants 
completing either task. Although it cannot be unequivocally concluded that conscious 
awareness of the experimental aggression-related words did not occur for a few 
participants, overall the pattern suggests that participants were unable to meaningfully 
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discriminate between unattended stimuli and new stimuli. So, results were generally not a 
product of conscious awareness of unattended stimuli.         
Participants were also asked to write down any other words they thought they 
might have seen or heard that were not listed on the recognition task. It was not 
surprising that most of the words participants recalled started with the letter “L.” Other 
experimental words listed that participants had been exposed to (in the unattended 
channel or parafoveally) included rape, kill, and shoot. All of these words were reported 
by participants in the DLT condition. Other words that participants in the PVT condition 
reported included wow, quick, yellow, and window. It is interesting to note that the 
masking stimulus for the PVT was represented by the string “WQXQW.” It is reasonable 
to consider that wow and quick are examples of words that someone might report when a 
stimulus is only presented for 100 milliseconds outside of his or her foveal region.  
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Discussion 
Comparison of the Dichotic Listening Task vs. the Parafoveal Visual Task 
 A specific hypothesis was not formulated regarding whether the Parafoveal Visual 
Task (PVT) methodology or Dichotic Listening Task (DLT) methodology would be most 
helpful for investigating the confluence of trait characteristics, alcohol-aggression 
expectancies, and aggression stimuli on attention. However, a comparison of the two 
methodologies was the overarching purpose of the current investigation. Power estimates, 
as discussed earlier, provided strong evidence that with an equal number of participants, 
the PVT (observed power = 1) was a more sensitive and useful task for investigating 
qualitative differences among Word Type Reaction Time and Error Rate means than the 
DLT (observed power ranged from .10 to .56).  
 It is possible that, with more participants, differences would have emerged across 
Word Type for the DLT. However, this still suggests that the PVT is a ore sensitive 
procedure. Further, it would be difficult to explain a trend for which the data did not 
conform to a relatively linear relationship (see Figures 1 and 2). The quantitative 
difference between NonAgg and HiAgg words on the PVT made it possible to calculate 
difference scores that may more meaningfully reflect within subject differences to such 
an elusive “black-box” phenomenon as attentional interference. 
Error Rate vs. Reaction Time 
 Error Rate (ER) means showed an equivalent trend to Reaction Time (RT) means 
for PVT data. Overall, ERs were low indicating that most participants had no trouble 
completing the primary “L-word” counting task as well as the secondary odd vs. even 
decision-making task. ER data proved extremely useful for detecting a small group of 
participants who were either unable to, or, more likely, did not choose to follow 
directions to “respond as quickly and accurately as possible.” Poor compliance with the 
directions was indicated by ERs no better than chance. 
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 ER means when used as the criterion variable in regression analyses were not as 
useful as RT means. Given the frequency with which participants made no or relatively 
few errors, it is reasonable to conclude that ER was not sensitive enough to detect minute 
changes in attention.  
HiAgg Means Vs. HiAgg—NonAgg Difference Scores 
Although ER means differed significantly across Word Type in the expected 
direction, individual ER means were not predicted by any of the trait anger or alcohol-
expectancy measures. HiAgg RT means were predicted by three of the four alcohol-
expectancy measures. Using a difference score that should reflect an individual’s level of 
interference from HiAgg words as opposed to NonAgg words also uncovered significant 
relationships among predictor and criterion variables. The nature of the relationships 
were contrary to predictions with the exception of the positive association between 
T/Ang-T and ER difference scores in the presence of alcohol cues. 
 Overall, it appears that ER means, RT means, and difference scores all had 
something important to add in the investigation of differential responding to Word Type 
for the Visual Task. That is, error rate means pointed out participants who may not have 
attended to task directions, RT means provided information about how attentional 
interference varied across participants, and difference scores provided information about 
how attentional interference varied within participants. 
Power for the Regression Analyses 
 In this study, ER and RT means reflected meaningful differences across Word 
Type. However, for ER, only the regression equation used to predict ER difference scores 
(HiAgg mean – NonAgg ER mean) in relation to Trait Anger/Angry Temperament was 
significant. For HiAgg RT means and RT difference scores, several regression equations 
were significant. A larger sample may clarify the relative usefulness of using an RT 
difference score instead of an RT mean as the criterion variable in regression analyses. 
 Overall, effect sizes for the significant regression equations were medium (~ .30) 
to large ~.50). Estimates of adjusted R2 ranged from .12 to .38. Although effect sizes 
were encouraging and moderate to strong bivariate correlations were observed, some 
regression coefficients were unstable. This is likely due to the small ratio between 
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predictors and sample size. For example, if all of the EQAAL subscales had been used to 
predict attentional interference above and beyond trait angry temperament, the ratio 
would have been approximately 1: 4. This is far below the most liberal of 
recommendations  (i.e., 1:15; Pedhazur, 1997).  
Overall, the data did not support the prediction hypotheses or the support was 
mixed. Given the concerns about adequate sample size for the regressions, the following 
conclusions are speculative. 
Hypothesis 1 
 Support for the hypothesis that higher self-reported levels of trait anger would 
predict higher levels of attentional interference from aggression stimuli was only 
provided when using ER mean difference scores (mean HiAgg ER—mean NonAgg ER) 
for participants tested in the presence of alcohol cues. The association between these two 
variables was positive, as specified in the hypothesis, and the effect did not hold in the 
absence of alcohol cues. 
 Since this is the only hypothesis for which ER mean difference scores were 
successfully predicted, and the result does not fit with the pattern of the rest of the results, 
it may be that this finding is spurious, especially given the sample size for the regressions 
and the overall inability of the current methodology to predict error rate differences. 
 Reaction time difference scores (HiAgg RT mean – NonAgg RT mean), on the 
other hand, appeared to be more meaningful and useful for uncovering relationships 
among trait anger, alcohol-aggression expectancies, and attentional interference. 
However, for Hypothesis 1, the association between trait angry temperament and the 
magnitude of attentional interference was predicted to be positive and was, in fact, 
negative. One possible explanation for this finding is that students who generally 
experience fewer angry feelings may be more attentive to stimuli in their environment 
that represents a potential threat. Since the negative association between trait angry 
temperament was found only in the Barroom, it is likely that alcohol cues and aggression 
cues combined to put lower angry temperament participants on the alert. Conversely, 
those with relatively higher levels of trait angry temperament were able to ignore 
aggression stimuli while in the presence of alcohol cues.  
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It may be, for the current study, that lower trait anger participants in the Barroom 
(which might be considered low stress environment when alcohol cues interact with 
aggression cues), experienced a similar attentional bias while participants higher in trait 
anger were able to ignore aggression stimuli in the Barroom. Literature on the 
interference of threat words was reviewed in order to shed some light on this unexpected 
finding. One study (MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992) found an interaction between high vs. 
low anxious participants under high vs. low stress and naming latencies to threatening 
Stroop words. The authors used a difference score (color naming latencies to threat words 
minus color naming latencies to nonthreatening words) to index individual susceptibility 
to attentional interference (p. 486). Low trait anxious individuals under high stress 
displayed a lower magnitude of interference from threatening Stroop words than high 
trait anxious individuals. This effect was reversed when participants were under low 
stress. That is, low trait anxious individuals under low stress showed greater interference 
to threat words than high trait anxious individuals under low stress. However, it appears 
that the findings of MacLeod and Rutherford do not support this alternative explanation. 
Another explanation for the lack of findings in the predicted direction involves the 
conditional compensatory responses (CCR) theory (Siegel, Baptista, Kim, McDonald, & 
Weise-Kelly, 2000). CCRs are initiated by the central nervous system to counteract the 
effects of a drug such as alcohol. Further, CCRs have been found to occur in the presence 
of cues that had earlier been paired with the consumption of a particular drug. Examples 
of these cues are drug-related paraphernalia and the context (environment) under which 
the drug is consumed. It is possible that a classically conditioned response to alcohol cues 
in the barroom prompted a compensatory emotional reaction.  
Although the interaction between Word Type X Setting was found to be 
nonsignificant, and follow-up analyses for Setting at each level of Word Type were not 
significant, Barroom clearly showed a moderating effect in the regression analyses. Also, 
the pattern of Reaction Time (RT) means, without exception, indicated that RT means in 
the barroom for a given word type were always higher than RT means in the cleanroom 
for the same word type. This does not suggest an overall compensatory effect. If a 
compensatory effect were occurring, it would most likely occur for participants with 
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heavier drinking experience since CCRs are presumed to represent the effects of drug 
tolerance. Although drinker status could be calculated from the Comprehensive Drinker 
Profile data collected during this study, the sample size was too small to investigate such 
a hypothesis. The tenability of a conditional compensatory response must await further 
investigation. 
Hypothesis 2 
 It was predicted that alcohol-aggression expectancies would predict attentional 
interference from aggression stimuli but that this effect would be moderated by the 
presence of alcohol cues. When AngReac, HostCog, and ExpCon, were used as 
predictors of HiAgg RT means, each regression equation was significant for participants 
tested in the Barroom. However, the direction of the relationships for the AngReac and 
HostCog variables were negative, and, thus, did not conform to our predictions. The 
relationship between ExpCon and HiAgg RT means was also negative, but the scale is 
scored such that lower scores reflect higher expectancies for losing control while drinking 
a low dose of alcohol. This finding supported our predictions. 
 Higher scores on the AngReac scale would suggest higher expectancies to react 
with anger while drinking a low dose of alcohol in response to a particular event. It is 
possible that participants with higher AngReac expectancies more easily dismissed the 
aggression cues since there was nothing obviously threatening about the Barroom 
environment (i.e., nothing to which to react with anger). The same may be said for 
HostCog scores. Higher scores on this scale would indicate a higher tendency for an 
individual to have suspicious thoughts about the intentions of others while drinking a low 
dose of alcohol. Again, those with higher scores may have more readily dismissed 
aggression stimuli in a clearly nonhostile situation. That is, the activation of aggression 
scripts would undoubtedly include information about the types of circumstances under 
which internal tendencies to feel angry would manifest. Those with lower scores, on the 
other hand, may have fewer or less strongly interconnected scripts for what would happen 
in the presence of alcohol cues, and, consequently, their attentional system was more alert 
to the relatively “novel” aggression stimuli. As with hypothesis 1, it could be illuminating 
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to measure drinking experience with a larger sample to explore the relationship between 
higher vs. lower drinking experience and attentional interference from aggression stimuli.   
 Regarding the capacity of Expectancies to Maintain Control (ExpCon) to predict 
automatic attentional interference, the significant association was in the expected 
direction. That is, participants who reported that they would be more likely to lose control 
while drinking a low dose of alcohol were also more likely to show greater interference 
to aggression stimuli. This result is encouraging in that expectancies to behave 
aggressively should more clearly relate to actually behaving aggressively than to merely 
having angry feelings that are not necessarily expressed behaviorally.  
 In fact, numerous studies are emerging in the literature in which distinctions are 
being made about the qualitative differences among behavioral, affective, and cognitive 
elements of aggression. For example, Giancola, Saucier, and Gussler-Burkhardt (2003) 
found that self-reported affective aggression was not related to behavioral aggression 
whether or not a low dose of alcohol was consumed. They suggested that the experience 
of anger is causally unrelated to behavioral manifestations of anger (p. 1951). Although 
the present study did not provide an opportunity for individuals to exhibit aggression and 
no alcohol was consumed, it is important to understand the extent to which individuals 
are biased toward aggression stimuli in the presence of alcohol cues. The tendency of 
participants with a lower rate of expectancies to maintain control to demonstrate 
attentional interference suggested a behavioral component that may not be tapped by trait 
angry temperament alone. Unfortunately, the results in respect to Hypothesis 3 indicated 
that expectancies to maintain control did not predict attentional interference beyond trait 
angry temperament. Future research may eventually disambiguate the components of 
aggression and determine which ones are causally related to attentional interference or 
behavioral aggression. 
Hypothesis 3 
 Overall, the use of T-Ang/T and HostCog provided the greatest explanatory 
evidence for the relationship between trait anger, alcohol-expectancies, and attentional 
interference. Not surprisingly, given the prior results, the direction of the relationships 
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did not conform to our predictions and ExpCon did not predict attentional interference 
beyond trait angry temperament. 
 The finding, that in the Barroom, T-Ang/T and HostCog contributed uniquely to 
HiAgg RT means and HiAgg—NonAgg difference scores, and that HostCog contributed 
beyond T-Ang/T, is indeed intriguing. The results suggested that after holding trait anger 
constant, lower scores on negative hostile cognitions explained 53% of the variance in the 
magnitude of attentional interference from aggression stimuli. This supports the 
continued need to evaluate alcohol-aggression expectancy networks in addition to trait 
characteristics. 
Alcohol Cues  
 Repeated Measures ANOVA failed to reveal a main effect for Setting or an 
interaction effect for Word Type X Setting. However, it was apparent from the regression 
analyses that alcohol cues moderated the relationships among the variables. This was as 
predicted. It is likely that alcohol cues served to activate aggression networks in some 
fashion. Whether that knowledge structure activation will ultimately be found to 
represent a suppression of attention toward aggression cues or not remains to be explored. 
Depending upon the outcome, a next step could be to explore whether actual behavioral 
aggression increases or decreases. Predicting the salience of internal cues (e.g., 
knowledge structures that include alcohol-aggression-related information) and external 
cues (alcohol stimuli and aggression stimuli) is a goal implied by alcohol myopia theory. 
Although the current methodology did not directly investigate assumptions of the alcohol 
myopia model, the mixed results of this study support the contention that the salience of 
cues is a highly complex matter. Studies such as this may eventually help identify and 
predict relative cue salience.  
Limitations of the Current Study and Future Directions 
 The most problematic concern for interpreting the results of this study is that the 
sample size was not optimal for the regression analyses. It might be possible to increase 
sample size for both the questionnaire and computer task data by collecting all of the data 
over one session. Such a procedure would need to avoid a priming effect if nonconscious 
processes are being investigated. 
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The possibility was explored that the differences in reaction time between 
NonAgg and HiAgg words could be due to the increase in reaction times caused by 
responding to “L” words. Seven “L” words were presented during the DLT and eight “L” 
words were presented during the Parafoveal Visual Task (PVT). For the DLT, none of the 
“L” words were presented within the two word types of interest. For the PVT, two of the 
“L” words were presented within word types of interest.  
Within the NonAgg category, note-lamp was presented resulting in a mean 
reaction time (RT) of 698.18 (SD = 321.92). The mean RT for the other 19 NonAgg 
words was 631.71 (SD = 200.50). The NonAgg “L” word RT mean was not significantly 
different from the mean RT of the other nineteen NonAgg words, t(38 ) = 1.70, p = .10. 
Leaving the RTs for this word pair in the analyses accounted for an increase in total mean 
RT by approximately 4 ms.  
Within the HiAgg category, scream-lake was presented yielding a mean reaction 
time of 853.49 (SD = 411.82). The mean RT for the other 19 HiAgg words was 689.88 
(SD = 216.27). These two RT means were significantly different, t(40) = 3.32, p < .01. 
Leaving the RTs for the word pair in the analyses resulted in an increase in total mean RT 
by about 9 ms. When the data were reanalyzed, the same pattern of results emerged. 
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the results of the current study were due to the 
inclusion of RTs for two “L” words. Although it is unclear why the mean for the HiAgg 
“L” word was significantly higher than the mean for the other 19 HiAgg words, in similar 
future studies it would be prudent to delete words such as the “L” word that may 
contribute to measurement error. 
Another concern for the current study is that the sample was over represented by 
females. It may be that females expect aggressiveness to increase for males who are 
drinking, but not for themselves. The range restriction caused by endorsing items in a 
manner consistent with this assumption (as noted in the section regarding the 
psychometric properties of the STAXI) may have dampened the predictive ability of the 
measures of interest. Since participants were aware that the questionnaires would include 
questions about alcohol and aggression, perhaps this sample of college students wanted to 
present themselves in a more positive light than samples that provide responses outside of 
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an alcohol-aggression context. In the future, adding a measure of social desirability (e.g., 
the Marlowe-Crowne Desirability Scale; Reynolds, 1982) may shed light on this potential 
threat to valid responses.   
Using the current methodology, an indication of how often a participant may have 
actually aggressed (with or without the consumption of alcohol) was not available. Future 
research will need to index the occurrence of behavioral aggression in order to more fully 
understand obtained differences in attentional interference for aggression stimuli. That is, 
perhaps an individual that had self-reported higher levels of trait anger and had reported 
prior instances of aggression would be biased toward aggression stimuli. Or perhaps he or 
she would be more likely to ignore aggression stimuli. Further it may be possible to 
predict behavioral aggression from attentional interference when the participant is then 
given the opportunity to aggress. Validating a methodology to investigate these 
hypotheses was the ultimate goal of this project. In the final estimation, the Parafoveal 
Visual Task provides such a methodology. 
The results of the current study suggested that the relationship between attentional 
interference and trait anger or alcohol-aggression expectancies is not straightforward, 
especially when research into these relationships relies upon self-report. One of the hopes 
of this study was to develop a methodology that may someday augment or even replace 
self-report. That is, if attentional interference (and therefore automatic attention to 
external cues) can be indexed and then shown to relate to aggressive behavior, the need 
for self-report would be obviated. This is a worthy goal of research since people are apt 
to give reports about feelings, thoughts, and behaviors that include biases in how that 
information was stored in memory, biases regarding how they want to be viewed, and 
other biases that may serve any number of unknown or indeterminate goals. It is 
concluded that the current methodology holds promise for further exploring attentional 
interference to aggression stimuli beyond what an individual may report.  
Another limitation of the current study is that the obtained results may not 
generalize to other aggression stimuli or beyond this analog drinking environment. 
Attentional interference is arguably a complex phenomenon that is challenging to study. 
This study represents a small step toward a methodology that may help us understand the 
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link between attentional interference from (or bias toward) aggression stimuli in the 
presence of alcohol cues and how that interference relates to trait characteristics and 
alcohol-aggression expectancies. Understanding these relationships may eventually guide 
us toward new strategies and interventions for those who drink and become aggressive.  
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Footnote 
1 Since significant mean error rate differences were not found in an earlier study 
(Edington, 1996), the potential effect of unreliable data on mean reaction time was 
considered to be of primary importance in the current study. Analyses revealed that when 
reaction time data from participants with chance-level error rates (N = 6) was compared 
with data from those that made relatively few mistakes (N = 79), standard errors 
calculated using Repeated Measures ANOVA were quite different. For low error rate 
participants completing the Dichotic Listening Task the standard error was estimated at 
24.77. For the Parafoveal Visual Task, standard error was 33.55. For high error rate 
participants completing the Dichotic Listening Task, standard error was 153.58 and, for 
the Parafoveal Visual Task, standard error was 162.10. Standard errors were roughly five 
times higher for participants with an error rate at a level no better than chance, further 
supporting the notion that the reaction time data from these six participants was 
unreliable. 
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Appendix A 
Request for Further Participation 
 Our lab is conducting several other experiments at this time. These include the 
completion of various computer tasks. Most of these tasks require from 45 minutes to 1 
hour and 15 minutes. Individuals may receive up to 3 experimental points for 
participating in any one of these experiments. 
 
ARE YOU INTERESTED IN BEING CONTACTED FOR PARTICIPATION IN 
ANY OF THESE STUDIES? 
______ NO 
______ YES (If YES, PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.) 
 
Do you have any hearing, visual, or motor impairments, or any other impairment, that 
would prevent you from completing various computer tasks? 
_______ NO 
_______ YES 
_______ DON’T KNOW/UNSURE (Please describe_______________________________.) 
 
Is English your first/native language? 
_______ NO 
_______ YES 
 
NAME (please print) _____________________________________________________ 
PHONE  NUMBER(S) (where you can be reached): (_____)_____________________ 
                                                                                      (_____)_____________________ 
E-MAIL ADDRESS: ____________________________________________________ 
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Appendix B 
State Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI) 
Part 1 Directions: A number of statements that people use to describe themselves are 
given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to indicate how 
you feel right now. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on 
any one statement, but give the answer that seems to best describe your present feelings. 
 
  Not At All Somewhat Moderately 
So 
Very 
Much So 
1. I am furious 1 2 3 4 
2. I feel irritated 1 2 3 4 
3. I feel angry 1 2 3 4 
4. I feel like yelling at somebody 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel like breaking things 1 2 3 4 
6. I am mad 1 2 3 4 
7. I feel like banging on the table 1 2 3 4 
8. I feel like hitting someone 1 2 3 4 
9. I am burned up 1 2 3 4 
10. I feel like swearing 1 2 3 4 
 
Part 2 Directions: A number of statements that people use to describe themselves are 
given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number on the answer 
sheet to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not 
spend too much time on any one statement, but give the answer that seems to best 
describe how you generally feel. 
  Almost 
Never 
Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
11. I am quick tempered 1 2 3 4 
12. I have a fiery temper 1 2 3 4 
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  Almost 
Never 
Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
13. I am a hotheaded person 1 2 3 4 
14. I get angry when I’m slowed 
down by others/ mistakes. 
1 2 3 4 
15. I feel annoyed when I am not 
given recognition for doing 
good work 
1 2 3 4 
16. I fly off the handle 1 2 3 4 
17. When I get mad, I say nasty 
things 
1 2 3 4 
18. It makes me furious when I 
am criticized in front of others
1 2 3 4 
19. When I get frustrated, I feel 
like hitting someone 
1 2 3 4 
20. I feel infuriated when I do a 
good job and get a poor 
evaluation 
1 2 3 4 
Part 3 Directions: Everyone feels angry or furious from time to time, but people differ in 
the ways that they react when they are angry. A number of statements are listed below 
which people use to describe their reactions when they feel angry or furious. Read each 
statement and the circle the appropriate number on the answer sheet to indicate how often 
you generally react or behave in the manner described when you are feeling angry or 
furious. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one 
statement. 
WHEN ANGRY OR FURIOUS… Almost 
Never 
Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
21. I control my temper 1 2 3 4 
22. I express my anger 1 2 3 4 
23. I keep things in 1 2 3 4 
24. I am patient with others 1 2 3 4 
25. I pout or sulk 1 2 3 4 
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WHEN ANGRY OR FURIOUS… Almost 
Never 
Sometimes Often Almost 
Always 
26. I withdraw from people 1 2 3 4 
27. I make sarcastic remarks to others 1 2 3 4 
28. I keep my cool 1 2 3 4 
29. I do things like slam doors 1 2 3 4 
30. I boil inside, but I don’t show it 1 2 3 4 
31. I control my behavior 1 2 3 4 
32. I argue with others 1 2 3 4 
33. I tend to harbor grudges that I don’t 
tell anyone about 
1 2 3 4 
34. I strike out at whatever infuriates me 1 2 3 4 
35. I can stop myself from losing my 
temper 
1 2 3 4 
36. I am secretly quite critical of others 1 2 3 4 
37. I am angrier than I am willing to 
admit 
1 2 3 4 
38. I calm down faster than most other 
people 
1 2 3 4 
39. I say nasty things 1 2 3 4 
40. I try to be tolerant and understanding 1 2 3 4 
41. I’m irritated a great deal more than 
people are aware of 
1 2 3 4 
42. I lose my temper 1 2 3 4 
43. If someone annoys me, I’m apt to 
tell him or her how I feel 
1 2 3 4 
44. I control my angry feelings 1 2 3 4 
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Buss Perry Aggression Questionnaire 
Instructions: Following are some statements which may or may not describe YOU. 
Beside each statement, circle the number representing the rating which best describes 
YOU. 
Extremely 
Unlike Me 
Mostly  
Unlike Me 
Somewhat 
 Like Me 
Mostly  
Like Me 
Extremely  
Like Me 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
  Extremely 
Unlike Me 
 
Mostly 
Unlike Me 
Somewhat 
Like Me 
Mostly 
Like Me 
Extremely 
Like Me 
1. Once in a while I can’t 
control the urge to strike 
another person. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I tell my friends openly 
when I disagree with 
them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I flare up quickly but get 
over it quickly. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I am sometimes eaten up 
with jealousy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. At times I feel I have 
gotten a raw deal out of 
life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I often find myself 
disagreeing with people. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. When frustrated, I let my 
irritation show. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8. Given enough 
provocation, I may hit 
another person. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Other people always seem 
to get the breaks. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I sometimes feel like a 
powder keg ready to 
explode. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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  Extremely 
Unlike Me 
Mostly 
Unlike Me 
Somewhat 
Like Me 
Mostly 
Like Me 
Extremely 
Like Me 
 
11.  If somebody hits me, I hit 
back. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. I wonder why sometimes I 
feel so bitter about things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. I am an even-tempered 
person. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. Some of my friends think 
I’m a hothead. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. I get into fights a little 
more than the average 
person. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. If I have to resort to 
violence to protect my 
rights, I will. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. When people annoy me, I 
may tell them what I think 
of them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. I know that “friends” talk 
about me behind my back. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. Sometimes I fly off the 
handle for no good reason. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. There are people who 
pushed me so far that we 
came to blows. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. I am suspicious of overly 
friendly strangers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. I can’t help getting into 
arguments when people 
disagree with me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. I can think of no good 
reason for ever hitting a 
person. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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  Extremely 
Unlike Me 
Mostly 
Unlike Me 
Somewhat 
Like Me 
Mostly 
Like Me 
Extremely 
Like Me 
 
24. I have become so mad that 
I have broken things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. I sometimes feel that 
people are laughing at me 
behind my back. 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. My friends say that I’m 
somewhat argumentative. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. When people are 
especially nice, I wonder 
what they want. 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. I have threatened people I 
know. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. I have trouble controlling 
my temper. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Expectancy Questionnaire for Alcohol and Aggression—Low Dose (EQAAL) 
version  
Instructions: Many people believe that drinking alcohol can influence how angry 
they feel and how aggressive they act. We would like to know how you think 
having a few drinks of alcohol (enough to make you buzzed) affects you. Please 
circle the number that best describes to what extent you agree or disagree with 
each statement below. (If you do not drink at all, you can still fill this out. Just 
answer the questions according to what you think you would feel like if you did 
drink.) 
 
When I have had a few drinks of alcohol I am more likely to: _____________________ 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
1. get furious. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. get angry when I am in 
line to get something and 
someone cuts in front of 
me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. think that people who act 
like they’re being honest 
really have something to 
hide 1 2 3 4 5 6 
4. keep my cool. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. feel angry. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6. get angry if I am trying to 
concentrate, but someone 
keeps making noise. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
7. get frustrated and feel 
like hitting someone 1 2 3 4 5 6 
8. get angry when I need to 
get somewhere in a hurry, 
but I get stuck in traffic. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
9. wonder about the hidden 
reasons if someone does 
something nice for me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
 
10. control my behavior. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
11. fly off the handle. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
12. get angry when I am 
singled out for correction, 
while someone else who 
is doing the same thing is 
ignored. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
13. stop myself from losing 
my temper. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
14. feel like yelling at 
somebody. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
15. get angry with someone 
who looks through my 
things without 
permission. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
16. feel that other people 
always seem to get the 
breaks. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
17. get mad. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
18. get angry when I am 
accused of something I 
didn’t do. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
19. try to be tolerant and 
understanding. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
20. have a fiery temper. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
21. get angry with someone 
who is always 
contradicting me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
22. control my angry 
feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
23. get burned up. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Alcohol-Aggression Items from Various Measures  
Power and Aggression Subscale 
(from the Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (George, Frone, Cooper, Russell, Skinner, & 
Windle, 1995; Rohsenow, 1983). 
Instructions: Please respond to the following statements according to your own personal 
thoughts, feelings and beliefs about alcohol. We are interested in what you think about 
alcohol, regardless of what other people might think. 
  Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Moderately 
Disagree 
Strongly 
1. Drinking makes me 
feel warm and 
flushed. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
5. I feel powerful when 
I drink, as if I can 
really make other 
people do as I want. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
9. If I have had a 
couple of drinks, it 
is easier for me to 
tell someone off. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
16. Drinking makes me 
more aggressive. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
32. I’m more likely to 
get into an argument 
if I’ve had some 
alcohol. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
37. After a few drinks it 
is easier for me to 
pick a fight. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Appendix E (Continued) 
Risk and Aggression Subscale 
(from the Comprehensive Effects of Alcohol scale; Fromme, Stroot, & Kaplan, 1993) 
Instructions: Please respond to the following statements by circling the number that best 
completes the following sentence. 
Disagree Slightly Disagree Slightly Agree Agree 
1 2 3 4 
 
If I were under the influence from drinking alcohol…. 
  Disagree Slightly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Agree 
1.  I would take risks. 1 2 3 4 
2. I would act aggressively. 1 2 3 4 
3. I would be loud, boisterous, or noisy. 1 2 3 4 
4.  I would act tough. 1 2 3 4 
5. I would feel dominant. 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix E (Continued)  
Arousal/Aggression Subscale 
(from the Alcohol Expectancy Questionnaire; Brown, Goldman, Inn, & Anderson, 1980) 
 
Instructions: Read each statement carefully and respond according to your own personal 
thoughts, feelings and beliefs about alcohol now.  We are interested in what you think 
about alcohol, regardless of what other people might think. If you think that the statement 
is true, or mostly true, or true some of the time, then circle "Agree" on the answer sheet.  
If you think the statement is false, or mostly false, then circle "Disagree" on the answer 
sheet.  When the statements refer to drinking alcohol, you may think in terms of drinking 
any alcoholic beverage, such as beer, wine, whiskey, liquor, rum, scotch, vodka, gin, or 
various alcoholic mixed drinks.  Whether or not you have had actual drinking experiences 
yourself, you are to answer in terms of your beliefs about alcohol.   
 
1.         Agree             Disagree Drinking makes me feel flushed 
2.         Agree             Disagree After a few drinks, it is easier to pick a fight 
3.         Agree             Disagree I feel powerful when I drink, as if I can really 
influence others to do as I want 
4.         Agree             Disagree Drinking increases male aggressiveness  
5.         Agree             Disagree At times, drinking is like permission to forget 
problems  
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Appendix E (Continued) 
Aggression Subscale 
(from the Drinking Expectancy Questionnaire; Young, & Knight, 1988) 
 
Instructions: The following questions ask about the effects that drinking alcohol has on 
you. There are no right or wrong answers to these items. We would like to know how you 
feel about them. All that is required is that you circle the appropriate number beside each 
statement, using the following key: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
   
Strongly 
Disagree
 
 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
 
 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
1.  I control my temper 
more easily when 
drinking alcohol. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Little things annoy me 
less when I’m 
drinking. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Drinking increases my 
aggressiveness. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix E (Continued) 
Social Subscale 
(from the Effects of Drinking Alcohol scale; Leigh & Stacy, 1993) 
Instructions: Here are some effects or consequences that some people experience after 
drinking alcohol. How likely is it that these things happen to you when you drink 
alcohol? Please circle the number that best describes how drinkingalcohol would affect 
you. (If you do not drink at all, you can still fill this out; just answer it according to what 
you think would happen to you if you did drink.) 
 
When I drink alcohol: ________________________________ 
  No 
Chance 
Very 
Unlikely Unlikely Likely 
Very 
Likely 
Certain to 
Happen 
1. I become 
aggressive. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. I get into fights. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. I get mean 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Appendix F 
Demographics Questionnaire 
 
Please provide the following background information: 
 
Date of Birth: _____________ 
 
Gender: ____ Male 
             ____ Female 
 
Race/Ethnicity: ____ African American 
                          ____ Asian American 
                          ____ Caucasian 
                          ____ Hispanic 
                          ____ Latino 
                          ____ Native American 
                          ____ Other (Please specify:__________________________________) 
 
Household yearly income (home that you were raised in): 
   ____ Less than $10,000  ____ $40,000 - $79,000  
   ____ $10,000 – $24,999  ____ More than $80,000 
   ____ $25,000 -- $39,999  ____ I do not know our yearly income. 
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Appendix G 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next 
to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way RIGHT NOW, THAT IS, AT 
THIS VERY MOMENT.  Use the following scale to record your answers: 
 
           1                        2                          3                          4                          5 
  very slightly         a little bit           moderately           quite a bit            extremely 
  or not at all 
 
  _____ guilty     _____ determined  
  _____ scared     _____ attentive  
  _____ hostile     _____ jittery  
  _____ enthusiastic    _____ active  
  _____ interested    _____ irritable 
  _____ distressed    _____ alert 
  _____ excited     _____ ashamed 
  _____ upset     _____ inspired 
  _____ strong     _____ proud 
  _____ nervous     _____ afraid 
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Appendix H 
PARAFOVEAL VISUAL TASK WORD PAIRS 
 
Parafoveal 
(Unattended; On the Computer) 
Type Digits Auditory 
(Attended; On the Headphones) 
Word 
(1st of Pair) 
Pixel Position  
(X/Y axis : range in cm)   
 Word 
(2nd of Pair) 
Db Word 
Begin 
Word 
End 
Length 
of .wav 
10 Blank  10 Blank Control (0 “L” words) 
  Odd  27935 1. Bird -1 1.01 1.80 2.002 
  Even 12476 2. Cone -1 1.07 1.78 2.000 
  Odd  71392 3. Dream -1 1.02 1.83 1.999 
  Even 49231 4. Math -1 1.05 1.65 2.000 
  Odd  92758 5. Mint -1 1.04 1.67 2.000 
  Even 25879 6. Porch -1 1.09 1.67 2.000 
  Odd  84167 7. Rhyme -1 0.93 1.83 2.000 
  Even 51683 8. Sheep -1 1.05 1.74 2.002 
  Odd  01589 9. Shirt -1 1.03 1.70 2.002 
  Even 39615 10. Well -1 1.09 1.70 2.000 
10 Practice Words  10 Practice Control (1 “L” word) 
1. Barn Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  52146 1. Calm -1 1.00 1.82 2.001 
2. Dull Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 82651 2. Prune -1 1.07 1.76 2.001 
3. Grace Lf (X-124 : 6.3  – 2.6) Odd  32768 3. Spice -1 0.84 1.82 2.000 
4. Grin Rt (X110 : 2.6 – 5.1) Even 60492 4. Roof -1 1.03 1.72 2.001 
5. Hall Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Even 46280 5. Lack -1 1.04 1.75 2.001 
6. Lend Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd 74325  6. Cough -1 1.10 1.77 2.000 
7. More Lf (X-115 : 5.6 – 2.6) Even 91847 7. Pink -1 1.08 1.81 2.000 
8. Ranch Rt (X127 : 2.6 – 6.3) Odd  08573 8. Shade -1 0.92 1.83 2.002 
9. Truth Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  15904 9. View -1 1.08 1.78 1.999 
10. Yacht Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 28469 10. Then -1 1.04 1.68 2.001 
20 NonAgg Words  20 NonAgg Control (1 “L” word) 
1. Air Lf (X-97 : 4.4 – 2.6) Odd  62793 1. Tent -1 1.12 1.64 2.002 
2. Bake Rt (X115 : 2.6 – 5.3) Even 17428 2. Tube -1 1.02 1.77 2.001 
3. Blank Up (Y87: 2.6  – 3.4) Even 90837 3. Shine -1 0.99 1.80 2.000 
4. Chance Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd  26180 4. Fruit -1 1.03 1.65 2.001 
5. Chill Lf (X-113 : 5.5 – 2.6) Even 83219 5. Truck -1 1.07 1.74 2.002 
6. Crust Rt (X127 : 2.6 – 6.3) Odd  50374 6. Scarf -1 1.00 1.79 2.000 
7. Find Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  38516 7. Pump -1 1.04 1.62 2.001 
8. Five Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 47632 8. Hip -1 1.07 1.65 2.001 
9. Flag Lf (X-108 : 5.3 – 2.6) Odd  71905 9. Mop -1 1.06 1.75 2.000 
10. Groom Rt (X132 : 2.6 – 6.2) Even 08459  10. Up -1 1.13 1.56 2.001 
11. Note Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Even 81625 11. Lamp -1 1.13 1.77 2.000 
12. Plot Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd  24730 12. Frog -1 1.17 1.71 2.000 
13. Rain Lf (X- 106 : 5 – 2.6) Even 90238 13. Spoon -1 0.98 1.86 2.001 
14. Scoop Rt (X128 : 2.6 –6.4) Odd  17584 14. Guide -1 1.03 1.76 2.000 
15. Scrap Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  62103 15. Teach -1 1.04 1.76 2.001 
16. Shop Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 59472 16. Grape -1 1.03 1.76 2.000 
17. Shrimp Lf (X-130 : 6.6 – 2.6) Odd  32941 17. Stamp -1 0.99 1.83 2.000 
18. Space Rt (X124 : 2.6 – 6.1) Even 43628 18. Desk -1 1.05 1.78 2.001 
19. Stew Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Even 71254 19. Fresh -1 0.99 1.80 2.000 
20.Year Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd  08396 20. Mom -1 1.05 1.77 2.001 
20 LoAgg Words 20 LoAgg Control (1 “L” word)  
21. Cage Lf (X-112 : 5.5 – 2.6) Even 91426 21. Reach -1 1.06 1.77 2.000 
22. Dare Rt (X116 : 2.6 – 5.5) Odd  68304 22. Cup -1 1.11 1.69 2.001 
23. Fray Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  59712 23. Blush -1 1.02 1.78 2.001 
24. Fraud Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 27830 24. Laugh -1 1.00 1.81 2.000 
25. Free Lf (X-111 : 5.4 – 2.6) Odd  14589 25. Plum -1 1.21 1.73 2.001 
26.Friend Rt (X129 : 2.6 – 6.5) Even 73625 26. Youth -1 1.06 1.80 2.001 
27. Ghoul Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Even 30257 27. Scale -1 0.97 1.80 2.001 
28. Grief Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd  47152 28. Flunk -1 1.07 1.80 2.000 
29. Hide Lf (X-106 : 5 – 2.6) Even 04863 29. Fool -1 1.19 1.75 2.000 
30. Lie Rt (X96 : 2.6 - 4) Odd  83921 30. Shrub -1 1.10 1.81 2.000 
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31. Like Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  34785 31. Need -1 1.00 1.82 2.001 
32. Make Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 71452 32. Crave -1 1.19 1.80 2.000 
33. March Lf (X-125 : 6.3 – 2.6) Odd  23501 33. Shed -1 1.00 1.80 2.001 
34. Mask Rt (X116 : 2.6 – 5.5) Even 19238 34. Chew -1 1.04 1.76 2.001 
35. Pat Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Even 58614 35. Few -1 1.09 1.80 2.000 
36. Take Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd  48327 36. Age -1 1.13 1.68 2.000 
37. Tight Lf (X-117 : 5.8 – 2.6) Even 60439 37. Scroll -1 0.92 1.85 2.000 
38. Toil Rt (X108 : 2.6 – 4.9) Odd  89106 38. Beach -1 1.02 1.65 2.000 
39. Trap Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  05983 39. Cheese -1 1.02 1.76 2.000 
40. Urge Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 92840 40. Great -1 1.15 1.66 2.000 
20 AmbAgg 20 AmbAgg Control (0 “L” words) 
41. Bang Lf (X-114 : 5.4 – 2.6) Odd  62793 41. Key -1 1.11 1.67 2.000 
42. Beat Rt (X114 : 2.6 – 5.1) Even 17428 42. Frost -1 0.93 1.86 2.000 
43. Bruise Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Even 90837 43. Have -1 1.03 1.81 2.001 
44. Chop Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd  26180 44. Film -1 1.04 1.70 2.000 
45. Curse Lf (X-125 : 6.2 – 2.6) Even 83219 45. Food -1 1.01 1.83 1.999 
46. Cut Rt (X108 : 2.6 – 4.8) Odd  50374 46. Feel -1 1.04 1.77 2.000 
47. Grab Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd 38516 47. Boat -1 1.10 1.78 2.000 
48. Guard Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 47632 48. Yawn -1 0.99 1.83 2.000 
49. Hit Lf (X-98 : 4.3 – 2.6) Odd  71905 49. Spell -1 1.02 1.80 2.001 
50. Lash Rt (X114 : 2.6 – 5.3) Even 08459  50. Scrub -1 1.01 1.80 2.000 
51. Mad Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Even 81625 51. Hint -1 1.11 1.67 2.001 
52. Mob Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd  24730 52. Guess -1 1.05 1.66 2.001 
53. Punch Lf (X-126 : 6.3 – 2.6) Even 90238 53. Store -1 1.10 1.71 2.001 
54. Push Rt (X116 : 2.6 – 5.5) Odd  17584 54. Room -1 1.11 1.79 2.003 
55. Rude Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  62103 55. Mist -1 1.06 1.67 2.000 
56. Stern Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 59472 56. Brave -1 1.18 1.79 2.001 
57. Strike Lf (X-126 : 6.3 – 2.6) Odd  32941 57. Broom -1 1.14 1.76 2.001 
58. Tank Rt (X116 : 2.6 – 5.5) Even 43628 58. Share -1 1.09 1.81 2.000 
59. Tough Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Even 71254 59. Feed -1 1.03 1.72 2.001 
60. Whip Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd  08396 60. Rose -1 1.09 1.74 2.001 
20 HiAgg Words 20 HiAgg Control Words (1 “L” word) 
61. Brawl Lf (X-127 : 6.3 – 2.6) Even 91426 61. Stream -1 1.00 1.80 2.001 
62. Feud Rt (X114 : 2.6 – 5.4) Odd  68304 62. Stock -1 1.00 1.80 2.000 
63. Fight Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  59712 63. Tape -1 1.10 1.63 2.001 
64. Fist Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 27830 64. Care -1 1.22 1.67 2.001 
65. Force Lf (X-124 : 6.2 – 2.6) Odd  14589 65. Chair -1 1.13 1.72 2.001 
66. Gun Rt (X110 : 2.6 – 4.9) Even 73625 66. Mud -1 1.15 1.75 2.000 
67. Harm Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Even 30257 67. Moon -1 1.07 1.65 2.000 
68. Hurt Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd  47152 68. Shell -1 1.08 1.78 2.001 
69. Kill Lf (X-104 : 4.7 –  2.6) Even 83921 69. Shape -1 0.97 1.86 2.001 
70. Rage Rt (X116 : 2.6 – 5.5) Odd  04863 70. Pouch -1 1.22 1.75 2.001 
71. Rape Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  34785 71. Wheat -1 1.18 1.68 2.001 
72. Scold Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 71452 72. Race -1 1.11 1.74 2.000 
73. Scream Lf (X-136 : 7 – 2.6) Odd  23501 73. Lake -1 1.14 1.75 2.000 
74. Shoot Rt (X128 : 2.6 – 6.3) Even 19238 74. Book -1 1.05 1.75 2.001 
75. Shot Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Even 58614 75. Touch -1 1.17 1.66 2.001 
76. Shout Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd  48327 76. Cute -1 1.21 1.71 2.001 
77.Shove Lf (X-124 : 6.2 – 2.6) Even 60439 77. Green -1 1.16 1.77 2.000 
78. Spank Rt (X125 : 2.6 – 6.1) Odd  89106 78. Horse -1 1.12 1.80 2.000 
79. Stab Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  05983 79. Park -1 1.14 1.72 2.000 
80. Yell Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 92840 80. Gum -1 1.22 1.70 2.001 
10 Random Blanks  10 Control Words (1 “L” word) 
  Odd  27935 1. Cake -1 1.21 1.69 2.000 
  Even 12476 2. Dusk -1 1.12 1.72 2.001 
  Odd  71392 3. List -1 1.11 1.80 2.001 
  Even 49231 4. Play -1 1.13 1.80 2.001 
  Odd  92758 5. Short -1 1.10 1.74 2.000 
  Even 25879 6. Show -1 1.14 1.81 2.001 
  Odd  84167 7. Spin -1 0.95 1.84 2.001 
  Even 51683 8. Train -1 1.14 1.85 2.000 
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  Odd  01589 9. Turn -2 1.19 1.78 2.000 
  Even 39615 10. Your -1 1.07 1.83 2.000 
10 Final Practice Words 10 Final Practice Control Words (3 “L” words) 
1. Card Lf (X-115 : 5.5 – 2.6) Odd  52146 1. Heart -1 1.18 1.79 2.001 
2. Dig Rt (X100 : 2.6 – 4.3) Even 82651 2. Lean -1 1.16 1.77 2.000 
3. Dough Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Odd  32768 3. Gloss -1 1.14 1.82 2.000 
4. Droop Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Even 60492 4. Last -1 1.08 1.81 2.001 
5. Kind Lf (X-108 : 4 – 2.6) Even 46280 5. Lunch -1 1.13 1.82 1.999 
6. News Rt (X119 : 2.6 – 5.7) Odd 74325  6. Mile -1 1.13 1.73 2.001 
7. North Up (Y87 : 2.6  – 3.4) Even 91847 7. Wait -1 1.12 1.85 2.001 
8. Please Dn (Y-90 : 2.6 – 3.4) Odd  08573 8. Street -1 1.15 1.84 2.000 
9. Proud Lf (X-127 : 6.3 – 2.6) Odd  15904 9. Vast -1 1.04 1.82 2.001 
10. Taste Rt (X124 : 2.6 – 5.9) Even 28469 10. Shoe -1 1.15 1.82 2.000 
Total Parafoveal Words = 100 Total Auditory Words = 120; Total “L” words = 8 
 
DICHOTIC LISTENING TASK WORD PAIRS 
 
Unattended Channel  
of Headphones 
Attended Channel 
of Headphones 
Length 
of .wav 
Type Digits 
Word 
(1st of Pair) 
Db Word 
Begin 
Word 
End 
Word (2nd of 
Pair) 
Db Word 
Begin 
Word 
End 
  
10 Blank 10 Blank Control (1 “L” words)   
    1. Cough -1 1.18 1.69 2.000 Odd  27935 
    2. Less -1 1.20 1.75 2.000 Even 12476 
    3. Good -1 1.10 1.70 2.001 Odd  71392 
    4. Math -1 1.18 1.77 2.002 Even 49231 
    5. News -1 1.06 1.78 2.001 Odd  92758 
    6. Please -1 1.06 1.77 1.999 Even 25879 
    7. Rhyme -1 1.06 1.75 2.002 Odd  84167 
    8. Soft -1 1.11 1.80 2.002 Even 51683 
    9. Stray -1 1.08 1.80 2.000 Odd  01589 
    10. Taste -1 1.19 1.72 2.002 Even 39615 
10 Practice 10 Practice Control (1 “L” words)   
1. Barn -19 1.03 1.84 1. Bird -1 1.03 1.71 2.000 Odd  52146 
2. Kind -19 1.06 1.88 2. Calm -1 1.06 1.84 2.000 Even 82651 
3. Dull -19 1.19 1.78 3. Dig -1 1.20 1.78 2.000 Odd  32768 
4. Grin -19 1.14 1.66 4. Grace -1 1.14 1.74 2.000 Even 60492 
5. Heart -19 1.12 1.77 5. Hall -1 1.14 1.84 1.999 Even 46280 
6. Last -19 1.10 1.84 6. Lunch -1 1.10 1.73 2.000 Odd 74325  
7. Spin -19 1.00 1.88 7. Spice -1 1.04 1.89 2.001 Even 91847 
8. Shade -19 1.05 1.87 8. Short -1 1.07 1.74 2.000 Odd  08573 
9. Train -19 1.08 1.83 9. Truth -1 1.08 1.71 2.001 Odd  15904 
10. View -19 1.06 1.80 10. Vast -1 1.03 1.81 2.001 Even 28469 
20 NonAgg Words 20 NonAgg Control (0  “L” words)   
1. Air -19 1.12 1.77 1. Age -1 1.12 1.79 2.000 Odd  62793 
2. Bake -19 1.16 1.66 2. Beach -1 1.16 1.73 1.999 Even 17428 
3. Blank -19 1.20 1.78 3. Blush -1 1.20 1.79 2.001 Even 90837 
4. Chance -19 1.16 1.80 4. Chew -1 1.19 1.73 2.000 Odd  26180 
5. Chill -19 1.04 1.77 5. Cheese -1 1.04 1.81 2.001 Even 83219 
6. Crust -19 1.13 1.76 6. Crave -1 1.13 1.80 2.002 Odd  50374 
7. Find -19 1.00 1.85 7. Few -1 1.00 1.63 2.000 Odd  38516 
8. Five -19 1.03 1.83 8. Fool -1 1.03 1.70 2.001 Even 47632 
9. Flag -19 1.00 1.87 9. Flunk -1 1.00 1.87 1.999 Odd  71905 
10. Groom -19 1.11 1.66 10. Great -1 1.12 1.82 2.000 Even 08459  
11. Note -19 1.15 1.76 11. Need -1 1.15 1.84 2.000 Even 81625 
12. Plot -19 1.19 1.76 12. Plum -1 1.19 1.77 2.001 Odd  24730 
13. Rain -19 1.16 1.83 13. Reach -1 1.19 1.80 2.001 Even 90238 
14. Scoop -19 1.03 1.71 14. Scale -1 1.03 1.85 2.001 Odd  17584 
15. Scrap -19 1.03 1.80 15. Scroll -1 1.03 1.80 2.000 Odd  62103 
16. Shop -19 1.10 1.85 16. Shed -1 1.13 1.80 1.999 Even 59472 
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17. Shrimp -19 1.05 1.85 17. Shrub -1 1.07 1.85 2.000 Odd  32941 
18. Space -19 1.01 1.85 18. Spoon -1 1.01 1.76 2.000 Even 43628 
19. Stew -19 1.19 1.82 19. Stamp -1 1.18 1.79 2.001 Even 71254 
20. Year -19 1.12 1.81 20. Youth -1 1.18 1.73 2.002 Odd  08396 
 
20 LoAgg Words 
 
20 LoAgg Control (2 “L” words) 
  
21. Cage -19 1.08 1.84 21. Cup -1 1.14 1.53 2.000 Even 91426 
22. Dare -19 1.14 1.85 22. Desk -1 1.14 1.81 2.000 Odd  68304 
23. Fraud -19 1.02 1.88 23. Fresh -1 1.05 1.83 2.000 Odd  59712 
24. Fray -19 1.10 1.81 24. Frost -1 1.10 1.88 2.000 Even 27830 
25. Free -19 0.99 1.78 25. Frog -1 1.02 1.88 1.999 Odd  14589 
26. Friend -19 1.05 1.85 26. Fruit -1 1.08 1.68 2.002 Even 73625 
27. Ghoul -19 1.00 1.89 27. Guide -1 1.00 1.89 2.000 Even 30257 
28. Grief -19 1.26 1.75 28. Grape -1 1.27 1.71 1.999 Odd  47152 
29. Hide -19 0.97 1.89 29. Hip -1 1.09 1.64 1.999 Even 04863 
30. Lie -19 1.16 1.80 30. Laugh -1 1.16 1.80 2.002 Odd  83921  
31. Like -19 1.10 1.77 31. Lamp -1 1.12 1.79 1.998 Odd  34785 
32. Make -19 1.16 1.73 32. Mist -1 1.17 1.75 1.999 Even 71452 
33. March -19 1.10 1.78 33. Mop -1 1.10 1.79 2.002 Odd  23501 
34. Mask -19 1.16 1.78 34. Mom -1 1.08 1.69 1.999 Even 19238 
35. Pat -19 1.17 1.73 35. Pump -1 1.20 1.73 2.001 Even 58614 
36. Take -19 1.20 1.65 36. Tent -1 1.20 1.68 1.999 Odd  48327 
37. Tight -19 1.20 1.67 37. Teach -1 1.20 1.72 2.002 Even 60439 
38. Toil -19 1.20 1.74 38. Tube -1 1.20 1.79 2.000 Odd  89106 
39. Trap -19 1.22 1.79 39. Truck -1 1.22 1.71 2.000 Odd  05983 
40. Urge -19 1.19 1.78 40. Up -1 1.20 1.61 1.999 Even 92840 
20 AmbAgg Words 20 AmbAgg Control (1 “L” word)   
41. Bang -19 1.10 1.85 41. Boat -1 1.10 1.68 2.002 Odd  62793 
42. Beat -19 1.16 1.76 42. Book -1 1.17 1.72 2.002 Even 17428 
43. Bruise -19 1.16 1.77 43. Brave -1 1.15 1.80 2.000 Even 90837 
44. Chop -19 1.10 1.79 44. Chair -1 1.13 1.80 2.001 Odd  26180 
45. Curse -19 1.20 1.79 45. Cute -1 1.20 1.68 2.000 Even 83219 
46. Cut -19 1.19 1.64 46. Care -1 1.19 1.75 2.001 Odd  50374 
47. Grab  -19 1.12 1.80 47. Green -1 1.15 1.78 2.002 Odd 38516 
48. Guard -19 1.19 1.86 48. Gum -1 1.19 1.74 2.002 Even 47632 
49. Hit -19 1.20 1.69 49. Horse -1 1.20 1.78 1.999 Odd  71905 
50. Lash -19 1.07 1.85 50. Lake -1 1.13 1.61 2.000 Even 08459  
51. Mad -19 1.01 1.87 51. Moon -1 1.00 1.81 2.001 Even 81625 
52. Mob -19 1.08 1.81 52. Mud -1 1.10 1.70 2.001 Odd  24730 
53. Punch -19 1.13 1.81 53. Park -1 1.13 1.70 2.000 Even 90238 
54. Push -19 1.11 1.64 54. Pouch -1 1.10 1.81 2.001 Odd  17584 
55. Rude -19 1.12 1.78 55. Race -1 1.12 1.80 2.000 Odd  62103 
56. Stern -19 1.01 1.88 56. Stock -1 1.05 1.72 2.000 Even 59472 
57. Strike -19 1.12 1.79 57. Stream -1 1.15 1.83 2.002 Odd  32941 
58. Tank -19 1.20 1.74 58. Touch -1 1.21 1.71 2.000 Even 43628 
59. Tough -19 1.23 1.73 59. Tape -1 1.23 1.70 2.000 Even 71254 
60. Whip -19 1.28 1.68 60. Wheat -1 1.29 1.72 1.999 Odd  08396 
20 HiAgg Words 20 HiAgg Control (0 “L” words)   
61. Brawl -19 1.20 1.80 61. Broom -1 1.20 1.77 1.999 Even 91426 
62. Feud -19 1.07 1.79 62. Film -1 1.08 1.80 1.999 Odd  68304 
63. Fight -19 1.15 1.70 63. Feed -1 1.13 1.80 2.000 Odd  59712 
64. Fist -19 1.20 1.79 64. Feel -1 1.20 1.76 2.000 Even 27830 
65. Force -19 1.08 1.70 65. Food -1 1.08 1.84 1.999 Odd  14589 
66. Gun -19 1.11 1.81 66. Guess -1 1.12 1.75 2.000 Even 73625 
67. Harm -19 1.02 1.88 67. Hint -1 1.02 1.64 2.001 Even 30257 
68. Hurt -19 1.18 1.74 68. Have -1 1.18 1.80 2.001 Odd  47152 
69. Kill -19 1.11 1.77 69. Key -1 1.11 1.84 2.002 Even 04863 
70. Rage -19 1.12 1.79 70. Room -1 1.12 1.68 2.001 Odd  83921 
71. Rape -19 1.12 1.63 71. Rose  -1 1.11 1.81 2.002 Odd  34785 
72. Scold -19 1.00 1.81 72. Scarf -1 1.00 1.74 1.999 Even 71452 
73. Scream -19 1.03 1.80 73. Scrub -1 1.03 1.83 2.000 Odd  23501 
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74. Shoot -19 1.06 1.60 74. Shine -1 1.06 1.80 2.002 Even 19238 
75. Shot -19 1.11 1.74 75. Share -1 1.10 1.81 1.999 Even 58614 
76. Shout -19 1.00 1.75 76. Shell -1 1.01 1.81 2.001 Odd  48327 
77. Shove -19 1.10 1.78 77. Shape -1 1.05 1.80 2.000 Even 60439 
78. Spank -19 1.05 1.85 78. Spell -1 1.06 1.81 2.000 Odd  89106 
79. Stab -19 1.01 1.88 79. Store -1 1.02 1.79 2.000 Odd  05983 
80. Yell -19 1.13 1.79 80. Yawn -1 1.12 1.80 1.999 Even 92840 
10 Blank 10 Blank Control (0 “L” words)   
    1. Cake -1 1.20 1.70 1.999 Odd  27935 
    2. Dusk -1 1.12 1.72 2.001 Even 12476 
    3. Mint -1 1.17 1.74 2.001 Odd  71392 
    4. Play -1 1.19 1.77 2.000 Even 49231 
    5. Porch -1 1.11 1.80 2.000 Odd  92758 
    6. Read -1 1.14 1.76 1.999 Even 25879 
    7. Slurp -1 1.15 1.81 2.001 Odd  84167 
    8. Snore -1 1.05 1.79 2.000 Even 51683 
    9. Street -1 1.13 1.78 2.003 Odd  01589 
    10. Thumb -2 1.18 1.77 2.000 Even 39615 
10 Practice Words 10 Practice Control (2 “L” words)   
1. Card -19 1.10 1.85 1. Cone -1 1.10 1.70 2.000 Odd  52146 
2. Dream -19 1.22 1.78 2. Droop -1 1.22 1.70 1.999 Even 82651 
3. Lack -19 1.16 1.71 3. Lean -1 1.16 1.76 2.001 Odd  32768 
4. Lend -19 1.20 1.77 4. List -1 1.20 1.77 2.001 Even 60492 
5. More -19 1.19 1.75 5. Mile -1 1.19 1.75 2.000 Even 46280 
6. Proud -19 1.17 1.80 6. Prune -1 1.18 1.80 2.002 Odd 74325  
7. Shoe -19 1.06 1.80 7. Shirt -1 1.06 1.78 2.000 Even 91847 
8. Show -19 1.15 1.76 8. Sheep -1 1.15 1.75 2.001 Odd  08573 
9. Wait -19 1.20 1.78 9. Well -1 1.20 1.77 2.001 Odd  15904 
10. Yacht -19 1.18 1.80 10. Your -1 1.19 1.81 1.999 Even 28469 
Total Unattended Words = 100 Total Attended Words = 120; Total “L” Words = 7 
 
Note. NonAgg = NonAggressive Words; LoAgg = Low Aggressive Words;  AmbAgg = Ambiguously 
Aggressive Words; HiAgg = High Aggressive Words. Words obtained from Nelson, McEvoy, & 
Schreiber’s (1999) normed database of words and their associated links. 
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Recognition Task 
Instructions: Some of the following words were presented to you on the computer task 
that you just completed. Please check off any words that you think you heard. 
_____ mop   [LoA Control] _____ shine [HiA Control] 
_____ shop [NonA] _____ bench [New] 
_____ film [AmbA Control] _____ grab [AmbA] 
_____ arm [New] _____ bend [New] 
_____ beach [NonA Control] _____ cute [AmbA Control] 
_____ shout [HiA] _____ hate [New] 
_____ play [BL Control] _____ kind [New] 
_____ pump [NonA Control] _____ shave [New] 
_____ touch [AmbA Control] _____ up [LoA Control] 
_____ give [New] _____ trick [New] 
_____ patch [New] _____ harsh [New] 
_____ crave [NonA Control] _____ broom [HiA Control] 
_____ march [LoA] _____ last [New] 
_____ fun [New] _____ gun [HiA] 
_____ take [LoA] _____ screen [New] 
_____ find [NonA] _____ rude [AmbA] 
_____ ram [New] _____ please [New] 
_____ mean [New] _____ laugh [LoA Control] 
_____ hard HiA Control] _____ maim [New] 
_____ feast 
 
[New] _____ gum [AmbA Control] 
 
Also, please list any words you think you heard that are not on the above list. 
__________          __________          __________          __________          __________ 
__________          __________          __________          __________          __________ 
What do you think the purpose of this experiment was? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
Did this experiment remind you of any other experiments that you have participated in?  
______ No, it did not remind me of any other experiments. 
______ Yes, and the experiment was about ____________________________________ 
   and it reminded me because _________________________________________ 
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Calculation of Standard Ethanol Consumption (SEC) units using part of the  
Comprehensive Drinker Profile (Marlatt & Miller, 1986) 
Steady Pattern Chart 
If the client drinks at least once per week complete the Steady Pattern Chart, then 
complete Q/F data summary. (If client does not drink at least once per week, proceed to 
the Episodic Pattern Chart.) For each time period enter the type of beverage, % alcohol, 
amount consumed, and approximate time span during which it was consumed. 
 
 Morning Afternoon Evening Total for Day 
Mon  
 
   
 
 
___________ 
Total SECs 
Monday 
Tues     
 
 
___________ 
Total SECs 
Tuesday 
Wed     
 
 
___________ 
Total SECs 
Wednesday 
Thur     
 
 
___________ 
Total SECs 
Thursday 
Fri     
 
 
 
 
___________ 
Total SECs 
Friday 
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Sat     
 
 
 
 
 
___________ 
Total SECs 
Saturday 
Sun     
 
 
 
 
 
___________ 
Total SECs  
Sunday 
 
Formula for calculating SECs: # oz. X % alcohol x 2 = SECs 
A. TOTAL SECs per week    ___________ 
B. TOTAL drinking (nonabstinent days) reported: ___________ 
C. AVERAGE SECs per drinking day (A/B): ___________ 
D. ESTIMATED Peak BAC for week:  ___________ 
 
Quantity/Frequency Summary Data (Steady Drinking Pattern Only)  
Total SECs per week from table:   [               ] SECs per week 
Multiply by 13 weeks         X   13 
       ------------ 
Total SEC’s in past 3 months:  =  [              ] SECs (From Steady Pattern 
Chart Only)     
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Episodic Pattern Chart (Periodic and Combination Patterns Only; For Steady Drinkers, 
skip to Pattern History.) 
 
Type and Amount 
of Beverage Consumed: 
 
 
Number of 
Episodes in past 3 
months: 
 
 
Multiply Quantity 
(SECs per episode) by 
Frequency (episodes per 
3 months) for each 
episode type: 
 
         
 
 
 
 
*Total SECs per episode: __________ 
                            *Hours: ______ 
                     *Peak BAC: ______ mg % 
 
 
 
 
 
X   ___________ 
episodes per 3 mo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 =  ________________ 
      SECs per 3 months 
         
 
 
 
 
 
*Total SECs per episode: __________ 
                            *Hours: ______ 
                     *Peak BAC: ______ mg % 
 
 
 
 
 
X   ___________ 
episodes per 3 mo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 =  ________________ 
      SECs per 3 months 
         
 
 
 
 
 
*Total SECs per episode: __________ 
                            *Hours: ______ 
                     *Peak BAC: ______ mg % 
 
 
 
 
 
X   ___________ 
episodes per 3 mo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 =  ________________ 
      SECs per 3 months 
 
For COMBINATION PATTERN DRINKERS, subtract from this 
total the number of SECs already accounted for in the Steady 
Pattern Chart and record here only SECs in excess of the steady 
drinking pattern. No drink should be counted on both charts. For 
PERIODIC DRINKERS, however, record all drinks here (since for 
these drinkers the Steady Pattern Chart is left blank). 
 
 
_______________ 
Grand Total SECs 3 mo. 
from all episodic 
drinking 
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Total Q/F  
Add the Total SECs from the 
Quantity/Frequency Summary Data section   ____________ 
to the Grand Total SECs  
from the Episodic Pattern Chart              +     ____________ 
 
for Total Q/F SECs for past 3 mos          =     ____________ 
 
Pattern History 
What is the largest amount of alcohol that you have ever drunk in one day? 
 
 Beverage    Amount 
 
___________________  _____________________ 
 
___________________  _____________________ 
___________________  _____________________ 
___________________  _____________________ 
___________________  _____________________ 
  Over ____________ Hours 
Total SECs: ______________  Estimated Peak BAC: ____________ mg% 
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Debriefing Statement for Phase I 
You were asked to respond to statements regarding personality characteristics and 
expectations you may hold about a variety of behaviors. Research indicates that some of 
our personality characteristics (such as being more or less aggressive) may be related to 
the expectations we hold about certain behaviors (such as drinking). Today you filled out 
some measures that may support or refute this research.       
 
Thank you very much for participating. If you have questions or concerns please contact 
Dr. James Epps at (813) 974-0388 or Michelle LeVasseur at (813) 974-1520. 
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Debriefing Statement for Phase II 
 
Today you completed a computer task designed to measure the interference of aggression 
stimuli (and for some, alcohol stimuli) on attention. Research suggests that those who are 
higher on certain personality characteristics may show more attentional interference to 
certain types of information (in this case, some aggression-related stimuli) that are 
presented on headphones (auditorily) or on a computer monitor (visually). During Phase I 
(several weeks ago), we measured your expectancies (with a variety of questionnaires) 
about how you would behave after drinking alcohol or how aggressive you consider 
yourself typically to be. We then asked for volunteers to participate in another study 
(Phase II) that was supposed to be unrelated to Phase I. The time delay and the deception 
were both necessary so that you would not be more reactive to alcohol and aggression 
stimuli simply because you had recently been asked many questions about those 
constructs. The decisions you made on the computer task (odd vs. even numbers) 
provided us with a measure of reaction time. Reaction times gave us an indication of 
whether aggressive words interfered with your ability to attend to the computer task more 
than nonaggressive words. 
 
Thank you very much for participating. Please do not discuss this experiment with other 
students until they have completed the experiment. If you have questions or concerns, 
contact Dr. James Epps at (813) 974-0388 or Michelle LeVasseur at (813) 974-1520. If 
you would like to learn more about these topics please refer to the following references: 
 
 
1. Bargh, J. A., Bond, R. N., Lombardi, W. J., & Tota, M. E. (1986). The additive 
nature of chronic and temporary sources of construct accessibility. Journal of 
Personality & Social Psychology, 50(5), 869-878. 
2. Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (2000). The mind in the middle: A practical 
guide to priming and automaticity research. In H. T. Reis & C. M. Judd (Eds.), 
Handbook of research methods in social and personality psychology. (pp. 253-
285). New York City: Cambridge University Press. 
3. Chermack, S. T. & Taylor, S. P. (1995). Alcohol and human physical aggression: 
Pharmacological versus expectancy effects. Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 56(4), 
449-456. 
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